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Abstract
In recent years, the analysis of household nancial decision making has become
the main focus for both policymakers and academics. Hence this thesis rst sets
out to investigate the role of household nancial literacy and psychological charac-
teristics in household nancial decisions. The results suggest that nancial literacy
is signicantly associated with household nancial management and practices such
as credit management, cash-ow management, retirement saving and investment.
Further, while exploring the importance of stock market literacy on household
decision to participate in the stock market, it is found that stock market literacy
and trust distinctly inuence the probability of household participation in the stock
market. Furthermore, stock market literacy not only increases the likelihood of par-
ticipation but also inuences the share of wealth invested in the stock market. Also,
economic shocks and future expectations are the key psychological characteristics
that explain household decision to invest in stocks. However, upon participation,
a larger set of psychological characteristics such as, past economic shock, future
expectations, self-condence, and time preference inuence a household decision
on how much to invest in stocks. Finally, the thesis examines the unwise nancial
decisions of households in usecured debt management, credit card debt, mortgage
debt management and investment diversication. The results show that nancial
distress and poverty increase the likelihood of households making unwise nancial
decisions. However, nancial distress is found to outperform poverty in explaining
the unwise nancial decision of the households. Thus, the thesis brings to light the
importance of nancial literacy, psychological characteristics and nancial distress
for understanding household nancial decision making.
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1 Introduction
The nancial ruin created by the ongoing economic crisis has changed the world
for millions of people across the globe. This situation has led to an increased
sense of urgency in understanding the household nancial decision making to fos-
ter a resilient economy and avoid the anticipated nancial apocalypse. Academic
researchers and policy makers attempt to comprehend how households, through
their nancial decision making, interact with the nancial sector. This interaction
plays a notable role in the household nancial health and functioning of the econ-
omy, as it a¤ects both the conduct of monetary policy and stability of nancial
system.
This thesis attempts to reach a better understanding of the household nancial
decision making by simultaneously investigating the household nancial manage-
ment, practices and participation. Because the household nancial behavior and
attitude take an incomprehensible range of forms, the key aspects are studied
by analyzing the household overall nancial management, retirement saving, cash
ow management, credit management, investment management, and stock mar-
ket participation. In addition, the household unwise nancial decision making is
examined in di¤erent areas of nance such as unsecured debt management, credit
card debt management, mortgage debt management and investment diversication
management.
While analyzing the household nancial decision making, researchers report
di¤erent household characteristics relating to di¤erent nancial decisions. For
example Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly, (2003) report relationship between nan-
cial knowledge and cash ow management, credit management, saving, and in-
vestment. Cole, Sampson and Zia (2009) associate household expenditure, risk
aversion, and fatalism with interest in commitment saving and deposit collector
products. And Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013) relate investors cognitive
1
ability to stock market participation. This thesis specically focuses on the impact
of household nancial awareness on di¤erent aspects of household nancial be-
havior. For this purpose, indices for household nancial literacy and stock market
literacy are instituted, while taking into account important aspects of nancial and
stock markets. This work is motivated by the considerable ndings in the existing
literature arguing that nancial literacy is imperative for the nancial wellbeing
of both households and overall economy. Such literacy enables the households to
make better nancial decisions. Academic researchers, such as Hilgert, Hogarth,
and Beverly (2003), Muller and Weber (2010), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b), and
Hogarth and ODonnell (1999) nd a positive relation between household nancial
literacy and nancial decision making. Moreover, public and private institutions in
developed and developing countries believe that by delivering nancial education,
important nancial and psychological changes in the households can be achieved.
In addition to the household nancial literacy, important psychological char-
acteristics are considered by creating measures for the household psychological
characteristics such as sociability, economic shock, time preference, future ex-
pectations, self-condence, sense of commitment, risk aversion, and trust. The
existing literature also points towards the importance of household psychologi-
cal characteristics in the understanding nancial decision making. For example,
Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003) and Behrman et al. (2010) argue that the
psychological characteristics such as procrastination, regret, risk aversion, gen-
erosity, and peer pressure have important implications for the household nancial
behavior.
The rst core investigation in this thesis, conducted in Chapter 2, analyzes the
relationship of household nancial literacy and other key psychological characteris-
tics with household nancial management. Previously, Hilgert, Hogarth, and Bev-
erly (2003), Muller and Weber (2010), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b), and Hogarth
and ODonnell (1999) nd a positive relation between household nancial literacy
2
and nancial management. In contrast, Cole and Shastry (2009) do not nd any
signicant relation between household nancial literacy or nancial education pro-
grams and nancial management. This is at least in part because di¤erent studies
employ di¤erent measures, techniques, and variables to dene and analyze the
household nancial literacy and nancial management. In order to investigate the
household nancial literacy and nancial management, this study rst institutes
indices for household nancial literacy and overall nancial management, while
taking into account important aspects of nancial knowledge and nancial man-
agement. These household indices are developed by using the American Life Panel
(ALP) datasets that provide a wide range of variables.1 In this study, the house-
hold nancial literacy index is measured by using twenty nine items from the Ba-
sic Financial Literacy, Investing, Life Insurance/Annuities, and General 401K/IRA
Knowledge sub-modules of Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009).2 Simultaneously, the
household overall nancial management index is created on the concept adopted
by Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003). The overall nancial management index
is based on twenty two aspects of household nancial management, categorized
as retirement saving, cash ow management, credit management, and investment
management. This study uses a di¤erent strategy as compared to the ones adopted
by Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009), and Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003) by
performing categorical principal component (CATPCA) analysis to create nan-
cial literacy and nancial management indices. The concept of optimal scaling
originated by di¤erent researchers with Guttman (1941) being the rst to intro-
duce it. This strategy makes provision for the discrepancies of normal principal
component analysis on categorical data, giving more reliable indices (Breiman and
Friedman, 1985; Gilula and Haberman, 1988; Hastie et al., 1994). In addition to
1ALP makes it possible to measure the household nancial literacy and nancial management,
and construct proxies for a wide range of household psychological characteristics. Further details
on ALP are provided in Section 2.2.
2Later in the thesis, other denitions and measurement concepts of nancial literacy are
utilized.
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the household overall nancial management, this chapter separately analyzes dif-
ferent aspects of household nancial management. For this purpose, the measures
for household retirement saving, cash ow management, credit management, and
investment management are developed. Another value addition this study brings
in the existing literature is that along with household nancial literacy and key
demographics indicators, the analysis takes into consideration the key psycholog-
ical variables describing the household attitudes, beliefs, and personality.3 In this
chapter, important demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education,
employment, income, and expense indicators are considered. This chapter also
develops and uses measures for the household psychological characteristics such as
sociability, economic shock, time preference, future expectations, self-condence,
sense of commitment, and risk aversion.
The rst notable nding of this chapter is that nancial literacy is strongly
associated with the household overall nancial management and also with the indi-
vidual aspects of household nancial management such as retirement saving, credit
management, and investment. Financial literacy consistently explains the nan-
cial management even when key demographics and psychological characteristics of
the households are accounted for. In addition, the results show that psychological
characteristics also signicantly explain the household nancial management.4 This
study further reports that some household characteristics have di¤erent nature and
strength of relationship with di¤erent aspects of nancial management. For ex-
ample, employment is positively related to investment management but negatively
related to cash ow management. In the robustness check, this chapter utilizes
di¤erent measures of nancial literacy that has been widely used in the existing
literature (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). For example Lusardi and Mitchell (2006),
3Along with demographics, it is important to consider the household psychological charac-
teristics for example, Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003), Lusardi (2003), and Behrman et al.
(2010) acknowledge that without the inclusion of important psychological aspects, the investi-
gation of household nancial decision making will be biased.
4In particular, some psychological characteristics such as exposure to economic shock consis-
tently explain many aspects of household nancial management.
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Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), and Lusardi and Tufano (2009) use three fundamental
concepts such as capacity to do interest rates calculations, understanding of ina-
tion and understanding of risk diversication to determine nancial literacy. This
chapter also tests for the robustness of nancial literacy by utilizing three items
on interest rate, ination and risk diversication from Hung, Parker, and Yoong
(2009) nancially literacy scale. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) recently performed
a comprehensive comparison of di¤erent types of approaches used to measure -
nancial literacy.5 The results with this alternative measure of nancial literacy
show that nancial literacy explains the household overall nancial management,
retirement saving, credit management, and investment management. This chapter
further tests for the widely used self-reported measure of nancial awareness by
the respondents. Following Lusardi (2011), Lusardi and Tufano (2009) and Lusardi
and Mitchell (2009) and Bucher-Koenen, Lusardi, Alessie and van Rooij (2012),
the self-reported measure of nancial literacy is used to investigate its relation with
nancial decision making. The results suggest that the self-reported measure of
nancial literacy explains all the nancial decisions with varying levels of signi-
cance. Further this chapter addresses the endogeneity problem, which is the most
discussed issue in investigating the linkage between nancial literacy and nancial
decision making. Previous studies suggest that nancial management may itself
be a source of nancial learning as people do learn through experience (Caskey,
2006; Behrman et al., 2010;Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij ,Lusardi and
Alessie, 2007; Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly, 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).6
5It is found that the percentage of households responding correctly to the three items in this
work is in close comparison with the scores reported across the studies mentioned by Lusardi
and Mitchell (2014). Further, the percentage of households responding correctly in all three
questions in this study is similar to the percentage reported in the studies mentioned by Lusardi
and Mitchell (2014).
6Many studies are unable to address the endogeneity issue due to unavailability of adequate
data in the existing surveys. Some authors are able to test for endogeneity by using di¤erent
instrument variables as a proxy for nancial literacy. For example, Christiansen, Joensen, and
Rangvid (2008) used the opening of a new university in a local, Klapper, Lusardi, and Panos
(2012) used the number of public and private universities in the Russian regions and the total
number of newspapers in circulation, Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) instrumented nancial literacy
using the fact that di¤erent U.S. states mandated nancial education in high school at di¤erent
5
This chapter uses the exposure to economics education as an instrument vari-
able for nancial literacy as used by van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2012), The
question that are used from American Life Panel (ALP) asks the households how
much of their schools education (high school, college or higher degrees) was de-
voted to economics, where possible responses are a lot, some, little and hardly
at all/none. The results suggest that the instrument variable employed in this
work signicantly explains overall nancial management, credit management and
investment management of the households. Therefore, this study concludes that
nancial literacy, measured on the basis of varying concepts, explain the nancial
decision making of the households.
After determining the relationship between household nancial literacy and their
nancial behavior, the chapter goes on investigating the gap between household
nancial management and nancial literacy. This gap is referred to as household
nancial spread and measured by subtracting the household overall nancial be-
havior scores from the nancial literacy scores, where the higher the di¤erence
between the household nancial literacy and overall nancial behavior, the higher
is the household nancial spread. This spread is used to determine two segments
of population that are households having higher nancial management as com-
pared to other households at a given level of nancial literacy (negative nancial
spread) and having lower nancial management as compared to other households
at a given level of level of nancial literacy (positive nancial spread). This iden-
tication is used to determine what characteristics of the households explain the
likelihood of having lower nancial management as compared to other households
at a given level of nancial literacy. The results show that household age positively
explains the likelihood of having lower nancial management as compared to the
level of nancial awareness. The di¤erence attributes to the lack of incentive for
the older households to manage nance as compared to the younger households.
points in time and they interacted these mandates with state expenditures.
6
Additionally, male households are found to be more likely to have lower nancial
management in comparison to their nancial literacy. These results fall in line with
the ndings of Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) suggesting that males are less risk
averse and of Brake (2005) reporting that males have more responsibilities to man-
age, hence their nancial management can be a¤ected. Further, it is observed that
future expectations of the households positively relates to the probability of having
positive nancial spread while, risk aversion negatively relates to the likelihood of
having a positive nancial spread. The risk-averse households tend to avoid risk
and therefore may have better nancial management at a given level of nancial
literacy.
The Chapter 3 carries out the second core investigation of this thesis by explor-
ing the inuence of stock market literacy on household decisions related to stock
market.7 Recently, Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) assess the joint impact of trust
and sociability on stock market participation. They show that trust and sociability
a¤ect stock ownership through distinct channels, where mistrust lowers the ex-
pected return on investment, making stock market participation unattractive, and
sociability serves to reduce the xed cost of participation through cheaper infor-
mation sharing. Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) document that the more sociable
households reduce their participation costs through cheaper information sharing,
thereby increasing participation.8 On the other hand, Bönte and Filipiak (2012)
7Recent literature suggests that household participation in the stock market is driven by fac-
tors such as optimism (Puri and Robinson, 2007), trust in nancial markets (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2008), intelligence quotient (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2011), ge-
netics (Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010), political orientation (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011),
the ability to understand investment (Graham, Harvey, and Huang, 2009; Christelis, Jappelli,
and Padula, 2010), stock market return experience (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), educational
attainment and nancial sophistication (Christelis, Georgarakos, and Haliassos, 2011), nancial
literacy (Cardak and Wilkins, 2009; Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011), cognitive ability
(Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2013), and sociability (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004; Bönte
and Filipiak, 2012).
8The literature identies di¤erent categories of participation cost for example, Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) categorizes participation costs as xed entry costs, xed and variable transac-
tion costs and per period trading costs and Andersen and Nielsen (2011), Haliassos and Bertaut
(1995), and Campbell (2006) report xed entry or ongoing participation costs to be the leading
explanation for non-participation in the stock market.
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report that the household investment decisions are not strongly a¤ected by their
social interaction, once the households are aware of shares, bonds and mutual
funds. They observe that although social interaction may not inuence investment
in nancial instruments directly, word-of-mouth communication a¤ects individuals
awareness of nancial instruments, thereby indirectly a¤ecting investment. Simi-
larly, van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) nd that nancial literacy plays a key
role in understanding the non-participation puzzle. They show that the households
with low nancial literacy are signicantly less likely to invest in stocks. Based
on the reports, this study suggests that sociability may actually act as a proxy for
the household stock market literacy, and hence introducing stock market literacy,
which is the aggregate product of stock market knowledge and awareness, should
capture the e¤ect of sociability on stock market participation. Hence, the evi-
dence for the distinct roles of trust and sociability on stock ownership observed by
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) can be explained by the unique and distinct e¤ects
of trust and stock market literacy on participation. As in Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2008), this study denes trust as the rm reliance on the characteristics
of the nancial system such as sound management, quality of investor protection,
and e¤ective regulation and supervision.9
Unlike Chapter 2, which uses a general measure of nancial literacy, an index for
stock market literacy is developed by using the investing sub-module of ALP Finan-
cial Literacy survey of Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009). The stock-market-specic
literacy index is related to the understanding of the stock market and measures the
household knowledge of investing in stocks directly or indirectly through mutual
funds or investment accounts. In this way, the analysis is able to reduce the noise in
capturing the household knowledge of stock market and study its impact on stock
ownership. In addition, the household level of sociability is measured by utilizing
9The household level of trust in the stock market cannot necessarily be associated with their
knowledge about the stock market. Knowing about the market does not make the market
trustworthy.
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the broader denition of sociability employed by Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004),
and Georgarakos and Pasini (2011), among others. Based on this denition, the
households are considered sociable if they participate in formal training, make do-
nations of money or possessions totaling $500 or more, participate in volunteer
work, or spend time helping friends, neighbors, or relatives. Finally, the household
trust more specic to the household trust relating to stock market investment de-
cisions is utilized to reduce the noise in measuring trust. The household trust in
stock market is measured by analyzing three questions about household level of
trust in stock market, trust in stockbrokers, and trust in investment advisers.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by reassessing the previously
documented inuence of sociability on stock market participation, once the house-
hold stock market literacy is taken into account. Further, this chapter utilizes a
theoretical framework to understand the distinct e¤ects of stock market literacy
and trust on stock ownership. Third, unlike previous studies which use general
nancial literacy questions to measure nancial knowledge, this work constructs
a stock-market-specic literacy index that is related to the understanding of the
stock market and measures the household knowledge of investing in stocks directly
or indirectly through mutual funds or investment accounts.10 Fourth, using the rich
set of data on household behavior characteristics, this study is able to addition-
ally test for various psychological factors inuencing stock market participation.
In particular, the impact of economic shock, time preference, future expectations,
self-condence, sense of commitment, and risk aversion on stock ownership is
measured. In this way, this study is also able to distinguish the e¤ects of stock
market literacy and trust from other psychological characteristics.11 Previous stud-
ies allude to the signicant impact of psychological characteristics on stock market
10In this way, this study is able to reduce the noise in capturing the household knowledge of
the stock market and study its impact on stock ownership.
11For instance, by modeling the impact of both trust and stock market literacy in the empirical
analysis this study is able to separate their distinct e¤ects, although the two characteristics might
often be understood synonymously.
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participation, but fail to test adequately for these e¤ects due to data constraints.
Hence this study lls a noticeable gap in the literature by considering a wide range
of psychological characteristics.
The empirical tests show that stock market literacy and trust in stock mar-
ket, the two distinct channels of inuence, simultaneously a¤ect the probability
of household participation in stock market. In addition, before considering the
household stock market literacy, signicant relationship for sociability is obtained.
However, it is observed that the impact of sociability vanishes when stock mar-
ket literacy is considered in the analysis. Hence, the results suggest that what
matters is stock market literacy, rather than sociability, which can be one source
of inuencing stock market literacy. Furthermore, stock market literacy not only
increases the likelihood of participation but also inuences the share of wealth in-
vested in stock market. In addition, economic shock and future expectations are
the key psychological characteristics that explain a households decision to invest
in stocks; however upon participation, a larger set of psychological characteristics
such as economic shock, future expectations, self-condence, and time preference
are found to inuence a household decision on how much to invest in stocks. The
investigation also show that the household stock market literacy is negatively as-
sociated with their stock market participation cost. In addition, it is observed that
age and employment are also negatively related to stock market participation cost.
In the separate investigation on what explains stock market participation among
high sociability and low sociability households, it is found that stock market liter-
acy is strongly signicant for both high sociability and low sociability households.12
Moreover, although sociability is signicant for both groups initially, it becomes
insignicant once stock market literacy is considered. Also, it is observed that the
12For the segregation purpose, proxy for sociability is used that denes households to be
sociable if they participate in formal training, make donations of money or possessions totaling
$500 or more, participate in volunteer work, or spend time helping friends, neighbors, or relatives.
Using this proxy, the high sociability households are dened as those that participate in two or
more sociable activities and low sociability households are dened as those that participate in at
most one sociable activity.
10
trust in stock market is highly signicant only for high sociable household groups.
The results conrm that no matter how sociable a household is, stock market
literacy signicantly explains their probability of owning stocks. It is also observed
that sociability is insignicant for high sociable but low stock market literate house-
holds. As expected, stock market literacy is insignicant for this household group
and trust remains strongly signicant. For the low sociable but high stock market
literate household groups, stock market literacy remains a signicant determinant
of participation. While testing if sociability dened through other denition can
explain stock market participation, it is observed that the alternative sociability
measure is positive and remains signicant in the presence of trust.13 However,
corroborating the previous ndings of this study, when stock market literacy in
the model specications is introduced, the signicant association of sociability on
stock market participation vanishes, while stock market literacy remains signi-
cant, along with trust. This chapter also addresses the arguments maintaining
that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient for a variable of interest cannot be compared
across the groups as done in the sociability and stock market literacy based group
analysis.14 This chapter utilizes interaction term between stock market literacy
and sociability to determine their conditional e¤ects on stock market participation.
The results show that stock market literacy consistently explains the stock market
participation decision of the households who are not social at all. On the other
hand, it is found that sociability does not explain the likelihood of participating
in the stock market of the households who have no stock market literacy. From
the interaction term, it can be concluded that the e¤ect of stock market literacy
are independent of the e¤ect of sociability on stock market participation decision.
Further, it is observed that for both completely non-social and stock market illiter-
13The household participation in national elections is used as an alternative denition for socia-
bility is used. Previous studies such as Rogers, Gerber, and Fox (2012) argue that participation
in elections is a volunteering act for society and fundamentally a social behavior.
14This study does not compare the magnitude of the coe¢ cients, and it is only used to
determine whether stock market literacy and sociability explain the stock market decisions of the
di¤erent groups.
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ate households, trust explains both the likelihood and the proportion of investment
in stocks. Hence, the results obtained in this chapter do not provide supportive
evidence of participation explained by social interactions with cheaper information
sharing, and peer-group e¤ects; however participation is found to be explained by
the household level of stock market literacy and trust.
The nal core investigation of this thesis, presented in Chapter 4, analyzes the
aspects of household nancial decision making ability by studying their unsecured
debt management, credit card debt management, mortgage debt management and
investment diversication management. This chapter proposes that in addition to
exploring the household nancial market participation, it is crucial to determine
whether the households are able to perform suitable nancial trades/transactions.
Numerous evidences suggest that households make poor nancial decisions, how-
ever, it is di¢ cult to pin down why and which households make such nancial
decisions.15 It is widely accepted that households make poor or unwise nancial
decisions because nancial decisions are complex, require trade-o¤s between the
present and the future, require assessing risk and uncertainty, involve emotions,
and permit little learning from past mistakes (Erta et al., 2013).16 Numerous
studies link poor or unwise nancial decision making with psychological biases of
the nancially week households.17 For example, Banerjee (2000), Bertrand et al.
(2004), Duo (2006), and Hall (2008) advocate that shortage of nancial resources
15Poor nancial decisions studied so far in the literature include lack of checking accounts
(Hilgert et al., 2003), excess interest rate and fee payments (Agarwal et al., 2009), use of high
interest payday loans (Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman, 2009), suboptimal use of credit card
balance transfer o¤ers (Agarwal et al., 2009), intentional credit card non-payment (Massoud
et al., 2006), inability to renance mortgage (Agarwal et al., 2012), non-participation in equity
markets (Cole and Shastry, 2009; Li, 2012; Calvet et al. (2007), highly concentrated portfolios
(Korniotis and Kumar, 2011; Calvet et al., 2007), disposition e¤ect (Calvet et al., 2009), inertia
in trading (Calvet et al., 2009), excessive trading (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011).
16In determining which segments of population make poor nancial decisions, numerous evi-
dences suggest that the shortage of money and adequate living conditions faced by the nancially
troubled households can a¤ect their decision making (Orwell, 1937; Scott, 1977; Karelis, 2007;
Banerjee, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2004; Duo, 2006; Hall, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011).
17In behavioural biases, lack of self-control (Skiba and Tobacman, 2008), over-optimism
(Mann, 2013), over-condence (Barber and Odean, 2001), inattention (Agarwal et al., 2012;
Mann 2013), scarcity (Mani et al. 2013) and lack of nancial experience and knowledge (Stango
and Zinman 2009) are found to explain household nancial decision making.
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can modify behavior either by making the nancially weak households desperate
or vulnerable. Moreover, Baumeister et al. (1998) report that nancially weak
households have more temptations to resist, that rich can fulll easily, resulting
in willpower depletion. While limited cognitive control argument suggests that
cognition control is limited that is depleted when making decisions under the inu-
ence of limited nancial resources (Robinson et al., 2010).18 On the other hand,
Mullainathan and Shar (2013) dene shortage of nancial resources as scarcity,
where scarcity constraints negatively inuences ones decision making due to the
overload of managing limited nancial resources.19
In the existing literature, poverty is widely used as an indicator of the nancial
fragility of household. Since poverty only concerns income, it is a narrow classi-
cation of household nancial hardship. The broader denition should consider
the total assets and debt households carry (Social Progress, 2009; Brandolini et
al., 2010).20 In this study, following Brown and Taylor (2008), nancial distress
is measured through household net worth, where the household with negative net
worth is dened as nancially distressed.21 Furthermore, this work includes income
based measure of nancial hardship to determine its association with unwise nan-
cial decisions of households. The income based nancial hardship is referred to
as poverty and is determined by comparing pre-tax household income against the
threshold set at three times the cost of a minimum food diet in 1963 by United
States Census Bureau. The di¤erence of income and corresponding poverty thresh-
18Cognitive control is also found to a¤ect other behavioral attitudes such as impatience (Shiv
and Fedorikhin, 1999).
19Di¤erent population segments face di¤erent forms of scarcity such as nancially troubled
households face the scarcity of money while the richer segment faces the scarcity of time, and
both segments face the scarcity of will-power. Though with di¤erent intensities, each scarcity
taxes the cognitive capacity of that population segment.
20Studies that use wealth based measures of nancial hardship such as net worth in under-
standing the nancial decision making of the households include Barwell et al. (2006), Brown
and Taylor (2008) and Christelis et al. (2009).
21The net wealth consists of net of debt values of household farm, business, checking and
saving accounts, stocks, vehicles, bond funds, cash value in a life insurance policy, valuable
collection for investment purposes, rights in a trust or estate minus credit card and store card
debts, student loans, outstanding medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives.
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old captures the depth of poverty, where the higher the di¤erence, the higher is
the level of poverty.
In line with the ndings of Orwell (1937), Scott (1977) and Karelis (2007), this
chapter nds that both measures of nancial hardship, namely nancial distress
and poverty, positively explain the likelihood of making unwise nancial decisions.
However, nancial distress is found to outperform poverty by explaining all the
unwise nancial decisions with signicantly higher marginal e¤ects as compared to
the e¤ects of poverty. Moreover, while investigating the level of unwise nancial
decisions, it is found that nancial distress positively explains the level of di¢ -
culty faced in paying o¤ credit card debt and investment under-diversication, and
negatively explains the mortgage debt to income ratio. Further it is found that
nancial distress has signicant e¤ects on nancial decisions that are independent
of the nancial decisions made in previous period. On the other hand, it is found
that the households who made unwise nancial decisions in previous period are
not necessary more likely to make unwise nancial decisions in current period in
presence of nancial distress.22
To investigate if certain segments of the poor pass their values, attitudes and
behaviors to their o¤-spring, this chapter tests if householdschildhood poverty
can explain their poor nancial behavior in later age. The results obtained suggest
that what matters in nancial decision making is the household own nancial
hardship irrespective of their nancial circumstances during childhood. Later in
the chapter, it is investigated if there is any association between exposure to
economics education and nancial decision making.23 The results signify that
economics education negatively associates with the likelihood of making unwise
credit card debt and investment diversication decisions, unsecured debt to income
22In other words, households who make unwise nancial decisions due to nancial distress do
not necessarily repeat the same mistake when facing nancial distress in future.
23Exposure to economics education is determined by using the questions that ask if households
have taken course in economics during their rst, second or third college education. If the
households took a course in economics in any of the college, they are considered having exposure
to economics education.
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ratio, di¢ culty in paying o¤ credit card debt and investment under-diversication.
With the addition of economics education, nancial distress retains signicance
in explaining unwise nancial decisions, while poverty loses the signicance of
association with all unwise decisions in presence of economics education indicator.
The overall ndings of this chapter show that nancially distress is overarching
in explaining the household nancial decision making by accurately indicating the
nancial scarcity or hardship. This inference is in line with the recommendations
of Stiglitz (2009) advising use of stock of debt and assets in measuring household
nancial hardship. Further, in line with the argument of Brandolini et al. (2010),
it is recommended that the policy makers and practitioners should also consider
nancially distress households as economically deprived segment eligible for public
benets that are provided to poor population segment.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the
chapter on household nancial literacy and nancial management, Chapter 3 con-
sists of chapter on household stock market literacy, trust and participation, Chap-
ter 4 gives the chapter on nancial distress, poverty and nancial decision making,
Chapter 5 presents the limitations and further research, and Chapter 6 concludes:
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2 Household nancial literacy and nancial
management
This chapter examines the importance of nancial literacy in explaining the nan-
cial management of the households. Using American Life Panel (ALP) surveys,
measures for household nancial literacy and attitude and beliefs are developed to
investigate di¤erent aspects of household nancial decision making. The household
psychological and demographic characteristics are included to control for their ef-
fect on nancial decision. The results points towards a strong association of house-
hold nancial literacy with di¤erent aspects of nancial management. Specically,
overall nancial management, retirement saving, credit management, and invest-
ment management related decisions are found to be explained by the household
nancial literacy. In addition, a large set of psychological characteristics, in partic-
ular economic shock, is found to be associated with di¤erent aspects of household
nancial management. It is further observed that household di¤erent character-
istics are related to di¤erent aspects of nancial behaviour. Simultaneously, the
results suggest that di¤erent household characteristics explain the probability of
having lower nancial management as compared to other households at a given
level of nancial literacy.
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2.1 Introduction
"As we recover from the worst economic crisis in generations, it is more
important than ever to be knowledgeable about the consequences of our nancial
decisions. (President Obama, 2011)
The above statement by the President of United States reects the importance
of nancial literacy in enabling consumers to engage in appropriate decision mak-
ing in relation to their personal nances. Such literacy is even more important in
periods of economic downturn such as the current nancial crisis. In this situation,
it is imperative for the individual investors to make careful nancial decisions that
ensure their nancial wellbeing as well as the wellbeing of whole economy. Pub-
lic and private institutions in developed and developing countries believe that by
delivering nancial education, essential nancial capability can be delivered to the
households. For example, the U.S. Presidents Advisory Council on Financial Lit-
eracy, the UKs Money Advice Service, the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission, the Reserve Bank of Indias Project Financial Literacy, the Center for
Financial Services Innovation (CFI)s Financial Capability Innovation Fund, and
the Citigroups nancial education curriculum have been established in an e¤ort to
improve the household nancial awareness, with an expectation of instigating the
household e¢ cient nancial market participation.
Primarily, this chapter attempts to reach a clear understanding of the relation-
ship between household nancial literacy and nancial management, in presence
of their nancial attitudes and beliefs. In the existing literature, the ndings of
nancial literacy relationship with nancial management and attitude are mixed.
For example, Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003), Muller and Weber (2010),
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b), and Hogarth and ODonnell (1999) nd a positive
relation between household nancial literacy and nancial behaviour. In contrast,
Cole and Shastry (2009) do not nd any signicant relation between household
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nancial literacy or nancial education programs and nancial decisions. This is
at least in part because di¤erent studies employ di¤erent measures, techniques,
and variables to dene and analyze the household nancial literacy and nancial
behaviour.24 This chapter argues that in order to e¤ectively and credibly measure
the inuence of nancial literacy on nancial management, there needs to be con-
sistency of denitions and mode of measurements for both nancial literacy and
nancial management.
In order to investigate the household nancial literacy and nancial manage-
ment, this study rst institutes indices for household nancial literacy and overall
nancial management, while taking into account important aspects of nancial
knowledge and nancial management. These household indices are developed
by using the American Life Panel (ALP) datasets that provide a wide range of
variables. In this study, the household nancial literacy index is measured by
using twenty nine items from the Basic Financial Literacy, Investing, Life Insur-
ance/Annuities, and General 401K/IRA Knowledge sub-modules of Hung, Parker,
and Yoong (2009). Simultaneously, the household overall nancial management
index is created on the concept adopted by Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003).
The overall nancial management index is based on twenty two household nan-
cial behaviours, categorized as retirement saving, cash ow management, credit
management, and investment management. This study uses a di¤erent strategy
as compared to the ones adopted by Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009), and Hilgert,
Hogarth, and Beverly (2003) by performing categorical principal component (CAT-
PCA) analysis to create nancial literacy and nancial management indices. The
concept of optimal scaling originated by di¤erent researchers with Guttman (1941)
being the rst to introduce it. This strategy makes provision for the discrepancies
of normal principal component analysis on categorical data, giving more reliable
indices (Breiman and Friedman, 1985; Gilula and Haberman, 1988; Hastie et al.,
24See Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a), and Lusardi and Tufano
(2009) for examples.
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1994).
In addition to the household overall nancial management, this chapter sep-
arately analyzes di¤erent aspects of household nancial management. For this
purpose, the measures for household retirement saving, cash ow management,
credit management, and investment management are developed. Another value
addition this study brings in the existing literature is that along with household
nancial literacy and key demographics indicators, the analysis takes into considera-
tion the key psychological variables describing the household attitudes, beliefs, and
personality. Along with demographics, it is important to consider the household
psychological characteristics for example, Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003),
Lusardi (2003), and Behrman et al. (2010) acknowledge that without the inclu-
sion of important psychological aspects, the investigation of household nancial
decision making will be biased. In this chapter, important demographic character-
istics such as gender, age, education, employment, income, and expense indicators
are considered. This chapter also develops and uses measures for the household
psychological characteristics such as sociability, economic shock, time preference,
future expectations, self-condence, sense of commitment, and risk aversion.
The rst notable nding of this study is that nancial literacy is strongly associ-
ated with the household overall nancial management and also with the individual
aspects of household nancial management such as retirement saving, credit man-
agement, and investment management. Financial literacy consistently explains the
household nancial management even when key demographics and psychological
characteristics of the households are accounted for. In addition, the results show
that psychological characteristics also signicantly explain the household nancial
management. In particular, some psychological characteristics such as exposure
to economic shock consistently explain many of the aspects of household nan-
cial management. This study further reports that some household characteristics
have di¤erent nature and strength of relationship with di¤erent aspects of nan-
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cial management. For example, employment is positively related to investment
management but negatively related to cash ow management.
In order to gain further understanding of the household nancial management,
this study develops nancial spread by subtracting the household overall nancial
management score from nancial literacy score, where the higher the di¤erence
between the household nancial literacy and overall nancial management, the
higher is the household nancial spread. This nancial spread is used to investigate
what explains the di¤erence between household nancial literacy and nancial
management. The nancial spread helps in identifying two types of households
that are households who have negative nancial spread and households who have
positive nancial spread. In other words, households who have relatively lower
nancial management as compared to other household and households who have
relatively higher nancial management as compared to other households at a given
level of nancial literacy are identied.
The results obtained through probit specication report that age of the house-
holds positively explains the likelihood of having a positive nancial spread. In other
words, older households are more likely to have a lower nancial management as
compared to their level of nancial awareness. These estimates suggest that older
household have less nancial management not because of their level of nancial
capability but the di¤erence attributes to the lack of incentive for the older house-
holds to manage nance as compared to the younger households. Additionally, it is
found that male households are more likely to have lower nancial management in
comparison to their nancial literacy. These results fall in line with the ndings of
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) suggesting that males are less risk averse and of
Brake (2005) reporting that males have more responsibilities to manage. Further,
it is observed that future expectations of the households positively relates to the
probability of having positive nancial spread. Finally, it is found that risk aver-
sion negatively relates to the likelihood of having a positive nancial spread. The
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risk-averse households tend to avoid risk and therefore may have better nancial
management at a given level of nancial literacy. Further, while investigating the
household nancial spread by utilizing the di¤erence of nancial literacy behavior
score tested through ordinary least square specication, it is found that age, sex
and risk aversion explain the di¤erence of nancial literacy and nancial behavior.
Further, it is found that sense of commitment negatively relates to the nancial
literacy-management gap.
As a robustness check, the nal section in this chapter utilizes di¤erent mea-
sures of nancial literacy that has been widely used in the existing literature
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). For example Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), Lusardi and
Mitchell (2007) and Lusardi and Tufano (2009) use three fundamental concepts
such as ability to do interest rates calculations, understanding of ination and un-
derstanding of risk diversication to determine nancial literacy. This section also
tests for the robustness of nancial literacy by utilizing three items on interest rate,
ination and risk diversication from Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009) nancially
literacy scale. First, the scores on these items are compared with the scores re-
ported in earlier studies that used similar measure of nancial literacy. Lusardi and
Mitchell (2014) recently carried out a comprehensive comparison of di¤erent types
of approaches used to measure nancial literacy. It is found that the percentage of
households in the sample responding correctly to the three items is in close com-
parison with the scores reported across the di¤erent approaches studied by Lusardi
and Mitchell (2014). Further, the percentage of households responding correctly
in all three questions in this study is similar to the percentage reported in other
studies. The results with this alternative measure of nancial literacy show that
nancial literacy retains its signicance in explaining the household overall nancial
management, retirement saving, credit management, and investment management.
Another measure of nancial literacy widely used is the self-reported level of nan-
cial awareness by the respondents. Following Lusardi (2011), Lusardi and Tufano
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(2009), Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) and Bucher-Koenen, Lusardi, Alessie and van
Rooij (2012), this section uses the self-reported measure of nancial literacy to
investigate its relation with nancial decision making. The results suggest that
the self-reported measure of nancial literacy explains all the nancial decisions
with varying levels of signicance. It suggests that the estimates of self-reported
measure of nancial literacy are consistent with the ndings of previous authors
who have used such measure in their work.
The nal step of the robustness check, addresses the endogeneity problem,
which is the most discussed issue in investigating the linkage between nancial
literacy and nancial decision making. Many studies suggest that care has to be
taken while analyzing the impact of nancial literacy on nancial management
and practices because the nancial management may itself be a source of nan-
cial learning as people do learn through experience (Caskey, 2006; Behrman et
al., 2010;Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij ,Lusardi and Alessie, 2007; Hilgert,
Hogarth and Beverly, 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). However, numerous stud-
ies are unable to address the endogeneity issue due to unavailability of adequate
data in the existing surveys. Some authors are able to test for endogeneity by
using di¤erent instrument variables as a proxy for nancial literacy. For example,
Christiansen, Joensen, and Rangvid (2008) used the opening of a new university
in a local, Klapper, Lusardi, and Panos (2012) used the number of public and
private universities in the Russian regions and the total number of newspapers in
circulation, Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) instrumented nancial literacy using the
fact that di¤erent U.S. states mandated nancial education in high school at dif-
ferent points in time and they interacted these mandates with state expenditures.
Following van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2012), exposure to economics education
is used as an instrument variable for nancial literacy in this study. The question
that is used from American Life Panel (ALP) asks the households how much of
their schools education (high school, college or higher degrees) was devoted to
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economics, where possible responses are a lot, some, little and hardly at all/none.
The results suggest that the instrument variable employed in this work signicantly
explains overall nancial management, credit management and investment man-
agement of the households. Therefore, this study concludes that nancial literacy
dened and measured on the basis of diverse concepts explain the nancial decision
making of the households.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the
data and variables, Section 2.3 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Data and variables
To test the association of nancial management with nancial literacy and key
psychological characteristics of the households, this chapter uses the data from
American Life Panel (ALP) that consists of over 340 diverse surveys and 6,000
representative samples of U.S. consumers aged 18 or above.25 ALP surveys capture
a rich information set that is of scientic and policy interest covering expectations,
opinions, nancial participation and circumstances, cognition, and demographics.26
Hence it makes it possible to measure the household nancial literacy and nancial
management, and construct proxies for a wide range of household psychological
characteristics. The interviews are conducted via an internet-based panel and
take advantage of its computerized nature with visualization and interactive tools
25Other databases such as the DNB Household Survey (DHS) of Dutch households and the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) database of multidisciplinary
and cross-national household data do not contain adequate information on household nancial
literacy and stock market participation. For example, although DHS contains information on
stockholding status and nancial literacy, the number of households that actually possess stocks
is very low. For instance, in the 2012 wave, only 218 households out of the 2155 responding
households possess stocks. In addition, only 170 households shared information on the amount
of money invested in stocks. For the SHARE database, it is found that there is no information
on household nancial literacy and investment in nancial assets.
26The sampling weights are constructed by ALP to correct for the sampling error and to
make the sample as representative of the population of interest as possible. Following common
practice in surveys of consumers, ALP uses three weighting methods that are cell-based post
stratication, logistic regression and raking.
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supporting the implementation of state of the art experiments with feedback and
preloading. Further, the survey questions are also customized for clients who
have special requirements, thereby increasing the diversity of surveys. Chang and
Krosnick (2010) show that the self-administered computer-based surveys facilitate
optimal responding, with higher concurrent validity, less survey satiscing, and
less social desirability response bias than in the intercom mode, especially among
households with limited cognitive skills. Moreover, question orders and response
choices are randomly assigned in order to avoid any response biases due to the
order in which they appear.
This study utilizes several ALP surveys in which the panel of respondent is same
but response rates are di¤erent. The survey with lowest response rate that is used
is the E¤ects of the Financial Crisis survey with average response rate and sample
size as 79% and 1,800 respectively, while the average response rate of all surveys
used is around 90%. HRS, which is one of the most related databases to ALP has
similar response rate, ranging between 81 to 89 percent. The primary unit of study
is household where data acquired such as family income, nancial management,
family expenses and household size are that of the household , while other nancial
literacy and demographic and psychological characteristics represent that of the
household head who is considered primary decision maker in the household.
The following sections describe the construction of the household nancial
literacy, nancial management, and demographics and psychological indices and
indicators.
2.2.1 Measuring nancial literacy
The measures of nancial literacy used in the existing studies are often crude
and inconsistent. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007a), and Lusardi and Tufano (2009) use three questions to determine nan-
cial literacy of their sample. In contrast, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) determine
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nancial literacy based on ve multiple-choice basic nancial literacy items and
eight multiple choice sophisticated nancial literacy items. Lusardi (2008) adopts
a broad strategy by creating two nancial literacy indices that are basic and ad-
vanced indices. The author develops basic nancial literacy index through three
questions regarding interest rates, the e¤ects of ination, and the concept of risk
diversication and advanced nancial literacy through questions about risk and
return, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, and basic asset pricing. van Rooij, Lusardi,
and Alessie (2011) also adopt a similar strategy by developing basic and advanced
nancial literacy indices.27
This study uses the ALP Financial Literacy survey by Hung, Parker, and Yoong
(2009) to develop an index for nancial literacy. This survey was in the eld
between March 2009 and September 2009 with a response rate of 85.87%. The
response rate for this survey is higher than other prominent nancial literacy surveys
such as DNB Household survey and Chen and Volpe survey having response rate
of 74% and 51% respectively, while response rate for the Jump$tart survey is less
than 50%. Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009) scale contains ve basic nancial
literacy items, eight sophisticated nancial literacy items, ve additional items
on investment markets and products and ve items related to general retirement
accounts knowledge. Finally, the Life Insurance subscale consists of four items
on life insurance and annuity products. Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009) conduct
a battery of tests to assess the construct validity and nd strong reliability and
internal consistency, with a highest cronbach alpha as compared to other prominent
nancial literacy scales. Appendix 2.1 presents the items used from Hung, Parker,
and Yoong (2009) nancial literacy survey to develop nancial literacy index. Since
the item responses are a mix of nominal and ordinal data, unlike previous studies
that use linear principal component analysis, this work uses categorical principal
component analysis (CATPCA) to construct the household nancial market literacy
27Other denitions and measurement concepts of nancial literacy are tested in Section 2.4.
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index. CATPCA, the earliest version given by Guttman (1941), is the non-linear
equivalent of linear PCA that has been developed for e¢ ciently handling categorical
variables and nonlinear relationships. Since Guttman (1941), CATPCA has evolved
with the major contributions coming from Kruskal (1965), Shepard(1966), Kruskal
and Shepard (1974), Young et al. (1978), and Winsberg and Ramsay (1983).
In the analysis the number of dimensions is set to twenty nine, which is the
number of items in the nancial literacy questionnaire. In order to nd how many
components signicantly explain the variance of the household data, Kaisers cri-
terion is used. According to Kaisers criterion, only principal components having
eigenvalue greater than one are considered essential and should be retained. It
is suggested that this criterion is most reliable when the number of variables is
between 20 and 50. Since there are more than 20 items in the nancial literacy
questionnaire, this criterion is used to determine signicant components. Columns
1 and 2 of Table 2.1 report the results of CATPCA analysis of the household -
nancial literacy index. The optimal scaling level of all items is set to ordinal. The
results show that there are eight signicant dimensions with eigenvalues greater
than one, explaining 52% of the variance of the data. In addition to eigenvalues,
CATPCA also provides object scores that are individual scores of households in
each dimension. These scores are used to create nancial literacy index by taking
weighted average sum of all signicant components, where the eigenvalues provide
the weight of each dimension. The sum of score is then scaled to lie between
the range of zero and one to create household nancial literacy index. In order
to determine the association between di¤erent questions in the nancial literacy
survey and dimensions obtained by the CATPCA, Appendix 2.4 presents the cen-
troid cooridinates of each question in each dimension. The centroid coordinates
provide the average of object scores of all cases for a particular category on each
dimension. These scores show the contribution of each category in each dimen-
sion. For example, it is found that dimension 1 of nancial literacy index is mostly
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explained by the knowledge of mutual funds and whole life insurance, dimension 2
is mostly explained by knowledge of 401k and IRA plans knowledge and dimension
3 is mostly explained by knowledge of stocks and bonds. Looking at other dimen-
sions, it can be seen that each dimension captures a particular set of household
nancial knowledge.
The descriptive statistics of Table 2.2 show that the households, on average,
report around 60% correct answers. This average score is compatible with other
nancial literacy surveys such as in Jump$tart respondents score an average of
57% in 1997 with reduced scores reported in subsequent years. In DNB Household
survey and Chen and Volpe (1998), respondents, on average, are correct 60% and
53% times respectively.
2.2.2 Measuring overall nancial management
Unlike other studies that focus on one aspect of household nancial management
while studying the relationship between household nancial literacy and nancial
decision making, this study focuses on household overall nancial management
covering di¤erent aspects of household nancial decision making.28 In this study,
the household overall nancial management index is developed by utilizing the
concept used by Hilgerth, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003). Their nancial practice
indices are based on eighteen nancial behaviours of households, covering the
household basic money management and sophisticated skills. The indices also
include information regarding the use of thirteen nancial products, which ranges
from savings and checking accounts to credit cards, mortgages, home equity loans,
and investment. The indices are categorized as cash ow management, credit
management, saving, and investment management.
The overall nancial management index in this chapter is based on twenty two
28For example, van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) focus on stock market, Behrman,
Mitchell, Soo and Bravo (2010) focus on wealth accumulation, and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a)
and (2007b) focus on retirement planning in their papers.
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aspects of household nancial management, categorized as cash ow management,
credit management, retirement saving, and investment management. Appendix
2.2 presents the items used to develop the overall nancial management index by
adopting the same process as in nancial literacy index. The results of the CATPCA
analysis of household overall nancial management are presented in Columns 3 and
4 of Table 2.1. The results signify that seven dimensions, with eigenvalues greater
than one, explain around 48% of the variance of the sample. The eigenvalues of
these seven dimensions are used as the weights to develop the household overall
nancial management index. Appendix 2.5 shows the contribution of each question
in the nancial management index in each dimension. It can be seen that dimension
1 of nancial management index is mostly explained by the credit rating and
overdrawn bank account, dimension 2 is mostly explained by the use of checking
and saving accounts and dimension 3 is mostly explained by the use of online
banking and debt card. As in nancial literacy index, it is again observed that
each dimension captures particular aspect of household nancial management.
From the descriptive statistics in Table 2.2, it is found that the sample considered
in this study has average nancial management score of 0.478 on a scale of zero
to one, showing that the household scores are not skewed towards very high or low
levels of nancial management.
2.2.3 Measuring demographics and psychological characteristics
This study considers key demographic characteristics to control for the hetero-
geneity of the households. The demographic information such as age, education,
employment status, and gender are obtained from the ALP Demographics survey.
It is observed from Table 2.2 that the average age of respondents in the sample
investigated is 54, and the average highest number of years in education is around
12, with 45% males and 61% employed respondents. The reason for higher average
age compared to the average age of US population is that this study only con-
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siders individuals who are aged 18 and above. Further, the average samples age
reported in other ALP based studies is above 50 years. Utilizing information from
the ALP E¤ects of the Financial Crisis survey, household total income is calculated
as the sum of respondent and partner income from work and other sources. The
average of the household income during 17 months starting from October 2009 is
taken to deal with abnormal income in any month. The average family income of
$72,000 in this study is in close comparison with average income of other studies
using ALP that are above $80,000.29 This study also considers the household total
expense, as using income alone in the analysis may be misleading, because higher
income may be followed by higher expense. The household monthly expenditures
on rent, bills, food, health, and transportation are summed to calculate the total
expense. Once again, the household monthly expenditure over twenty months in
year 2009 and 2010 are averaged to avoid abnormal expense in certain months.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 shows that on average the households in
the sample considered expend $3,473 monthly. Furthermore, from Table 2.3 it
is found that age is moderately correlated with employment. In addition, income
is moderately correlated with expense, and weakly correlated with education and
employment.
Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly (2003) argue that psychological economics ac-
knowledges the role that psychological characteristics (such as procrastination,
regret, risk aversion, compulsiveness, generosity, altruism, and peer pressure) play
in household economic decisions. Behrman et al. (2010) also state that prior
literature shows positive correlation between the household nancial literacy and
schooling and nancial behaviour, but mostly does not have controls for unob-
served factors such as risk aversion, intelligence, and motivation that have im-
portant implications for nancial literacy and nancial behaviour. According to
them, without inclusion of these variables, the estimated e¤ects of schooling and
29Some subjects in the sample have abnormal income. These subjects have been dropped to
remove the outliers.
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nancial literacy on nancial management may be biased. This study includes a
large set of household psychological characteristics, while analyzing nancial liter-
acy and management relationship. In measuring the psychological characteristics
of households, this study utilizes information from a wide range of ALP surveys
and constructs proxies for economic shock, time preference, future expectations,
self-condence, sense of commitment, and risk aversion. Exact wordings of the
questions, choices of responses, and the construction of the psychological variables
used in the empirical work are given in Appendix 2.3. From average values in Table
2.2, it can be seen that the households in the sample, on average, are risk averse
with low expectations of the future. Further, it is observe that the households on
average are moderately self-condent and committed, and prefer present as com-
pared to future. Moreover, Table 2.3 shows that family income and total expense
is moderately correlated with future expectations.
2.3 Empirical analysis
This section analyzes whether nancial literacy and other key determinants have
a distinct and signicant impact on household nancial management. For this
purpose, following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model is tested:
FMi = 1FLi + 2SOi + 3ESi + 4OPi + 5TPi + 6FEi
+7SOi + 8CMi + 9RAi + 10MAi + 11AGi + 12EDi
+13EMi + 14INi + 15EXi + "i; (2.1)
where dependent variable FM on the left hand side is the household nancial
management. The independent variables on the right hand side are nancial lit-
eracy (FL), sociability (SO), economic shock (ES), time preference (TP), future
expectations (FE), self-condence (SC), sense of commitment (CM), and risk aver-
sion (RA), and male (MA), age (AG), education (ED), employment (EM), income
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(IN) and expense (EX) indicators.
2.3.1 Analysis of household overall nancial management
The results of the overall nancial management analysis are given in Table 2.4,
where the mean marginal e¤ects, the average of all the individual marginal e¤ects,
are reported. The estimates show that nancial literacy is consistently positive and
highly signicant in all model specications considered (all estimates signicant at
1% tolerance level). The household nancial literacy is found to have the strongest
relation, with a coe¢ cient of 0.108, showing that a one unit increase in nancial
literacy increases the nancial management by 10.8 percent. The signicance of
household nancial literacy for the overall nancial management, is in line with the
ndings of Cole, Sampson and Zia (2009), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b), Hogarth
and ODonnell (1999), and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), who nd that
the households with less nancial knowledge have less participation in nancial
markets. In addition, estimates show that age and income, that are signicant at
5% tolerance level, positively explains the household overall nancial management.
In household psychological characteristics, economic shock (estimate signicant at
1% tolerance level), future expectations, self-condence and sense of commitment
(estimates signicant at 5% tolerance level) signicantly explain the household
overall nancial management. The positive coe¢ cient obtained for economic shock
shows that the households, who participate in nancial markets, are impacted more
by the economic shock.
2.3.2 Analysis of di¤erent aspects of household nancial management
Research methods employed to understand nancial practices have been overly sim-
plistic. National studies have composed indexes of high, medium, and low based
on frequencies of nominal positive responses (Hilgert et al., 2003). Mixed-methods
studies have also used composite indexes where nancial practices were summed
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to create an index ranging from 0 to 5 (Mistry et al., 2008). These summa-
tive approaches are limited because they do not account for interactions between
nancial practices. For example, in analysis, paying bills on time is treated as
equivalent to saving for retirement despite having di¤erent implications for the
household members. In order to gain further insight into the household nancial
decision making, this chapter creates a separate measure for each of the aspect
of household overall nancial management that are retirement saving, credit man-
agement, cash ow management and investment management. Each of these
aspect is tested through Equation 2.1, which is also used in household overall -
nancial management analysis. This strategy helps to determine the di¤erent nature
and strength of relationship of household characteristics with di¤erent aspects of
household nancial management.
Retirement saving
With the rise in life expectancy and decline in birth rates, publicly nanced
retirement has become increasingly costly, both in absolute terms and as share of
national income (Bohn, 2002). In this scenario, most retirees have to rely more on
private savings to nance their increased retirement needs. This section explores
the association of household retirement saving with nancial literacy and other
characteristics of the households. This investigation is performed by using the
household total value of pension account as a proxy for retirement saving.30 Table
2.5 shows that the association between household nancial literacy and retirement
saving is positive, validating the ndings of Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003),
who nd that the households with low scores on the saving index have lower overall
nancial knowledge. Moreover, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) also document a
strong positive relationship between nancial literacy and retirement planning.
30In contrast to the household overall nancial management model, which uses the amount of
money in pension account individuals have and how much they thought about retirement, this
section only uses the balance in pension account as a proxy for retirement saving. In this way,
the analysis avoids combining two di¤erent kinds of responses to create the proxy, while balance
in pension account gives an acceptable measure for retirement saving management.
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From the results, it is observed that age, with strong signicance (at 1% tol-
erance level), explains the household saving for retirement. Simultaneously, future
expectations, with the highest explanatory power and strong signicance (at 1%
tolerance level), is positively related to household retirement saving. Furthermore,
the results suggest that income (with the third highest coe¢ cient signicant at 5%
tolerance level) positively relates to the household saving for retirement. In line
with the ndings of Lusardi (2003), the results imply that education (estimate sig-
nicant at 1% tolerance level) positively associates with the household retirement
saving. Considering the household psychological characteristics, the positive rela-
tionship between economic shock and retirement saving relates to the ndings of
Paxton and Zhuo (2011), reporting positive association between economic shock
and formal saving. The authors explain that the households who face economic
shock start saving more to smooth income and consumption during shocks as a
precaution. Finally, it is found that the households who prefer future over present
or have higher future expectations have more retirement saving.
Cash ow management
Cash ow management enables the households to achieve nancial indepen-
dence, a state in which the household income is either equal to or less than their
costs of living. Prudent management of cash ows and savings are important for
at least two household functions. First, resources can be invested in ways that
promote development. The assumption is that higher incomes will lead to more
disposable income and thus investment in the home environment. Ultimately these
investments promote healthy family and child development (Mayer, 1997). Second,
economic resources can bu¤er against unexpected nancial shocks and mitigate
family stress (Conger and Donnellan, 2007). In this way, careful nancial man-
agement may lead to more disposable economic resources, and these assets can
bu¤er unexpected nancial events and reduce nancial strains directly (Rothwell
and Han, 2010). Importantly, asset development can only occur, after the ows
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of household income have been managed carefully.
In this study, the household cash ow management is quantied by performing
the CATPCA analysis on 11 questions from ALP surveys that are also used in
the cash ow management section of overall nancial management index. Results
reported in Table 2.6 show that the household nancial literacy does not have
signicant association with the cash ow management. This nding is in contrast
with the ndings of Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003), who nd a positive
relationship between the household cash owmanagement and nancial knowledge.
The results further signify that the opportunity cost of time of employed household
may deter the household budgeting and nancial planning activities.
In the household psychological characteristics, sense of commitment has the
highest coe¢ cient (at 5% signicance level), showing that the households who are
more committed and disciplined have better cash ow management. Finally, it is
found that the risk averse households may be more concerned about their cash
ows (positive estimates signicant at 5% tolerance level), resulting in better cash
ow management scores. This result concurs with the ndings of Walker (1996)
reporting that nancial management in the form of budgeting is also important,
where a stable budget is positively associated with more economic satisfaction.
Credit management
Debt is an essential source of nancial leverage that assists households in
smoothing their consumption. However, excess debt can have severe consequences
on household nancial wellbeing. In addition, high and persistent levels of house-
hold debt, referred to as debt overhung, holds back economic recovery, because
households continue to deleverage in an attempt to repair their balance sheets
(Knoll, 2013).
In order to determine the connection between the household credit management
and nancial literacy and other characteristics, this study creates a proxy for credit
management by using the responses on four questions from ALP surveys that
34
are also used in the credit management section of overall nancial management
index. The questions ask individuals how many credit cards they have (general
purpose, charge, and branded), do they pay credit card balance in full each month,
what is their credit ranking, and are they or were they ever behind their mortgage
payment.31 First, the household average of scores on all four questions is taken,
and then this average is scaled to lie between zero and one to create the household
credit management index.
The results in Table 2.7 show that the household nancial literacy has positive
association with highest mean marginal e¤ect, at 1% signicance level, with the
household credit management. Similar ndings have been reported by Hilgert,
Hogarth, and Beverly (2003), who document that the households with low credit
management indices have lower nancial knowledge scores. In demographics, it is
found that education (estimate signicant at 10% tolerance level), income, and
expense (both estimates signicant at 5% tolerance level) are positively related
to the household credit management. Negative association is reported between
economic shock and credit management, signifying that the households who do
not manage their credits e¢ ciently might be more exposed economic shock.
Investment
The household investment in nancial market helps to increase the household
nancial welfare by enabling them to make the most of their savings. This house-
hold investment also has an e¤ect on the overall economy by moderating the asset
prices and market volatility. Saving is a fundamental nancial practice. In recent
years there has been intense research interest in the saving behavior of low-income
households (Beverly et al., 2008). Asset accumulation via saving is benecial to
households for a number of reasons. Saving habits were shown to reduce feelings
31General purpose credit cards have a logo from Visa, MasterCard, Discover or American
Express, and can be used anywhere those credit cards are accepted. Charge cards are similar to
credit cards, except that the full payment of balance is required at the end of each billing period.
Branded cards have a merchants logo on the card, and may or may not have a logo from Visa,
MasterCard, Discover, or American Express. Examples of this type of card include Sears cards,
Exxon cards, Amazon.com cards, or United Mileage cards.
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of nancial strain (Loibl, Kraybill, and DeMay, 2011). Shortage of assets can con-
strain the development of human capital (Nam and Huang, 2009), and nancial
crises were reported to strain the most successful of marriages (Skogrand, Johnson,
Horrocks, and DeFrain, 2011).
This study measures household investment management by averaging the re-
sponses on ALP questions asking households if they possess bonds, stocks, and
IRA or KEOGH accounts and enquiring the number of saving accounts house-
holds posses. Results reported in Table 2.8, show that the household nancial
literacy have consistent positive estimates with highest mean marginal e¤ects,
with 1% signicance level, in all specications tested. This nding corroborates
with the ndings of Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003), who report that the
households in the low investment group have less overall nancial knowledge and
investment knowledge scores. The results further show that employment has the
second highest power in explaining household investment. The positive association
of education and household investment, reported here, is in line with the ndings
of Cole and Shastry (2009), who report a positive relation between income from
investment and education. Finally, economic shock associates with the household
investment positively, as in the retirement saving model. One explanation for such
positive association is that the households who have more nancial assets are ex-
posed to more economic shock with frequent and larger impacts as compared to
the households with less number of such assets. In addition, as argued by Paxton
and Zhuo (2011), economic shock may set o¤ the households to invest in more
nancial assets in order to smooth income and consumption during next economic
shock.
2.3.3 Development and analysis of nancial spread
After determining the household nancial literacy association with nancial man-
agement, this section investigates what explains the di¤erence between household
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nancial literacy and nancial management. This deviation is referred to as the
household nancial spread and is determined by subtracting the household overall
nancial management score from nancial literacy score, where the higher the dif-
ference between the household nancial literacy and overall nancial management,
the higher is the household nancial spread. From this di¤erence, two types of
households are identied that are households who have negative nancial spread
and households who have positive nancial spread. In other words, this section
identies households who have relatively lower nancial management than other
households and households who have relatively higher nancial management than
other households at a given level of nancial literacy.
In order to run the above query, this section creates a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the household nancial spread is positive and zero if the nan-
cial spread is negative. The following probit specication is used to determine
what factors contribute to the likelihood of having lower nancial management as
compared to other households at a given level of nancial literacy:
FS_probi = 1SOi + 2ESi + 3TPi + 4FEi + 5SOi
+6CMi + 7RAi + 8MAi + 9AGi + 10EDi
+11EMi + 12INi + 13EXi + "i (2.2)
where the dummy dependent variable FS_prob on the left hand side equals
to one if nancial spread is positive and zero if nancial spread is negative. The
independent variables on the right hand side are sociability (SO), economic shock
(ES), time preference (TP), future expectations (FE), self-condence (SC), sense
of commitment (CM), and risk aversion (RA), , and risk aversion (RA), and male
(MA), age (AG), education (ED), employment (EM), income (IN) and expense
(EX) indicators.
The results presented in Column 1 to 4 of Table 2.9 show that age of the
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household head positively explains the likelihood of having a positive nancial
spread. In other words, households with older heads are more likely to have a
lower nancial management as compared to households with younger heads at
given level of nancial awareness. These estimates suggest that older household
have less nancial management not because of their level of nancial capability.
The di¤erence attributes to the lack of incentive for the older households to manage
nance as compared to the younger households. Additionally, it is found that
households with male heads are more likely to have lower nancial management
in comparison to households with female heads. These results fall in line with the
ndings of Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) suggesting that males are less risk
averse and of Brake (2005) reporting that males are have more responsibilities
to manage. Further, it is observed that future expectations of the households
positively relates to the probability of having positive nancial spread. Finally, it is
found that risk aversion of the household head negatively relates to the likelihood
of having a positive nancial spread. The risk averse households tend to avoid risk
and therefore may have better nancial management at a given level of nancial
literacy.
Next, the chapter investigates what explains the level of household nancial
spread by utilizing the di¤erence of nancial literacy behavior score tested through
following ordinary least square specication:
FS_leveli = 1SOi + 2ESi + 3TPi + 4FEi + 5SOi
+6CMi + 7RAi + 8MAi + 9AGi + 10EDi
+11EMi + 12INi + 13EXi + "i (2.3)
where the dummy dependent variable FS_level on the left hand side is the
level of household nancial spread. All independent variables are as described in
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Equation 2.2. The results reported in Column 5 to 8 of Table 2.9 suggest that as
in the probit specication, age, sex and risk aversion of the household head explain
the di¤erence of nancial literacy and nancial behavior. Further, it is found that
sense of commitment negatively relates to the nancial literacy-management gap.
Households with high sense of commitment will be committed to all important
aspects of their life. The same is true for nancial management where a household
with higher sense of commitment will have a better nancial management score
at a given level of nancial literacy.
2.4 Robustness check for nancial literacy
2.4.1 Alternative measure of nancial literacy
The nancial literacy measure that this study employs is based on twenty nine
items developed by Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009). In contrast, other studies
such as Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a), and Lusardi
and Tufano (2009) use three fundamental concepts such as capacity to do interest
rates calculations, understanding of ination and understanding of risk diversi-
cation to determine nancial literacy. This section also tests for the robustness
of nancial literacy results by utilizing three items on interest rate, ination and
risk diversication from Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009) nancially literacy scale.
First, the scores on these items are compared with the scores reported in earlier
studies that used similar measure of nancial literacy. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014)
recently performed a comprehensive comparison of di¤erent types of approaches
used to measure nancial literacy. The comparison of scores obtained in this study
with the sores of twelve studies investigated by Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) show
that the percentage of households responding correctly to the three items is in
close comparison with the scores reported across other studies. Further, the per-
centage of households responding correctly in all three comparisons in this study
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is similar to the percentages reported in studies discussed by Lusardi and Mitchell
(2014). The nancial literacy scale based on the three items mentioned above
is used to check for the robustness of nancial literacy in explaining household
nancial management. The mean marginal estimates reported in Table 2.10 show
that this alternative measure of nancial literacy retains its signicance at 1% tol-
erance level in explaining the household overall nancial management, retirement
saving, credit management, and investment management. It is implied that nan-
cial literacy, irrespective of measurement method, explains nancial management
of households.
2.4.2 Self reported measure of nancial literacy
In addition to di¤erent items used to measure nancial literacy, there are other
studies that use self-reported measure of nancial literacy. Lusardi and Mitchell
(2014) investigate the studies that use self-reported measure of nancial literacy.
Following Lusardi (2011), Lusardi and Tufano (2009) and Lusardi and Mitchell
(2009) and Bucher-Koenen, Lusardi, Alessie and van Rooij (2012) this section
uses the self-reported measure of nancial literacy to investigate its relation with
nancial decision making. From Panel B of Table 2.11, it is found that the self-
reported measure of nancial literacy explains all the nancial decisions. It suggests
that the estimates of self-reported measure of nancial literacy are consistent with
the ndings of previous authors who have used such measure in their work. Further,
it conrms the ndings of nancial literacy measures earlier reported in this work.
2.4.3 Instrument variable for nancial literacy
One of the most argued issues in linking nancial literacy with nancial decision
making is the endogeneity problem. Many studies suggest that care has to be
taken while analyzing the impact of nancial literacy on nancial management
because the nancial management may itself be a source of nancial learning as
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people do learn through experience. For example, Caskey (2006) explains that it
is di¢ cult to analyze the impact of nancial education in rms to nancial man-
agement of employees because mostly stable rms o¤er nancial education and
mostly future oriented people are attracted to stable rms. Behrman et al. (2010)
while determining the impact of nancial literacy on wealth accumulation discuss
the causality issues by saying that nancial literacy and schooling, as well as un-
observed factors such as ability, intelligence, and motivation can enhance nancial
literacy and schooling but also directly a¤ect wealth accumulation. Lusardi and
Mitchell (2007) also points toward endogeneity issues in their study of nancial
literacy. According to them, those who attempt to plan for retirement may be-
come more nancially knowledgeable in the process and hence planning would be
inuencing nancial literacy rather than the other way around. Hilgert, Hogarth
and Beverly (2003) state that the existing literature nd the correlation between
nancial knowledge and behaviour. According to the authors, this correlation does
not necessarily mean that an increase in knowledge improves behaviour. Instead,
the causality may be reversed in that people may gain knowledge as they save
and accumulate wealth, or there may be a third variable, for example, family ex-
periences and economic socialization, that a¤ects both knowledge and behaviour.
Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) argue that individuals with high net worth investing
in nancial markets may be investing in nancial literacy to better manage their
investment.
Albeit its importance, few authors are able to account for the potential en-
dogeneity of nancial literacy and nancial behaviour, which is in large part due
to unavailability of adequate data in the existing surveys. Some authors are able
to test for endogeneity by using di¤erent instrument variables to stand in for the
questionable measures of nancial literacy. For example, Christiansen, Joensen,
and Rangvid (2008) used the opening of a new university in a local, Klapper,
Lusardi, and Panos (2012) used the number of public and private universities in
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the Russian regions and the total number of newspapers in circulation, Lusardi and
Mitchell (2009) instrumented nancial literacy using the fact that di¤erent U.S.
states mandated nancial education in high school at di¤erent points in time and
they interacted these mandates with state expenditures.32
Following van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2012), exposure to economics edu-
cation is used as an instrument variable for nancial literacy. The question that is
used from ALP asks the households how much of their schools education (high
school, college or higher degrees) was devoted to economics, where possible re-
sponses are a lot, some, little and hardly at all/none. The results suggest that the
instrument variable employed in this work signicantly explains overall nancial
management, credit management and investment management of the households.
Hence, it is concluded that the relationship between nancial literacy and nancial
management is caused by household nancial literacy.
2.5 Conclusion
In order to reach a clear understanding of relationship between household nan-
cial literacy and nancial decision making, this chapter devises indices for the
household nancial literacy and overall nancial management by covering many
important areas of these two measures. In addition to the household overall nan-
cial management, this work also analyzes individual aspects of household nancial
management separately. For this purpose, measures for household retirement sav-
ing, cash ow management, credit management, and investment management are
developed. The relationships are tested while controlling for the households key de-
mographic and psychological characteristics. For this purpose, this study creates
proxies for household important psychological characteristics such as sociability,
economic shock, time preference, future expectations, self-condence, sense of
commitment, and risk aversion. Furthermore, the household nancial literacy 
32Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) provide a detail study on the instruments used for nancial
literacy in existing literature.
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behaviour gap, referred to as nancial spread, is developed by subtracting the
household nancial literacy scores from their nancial management scores. Here,
the higher the di¤erence between the household nancial literacy and nancial
management, the higher is the household nancial spread. This nancial spread
is used to study why the household nancial management deviates from other
households at a given level of nancial literacy.
The results suggest a consistent strong and signicant relationship between
the household nancial literacy and nancial management. In particular, nancial
literacy is found to explain the household overall nancial management, retirement
saving, credit management, and investment management. These relationships
consistently retain signicance even when the household psychological character-
istics are considered in the analysis. Simultaneously, the household psychological
characteristics are found to be associated with nancial management. However,
some of the household characteristics have di¤erent nature and strength of rela-
tionship with di¤erent aspects of nancial management. For example, employment
is positively related to investment management but negatively related to cash ow
management. Further, it is found that older and male households are more likely
to have lower nancial management as compared to younger households at a given
level of nancial literacy. These estimates suggest that older household have less
nancial management not because of their level of nancial capability but the
di¤erence attributes to the lack of incentive for the older households to manage
nance as compared to the younger households. The high probability of male
households to have lower nancial management as compared to female households
can be explained by the ndings of Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) suggesting
that males are less risk averse and of Brake (2005) reporting that males are have
more responsibilities to manage. Further, it is observed that future expectations
positively and risk aversion negatively relates to the probability of having positive
nancial spread. Similar results are obtained while considering the di¤erence of
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nancial literacy behavior score in ordinary least square specication, where age,
sex and risk aversion explain the di¤erence of nancial literacy and nancial be-
havior. Further, it is found that sense of commitment negatively relates to the
nancial literacy-management gap.
The ndings in this study reveal several possible implications that can assist
in policy and nancial education programs development and implementation. For
example, the results suggest that nancial literacy plays an important role in house-
hold nancial decision making. Furthermore, the household attitudes, beliefs, and
personalities are also found to explain their nancial management. These addi-
tional factors are found to inuence di¤erent nancial management aspects with
di¤erent natures and signicances. The ndings suggest that there is no general
formula or strategy to improve the household nancial management in all areas,
or to improve household nancial management for all population segments.
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Appendix 2.1: Financial literacy questionnaire
2.1.1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per
year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account
if you left the money to grow?
[ ] More than $102
[ ] Exactly $102
[ ] Less than $102
[ ] I dont know
2.1.2. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per
year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how
much would you have in this account in total?
[ ]More than $200
[ ] Exactly $200
[ ] Less than $200
[ ] I dont know
2.1.3. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and
ination was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy
with the money in this account?
[ ] More than today
[ ] Exactly the same
[ ] Less than today
[ ] I dont know
2.1.4. Assume a friend inherits $10,000 today and his sibling inherits $10,000 three
years from now. Who is richer because of the inheritance?
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[ ] My friend
[ ] His sibling
[ ] They are equally rich
[ ] I dont know
2.1.5. Which of the following statements describe the main function of the stock
market?
[ ] The stock market helps to predict stock earnings
[ ] The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks
[ ] The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those
who want to sell stocks
[ ] None of the above
[ ] I dont know
2.1.6. Which of the following statements is correct?
[ ] Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the
rst year
[ ] Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks
and bonds
[ ] Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past
performance
[ ] None of the above
[ ] I dont know
2.1.7. If the interest rates [Rise/Fall ], what should happen to bond prices?
[ ] They should rise
[ ] They should fall
[ ] They should stay the same
[ ] I dont know
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2.1.8. Buying a [Single/Mutual] usually provides a safer return than a company
stock?
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.9. [Stocks/Bonds/Cap] are normally riskier than [Stocks/Bonds/Cap]
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.10. Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset
normally gives the highest return?
[ ] Savings accounts
[ ] Bonds
[ ] Stocks
[ ] I dont know
2.1.11. Normally, which asset displays the highest uctuations over time?
[ ] Savings accounts
[ ] Bonds
[ ] Stocks
[ ] I dont know
2.1.12. When an investor spreads his money among di¤erent assets, does the risk of
losing money:
[ ] Increase
[ ] Decrease
[ ] Stay the same
[ ] I dont know
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2.1.13. What happens if you buy a companys stock?
[ ] You own a part of the company
[ ] You have lent money to the company
[ ] You are liable for the companys debts
[ ] The company will return your original investment to you with interest
[ ] I dont know
2.1.14. What happens if you buy a companys bond?
[ ] You own a part of the company
[ ] You have lent money to the company
[ ] You are liable for the companys debts
[ ] You can vote on shareholder resolutions
[ ] I dont know
2.1.15. If you were to invest $1000 in a stock mutual fund, it would be possible to
have less than $1000 when you withdraw your money.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.16. A stock mutual fund combines the money of many investors to buy a variety
of stocks.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.17. It is hard to nd mutual funds that have annual fees of less than one percent
of assets.
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[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.18. Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.19. Whole life insurance has a savings feature while "term" insurance does not.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.20. The cash value of a life insurance policy is the amount available if you
surrender your life insurance policy while youre still alive.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.21. An annuity pays you money every year while you are alive, but stops paying
money once you are dead.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
2.1.22. An annuity is a nancial product that pays a lump sum when you die.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
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2.1.23. How knowledgeable are you about the retirement plan o¤ered by your em-
ployer?
1 to 7 Scale
2.1.24. A person who withdraws money from his 401(k) plan after he turns 59 1/2
must pay taxes on the money that he withdraws.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of 401(k) plan
[ ] I dont know
2.1.25. A person who withdraws money from her Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) plan after she turns 59 1/2 must pay taxes on the money that she
withdraws.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of IRA
[ ] I dont know
2.1.26. A person who has a dened contribution plan through work (like a 401(k)
or 403(b) plan) is not eligible to open or deposit money into an IRA.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of IRA and/or 401(k) plan
[ ] I dont know
2.1.27. There are annual contribution limits on the amount you can save in a 401(k)
plan or IRA that depend on your income
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[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of IRA and/or 401(k) plan
[ ] I dont know
2.1.28. If you are undergoing any nancial hardship, you will not incur an extra
penalty if you withdraw money from a 401(k) plan or IRA before the age of
59 1/2.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of IRA and/or 401(k) plan
[ ] I dont know
2.1.29. After age 70 1/2, you have to withdraw at least some money from your
401(k) plan or IRA.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of IRA and/or 401(k) plan
[ ] I dont know
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Appendix 2.2: Overall nancial management questionnaire
2.2.1. How many bank accounts (checking) do you have?
2.2.2. How many bank accounts (savings) do you have?
2.2.3. How many credit cards (General purpose, Charge and Branded) do you have?
2.2.4. How many ATM and debit cards do you have?
2.2.5. Have you set up telephone banking?
2.2.6. Have you set up online banking?
2.2.7. Have you set up automatic bill payment?
2.2.8. Have you set up mobile banking?
2.2.9. During the past 12 months, did you carry an unpaid balance on any credit
card from one month to the next (that is, you did not pay the balance in full
at the end of the month)?
2.2.10. Please estimate your most recent credit rating, as measured by a FICO score?
2.2.11. During the past 12 months, did you overdraw any of your bank accounts?
2.2.12. Who prepared (or will prepare) your 2008 federal income tax return?
2.2.13. In your house how much responsibility do you have for budgeting and man-
aging income?
2.2.14. How often do you (and your partner) keep track of your actual spending?
2.2.15. How often do you (and your partner) set budget targets for your spending?
2.2.16. How much do you shop around for the very best conditions when making
major nancial decisions?
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2.2.17. Are you or were you ever behind your mortgage payment?
2.2.18. Do you currently have any money or assets that are held in an Individual
Retirement Account, that is, in an IRA or KEOGH account?
2.2.19. How much have you thought about retirement?
2.2.20. Does your household now or did your household ever have any shares of
stock or stock mutual funds?
2.2.21. Does your household now or did your household ever have any bonds?
2.2.22. What is the balance of your pension account now?
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Appendix 2.3: Exact wordings of survey questions
2.3.1. Sociability
Who are the people with whom you discuss nancial matters?
[ ] Name of the person
The question above is taken from ALP Social Networks survey, which records
the name and number of individuals the respondent approaches for seeking nancial
advice. This survey was in eld between September 2009 and November 2010,
and has a response rate of 91%. The number of individuals that the households
approach for nancial advice is used to proxy sociability. This measure directly
captures the inuence of sociability on household nancial decision making. The
family, friends and peers from whom the households seek nancial advice will
transfer their nancial know-how and experience that can a¤ect the household
nancial decisions..
2.3.2. Economic shock
Over the past months there have been reports about the nations nancial
problems including large drops in the stock market and in the housing market and
increased rates of foreclosures and joblessness. As this nancial crisis unfolds,
more and more people have been a¤ected in di¤erent ways. Have you (or your
husband/wife/partner) been a¤ected by these problems?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, a little [ ] Yes, a lot
The above question is taken from ALP E¤ects of Financial Crisis survey, mea-
suring household exposure to economic shock. The average of the responses over
the 22 months between 2009 and 2012 is taken as a proxy for economic shock.
By using the average over multiple periods, not only the intensity of the economic
shock is captured but also the frequency of the household exposure to economic
shock is measured. A household facing the greatest number of economic shocks
with highest impact will have the highest economic shock score.
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2.3.4. Time preference
Would you prefer to receive 100 dollars today or 100 dollars one year from now?
[ ] 100 dollars today [ ] 100 one dollars year from now
The question is further repeated four times with di¤erent amounts o¤ered in
one years time: $105, $110, $115 and $120. These questions measuring time
preference of the households is taken from the Economic Conditions module of
ALP Economy and Personal Financial Well Being survey. If the households choose
to receive money today then they prefer present as compared to the future. The
average of the household responses on these ve questions is taken and this average
is scaled between zero and one to proxy the household time preference.
2.3.5. Future expectations
What are the chances that you (and your husband/wife/partner) will leave an
inheritance totaling $10,000 or more? Include properties and other valuable items
as well in your total estimate. Remember, 0% means absolutely no chance, and
100% means you are absolutely certain.
For this question, the respondents provide a percentage number between 0 and
100. The question is further repeated twice with an increased inheritance amount
of $100,000 and $500,000 respectively. The questions are obtained from the HRS
P Expectations and N Healthcare Section survey. This survey was in the eld from
September 2009 until August 2013 and has a response rate of 98.52%. The proxy
for future expectations is based on the weighted average of the responses on the
three questions.
2.3.6. Self-condence
I hardly ever expect things to go my way.
[ ] I strongly disagree [ ] I somewhat disagree [ ] I slightly disagree [ ] I slightly
agree
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[ ] I somewhat agree [ ] I strongly agree
The Optimism module of ALP Health Expectations survey contains the above-
mentioned question that is used to create a proxy for household self-condence.
This survey was in the eld from July 2010 to May 2011 and has a response rate
of 89.49%. The responses are scaled between zero and one to create the index
where zero corresponds to the households who strongly agree and one corresponds
to the households who strongly disagree with the above statement.
2.3.7. Sense of commitment
i. How closely do you follow the suggestions of your doctor? Please indicate
which of the below.
[ ] I closely follow the suggestions [ ] I loosely follow the suggestions [ ] I rarely
follow the suggestions
[ ] I would like to follow the suggestions but I dont manage to do so
ii. Are you currently smoking cigarettes?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
iii. Do you go to a doctor to have a routine examination at least twice a year?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
iv. How many servings of alcohol do you have on a typical day? (One serving
is a can of beer, a glass of wine or a shot of liquor.)
[ ] None [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 or more
v. How many times per week do you do some sort of moderate activity (like
walking or raking the leaves) for at least 30 minutes?
[ ] None [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 or more
vi. All in all, how many hours per week do you do some sort of moderate
activity?
[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 or more
vii. On average, how many servings of fruits and vegetables do you eat in a
day?
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[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 or more
viii. And how many servings of cereal ber or whole grain (wheat bread, whole
grain pasta, brown rice, oatmeal, whole grain breakfast cereal, bran or popcorn)
do you eat in a typical day? A serving is one slice of bread, 1 ounce of breakfast
cereal or 1
2
cup of cooked cereal, pasta or rice. How many servings of rened grains
(white bread, white rice, white pasta, white potatoes or low ber cereals like crispy
rice and corn akes) do you eat in a typical day? A serving is one slice of bread,
1 ounce of breakfast cereal or 1
2
cup of cooked cereal, pasta or rice.
[ ] 0 [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3 [ ] 4 [ ] 5 [ ] 6 or more
The eight questions above are part of the Health behaviors/Risk Factors module
of ALP Health Expectations survey that are used to create a proxy for household
sense of commitment. All above questions reect how responsibly households treat
themselves. Households with sense of commitment will also treat their own lives
with commitment/responsibility. The average of the responses on these questions
is taken, and proxy for sense of commitment is established by scaling the average
between zero and one.
2.3.8. Risk aversion
Suppose that you unexpectedly inherited 1 million dollars. You have the chance
to take a risky but possibly rewarding investment option that has a 50-50 chance of
doubling the money to 2 million dollars in a month, and a 50-50 chance of reducing
the money by one third, to 667,000 dollars in a month. Would you choose to invest
in the risky asset?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Following Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) and Hung, Parker, and
Yoong (2010), this study uses the above question from the Risk and Time Pref-
erence module of ALP Department of Labor (DOL) Pilot survey, elded between
June 2011 and August 2011 with a response rate of 85.04%, to create the house-
hold risk aversion proxy. The above question is repeated if the respondent chooses
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the xed income over the lottery option, with a reduced level of potential loss in
income until the respondent switches from the xed option to the lottery option.
However, if the respondent chooses the lottery option in the rst question then the
questions are repeated with an increased level of potential loss until the respondent
switches from the lottery to the xed amount option. If the proportion of potential
loss is dened as 1   then  is the risk aversion measure of the households and
it is calculated at the point where the households decide to switch from the xed
income to lottery options (or vice versa). For example, if a household is willing
to risk all their income, then  = 0; showing that the household is a completely
risk-taker. In this index, zero corresponds to the lowest risk aversion and one
corresponds to the highest risk aversion.
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Table 2.1: Categorical principal component analysis results for nancial literacy and overall
nancial behavior index. Columns 1 and 2 report the eigenvalues and the proportion of the variance
explained by the dimensions of nancial literacy index, and Columns 3 and 4 present the eigenvalues
and the proportion of the variance explained by the dimensions of overall nancial behavior index.
For nancial literacy index, the total number of dimensions is 29, which is the number of items in
nancial literacy questionnaire. For overall nancial behavior index, the total number of dimensions
is 22, which is the number of items in overall nancial behavior questionnaire. Optimal scaling level
of all the variables is set as ordinal.
Financial Literacy Financial Management
Dimension Total (Eigenvalue) % of Variance Dimension Total (Eigenvalue) % of Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 6.38 21.999 1 2.037 9.259
2 1.6 5.518 2 1.763 8.013
3 1.301 4.485 3 1.737 7.897
4 1.248 4.302 4 1.663 7.561
5 1.237 4.264 5 1.183 5.376
6 1.092 3.765 6 1.059 4.812
7 1.045 3.605 7 1.021 4.643
8 1.031 3.553 8 0.997 4.532
9 0.99 3.412 9 0.962 4.372
10 0.953 3.285 10 0.947 4.306
11 0.873 3.01 11 0.927 4.213
12 0.841 2.901 12 0.88 3.998
13 0.831 2.865 13 0.853 3.875
14 0.806 2.779 14 0.83 3.772
15 0.788 2.716 15 0.811 3.684
16 0.755 2.603 16 0.781 3.548
17 0.708 2.443 17 0.716 3.256
18 0.678 2.337 18 0.694 3.154
19 0.651 2.245 19 0.646 2.937
20 0.632 2.181 20 0.591 2.689
21 0.6 2.068 21 0.498 2.263
22 0.569 1.96 22 0.405 1.84
23 0.556 1.919 - -
24 0.546 1.883 - -
25 0.512 1.767 - -
26 0.487 1.68 - -
27 0.472 1.626 - -
28 0.432 1.49 - -
29 0.389 1.34 -
Total 29 100 22 100
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Table 2.4: Analysis of overall nancial management. This table reports mean marginal
e¤ects obtained from ordinary least square regressions. The robust standard errors are re-
ported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is the overall nancial management index
measured through performing categorical principal component analysis on twenty two aspects
of household nancial management categorized as cash ow management, credit manage-
ment, retirement saving, and investment. The explanatory variables are nancial literacy and
demographic and psychological characteristics. ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and
10 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial literacy 0.154*** 0.107*** 0.0994*** 0.145*** 0.108***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.032)
Age 0.00108*** 0.00103*** 0.00117** 0.00122**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Education 0.00831*** 0.00716*** 0.00722*** 0.00377
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Employed 0.00423 0.00190 -0.0103 -0.00707
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Male 0.000880 0.00139 0.00264 0.00408
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Income (in thousands) 0.000837* 0.00116** 0.00135**
0.000 -0.001 (0.001)
Expense (in thousands) -0.000104 0.0000228 -0.00200*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Social network 0.00650** 0.00357
(0.003) (0.003)
Economic shock 0.0704***
(0.019)
Time preference 0.00338
(0.015)
Future expectations 0.0389**
(0.017)
Self-condence 0.0522**
(0.022)
Sense of commitment 0.0962**
(0.040)
Risk aversion 0.00683
(0.029)
Adjusted R-squared 0.077 0.113 0.112 0.131 0.180
Observations 1709 1709 1611 642 560
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Table 2.5: Analysis of retirement saving. This table reports the mean marginal e¤ects
obtained from ordinary least square regressions. The robust standard errors are reported in the
parentheses. The dependent variable is the households total value of pension account. The
explanatory variables are nancial literacy and demographic and psychological characteristics.
***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial literacy 0.0839*** 0.0283*** 0.0185* 0.0484*** 0.0256**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Age 0.00140*** 0.00143*** 0.000956*** 0.00103***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.00942*** 0.00708*** 0.00687*** 0.00451***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed -0.00933 -0.0128** -0.00133 0.00720
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Male -0.00801* -0.00775* 0.00198 0.00127
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Income (in thousands) 0.00131*** 0.00149*** 0.00118**
0.000 0.000 (0.001)
Expense (in thousands) 0.00257*** 0.00214** 0.00137*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Social network -0.000977 -0.000855
(0.001) (0.001)
Economic shock 0.0288***
(0.008)
Time preference 0.0269***
(0.007)
Future expectations 0.0345***
(0.008)
Self-condence 0.0115
(0.009)
Sense of commitment 0.0238
(0.016)
Risk aversion 0.00384
(0.010)
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 0.116 0.179 0.242 0.327
Observations 1324 1324 1289 539 474
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Table 2.6: Analysis of cash ow management. This table reports the mean marginal
e¤ects obtained from ordinary least square regressions. The robust standard errors are
reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is the household cash ow management
index quantied by performing categorical principal component analysis on 11 items related
to cash ow management. The explanatory variables are nancial literacy and demographic
and psychological characteristics. ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial literacy 0.00213 -0.0195 -0.00337 -0.00153 0.0185
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.041) (0.044)
Age 0.00152*** 0.00156*** 0.00137** 0.000660
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.00646*** -0.00625*** -0.00102 -0.00281
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Employed -0.0308*** -0.0295*** -0.0365** -0.0284*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Male 0.0109 0.00818 0.0127 0.0126
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
Income (in thousands) -0.0000315 -0.000914 -0.000410
0.000 -0.001 (0.001)
Expense (in thousands) -0.00257* -0.00374 -0.00489
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Social network -0.00268 -0.00355
(0.004) (0.005)
Economic shock -0.00579
(0.031)
Time preference -0.00425
(0.023)
Future expectations 0.0152
(0.024)
Self-condence 0.0165
(0.036)
Sense of commitment 0.165**
(0.068)
Risk aversion 0.109**
(0.049)
Adjusted R-squared 0.000 0.050 0.057 0.047 0.070
Observations 1708 1708 1611 642 560
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Table 2.7: Analysis of credit management. This table reports the mean marginal e¤ects
obtained from ordinary least square regressions. The robust standard errors are reported in
the parentheses. The dependent variable is the households debt management index created
by using the 4 items related to credit management. The explanatory variables are nancial
literacy and demographic and psychological characteristics. ***, ** and * denote signicance
at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial literacy 0.182*** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.189*** 0.195***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.056) (0.058)
Age 0.00217*** 0.00201*** -0.000586 -0.0000276
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.0130*** 0.00925*** 0.00882** 0.00850*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Employed 0.0490*** 0.0336** -0.00780 -0.00250
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Male -0.00360 -0.00533 0.0174 0.00708
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
Income (in thousands) 0.000855 0.00195** 0.00221**
-0.001 -0.001 (0.001)
Expense (in thousands) 0.00895*** 0.00759** 0.00726**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Social network -0.000381 -0.00160
(0.005) (0.005)
Economic shock -0.0795**
(0.036)
Time preference -0.0119
(0.026)
Future expectations 0.00412
(0.027)
Self-condence 0.0146
(0.041)
Sense of commitment 0.0262
(0.066)
Risk aversion 0.0358
(0.047)
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.056 0.093 0.100 0.098
Observations 1614 1614 1548 622 543
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Table 2.8: Analysis of investment management. This table reports the mean marginal
e¤ects obtained from ordinary least square regressions. The robust standard errors are
reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is the average of number of assets such
bonds, stocks, IRA or KEOGH accounts, and the number of saving accounts households
posses. The explanatory variables are nancial literacy and demographic and psychological
characteristics. ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial literacy 0.225*** 0.166*** 0.153*** 0.262*** 0.252***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.052) (0.057)
Age 0.00152*** 0.00146*** 0.000115 -0.000449
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.00947*** 0.00826*** 0.0125*** 0.0149***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Employed 0.157*** 0.151*** 0.125*** 0.102***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
Male 0.0133 0.0132 -0.0212 -0.0176
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020)
Income (in thousands) 0.00138** 0.000110 0.000173
-0.001 -0.001 (0.001)
Expense (in thousands) 0.00227 0.00486* 0.00420
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Social network 0.00393 -0.00244
(0.005) (0.006)
Economic shock 0.0741*
(0.041)
Time preference 0.0378
(0.030)
Future expectations -0.0112
(0.034)
Self-condence -0.00222
(0.042)
Sense of commitment -0.111
(0.084)
Risk aversion 0.0250
(0.061)
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.132 0.132 0.155 0.168
Observations 1709 1709 1611 642 560
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Table 2.9: Analysis of nancial spread. Columns 1 to 4 of this table report mean marginal e¤ects from probit regressions, where the
dummy dependent variable takes the value of 1 if households have positive nancial spread and 0 if households have negative nancial
spread. Columns 5 to 8 report mean marginal e¤ects from ordinary least square regressions, where the dependent variable equals to
the level of household nancial spread. The robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The explanatory variables include
household demographic and psychological characteristics. ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit estimates OLS estimates
Age 0.0206*** 0.0200*** 0.0117** 0.0117* 0.00295*** 0.00291*** 0.00214*** 0.00226**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.111*** 0.0810*** 0.0587** 0.0410 0.0140*** 0.0111*** 0.00345 0.00292
(0.017) (0.019) (0.029) (0.033) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Employed 0.160** 0.0691 0.0541 0.0315 0.0213** 0.0120 0.0202 0.0131
(0.077) (0.082) (0.126) (0.143) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017)
Male 0.379*** 0.375*** 0.243** 0.219* 0.0614*** 0.0654*** 0.0575*** 0.0485***
(0.071) (0.074) (0.117) (0.128) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015)
Income 0.0181*** 0.0337*** 0.0300** 0.000456 0.00195** 0.00119
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Expense 0.00749 -0.00747 -0.00858 0.00248* 0.00159 0.00201
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Social network 0.00654 0.00458 -0.000723 0.000118
(0.036) (0.040) (0.005) (0.005)
Economic shock 0.176 0.0102
(0.248) (0.030)
Time preference 0.256 0.0306
(0.200) (0.024)
Future expectations 0.424* 0.0132
(0.243) (0.026)
Self-con?dence -0.265 -0.00951
(0.291) (0.037)
Sense of commitment -0.818 -0.160**
(0.512) (0.065)
Risk aversion -0.752* -0.102*
(0.442) (0.054)
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.159 0.095 0.142 0.098 0.105 0.066 0.082
Observations 1692 1596 636 556 1693 1596 636 556
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3 Household stock market literacy, trust and
participation
This chapter studies the importance of stock market literacy and trust for stock
ownership decisions. While stock market literacy lowers a household cost of partici-
pating in the market, trust increases return expectations from investment in stocks.
These two distinct channels simultaneously explain not only the probability of par-
ticipation but also the share of wealth invested in stocks. Further, it is found that,
once the study accounts for stock market literacy, sociability is no longer important
for stock market participation, and what matters is literacy rather than sociability.
Further, it observed that economic shocks and future expectations are the key
psychological characteristics that explain a household decision to invest in stocks;
however, upon participation, a larger set of psychological characteristics, including
past economic shocks, future expectations, self-condence and time preference, is
found to explain a household decision on how much to invest in stocks.
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3.1 Introduction
In explaining the stock market non-participation puzzle, there is a growing litera-
ture that studies the psychological factors that act as barriers to stock ownership.
Recent literature suggests that household participation in the stock market is driven
by factors such as optimism (Puri and Robinson, 2007), trust in nancial markets
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008), intelligence quotient (Grinblatt, Keloharju,
and Linnainmaa, 2011), genetics (Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010), politi-
cal orientation (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011), the ability to understand investment
(Graham, Harvey, and Huang, 2009; Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2010), stock
market return experience (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), educational attainment
and nancial sophistication (Christelis, Georgarakos, and Haliassos, 2011), nan-
cial literacy (Cardak and Wilkins, 2009; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011),
cognitive ability (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2013), and sociability (Hong,
Kubik, and Stein, 2004; Bönte and Filipiak, 2012).
Recently, Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) assess the joint impact of trust and so-
ciability on stock market participation. They show that trust and sociability a¤ect
stock ownership through distinct channels, where mistrust lowers the expected re-
turn on investment, making stock market participation unattractive, and sociability
serves to reduce the xed cost of participation through cheaper information sharing.
However, Bönte and Filipiak (2012) report that the household investment decisions
are not strongly a¤ected by their social interaction once the households are aware
of shares, bonds and mutual funds. They observe that although social interac-
tion may not inuence investment in nancial instruments directly, word-of-mouth
communication a¤ects individualsawareness of the nancial instruments, thereby
indirectly a¤ecting investment. Meanwhile, van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011)
nd that nancial literacy plays a key role in understanding the non-participation
puzzle. They show that the households with low nancial literacy are signicantly
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less likely to invest in stocks. However, the mechanism through which nancial
literacy inuences stock ownership decisions is unclear.
Therefore, this chapter empirically tests whether sociability is capturing the
e¤ect of stock market literacy and hence whether it is literacy, rather than socia-
bility, that matters for understanding stock market participation. Georgarakos and
Pasini (2011) document that the more sociable households reduce their participa-
tion costs through cheaper information sharing, thereby increasing participation.
This work argues that sociability actually proxies for the household stock market lit-
eracy, and hence introducing stock market literacy, which is the aggregate product
of stock market knowledge and awareness, should capture the e¤ect of sociability
on stock market participation. Moreover, it is argued that the evidence for the
distinct roles of trust and sociability on stock ownership observed by Georgarakos
and Pasini (2011) can be explained by the unique and distinct e¤ects of trust and
stock market literacy on participation. As in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008),
this study denes trust as the rm reliance on the characteristics of the nancial
system such as sound management, quality of investor protection, and e¤ective
regulation and supervision. The household level of trust in the stock market cannot
necessarily be associated with their knowledge about the stock market. Knowing
about the market does not make the market trustworthy. The empirical ndings
of this work support these conjectures.
To understand the distinct e¤ects of stock market literacy and trust on partici-
pation, this work adopts the standard two-asset portfolio model framework. In this
theoretical framework, a payment or cost levied for participating in stock market
reduces the disposable wealth to be invested in the asset portfolio, hence lowering
the expected returns from the portfolio. This escalates the threshold level for the
proportion of initial investment in the stock market, below which participation is
no longer worthwhile. The literature identies di¤erent categories of participa-
tion cost for example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) categorizes participation costs as
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xed entry costs, xed and variable transaction costs and per period trading costs
and Andersen and Nielsen (2011), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), and Campbell
(2006) report xed entry or ongoing participation costs to be the leading explana-
tion for non-participation in the stock market. The contents of the categories of
participation cost vary across researches but all these researches report two main
components of the participation cost that are the cost paid in monetary terms and
the opportunity cost of time and resources. These two aspects of stock market
participation cost can be decomposed into the tangible cost, including the bid ask
spread paid to the market maker, cost to open the accounts and setting up the
trade, xed and variable brokerage fee/commission, and intangible cost consisting
of cost of time and resources spent to understand the principles and working of
stock market, acquiring information about di¤erent stocks and their risk and re-
turn to set the suitable mix of stocks and risk free asset, accessing and selecting
brokers, setting up accounts, implementing and carrying out trade and following
stock market/economy.
This study reports numerous evidences from the literature reporting that nan-
cial knowledge may lead to reduced participation costs, thereby encouraging stock
market participation. These evidences show that both tangible and intangible costs
of stock market participation are reduced because of nancial literacy. For exam-
ple Khorunzhina (2013) reports that nancial education and counselling alleviates
the burden on consumerstime and the e¤ort necessary for making nancial deci-
sions and reduces the objective cost of stock market participation. In a di¤erent
context, Andersen and Nielsen (2011) argue that nancial education might limit
the e¤ect of psychological barriers hence decreasing the non-tangible portion of
the participation cost. Finally, Campbell (2006) discusses that non-participating
households may be aware of their limited investment skills and may withdraw from
risky markets, while other households may delegate the decision making to profes-
sionals resulting in higher fees paid by these investors. Based on these evidences,
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this chapter argues that the stock market literate households will reduce their cost
of participation; and therefore this e¤ect will be diminished. In other words, the
higher the household stock market literacy, the lower will be their cost of participa-
tion and therefore the greater will be their participation in the stock market. This
framework is motivated by recent research showing that nancial awareness may
lead to reduced pecuniary and non-pecuniary portions of participation cost, thereby
encouraging stock market participation (see, for example, Campbell, 2006; Jappelli
and Padula, 2013; and Khorunzhina, 2013). When considering the household level
of trust in the stock market, the probability of being cheated by participating in the
stock market reduces their expected returns. However, the households that trust
the stock market have a lower threshold level for the proportion of stock market
investment below which participation is not worthwhile and hence participate more
in the stock market.
To test these e¤ects empirically, this study uses data from the American Life
Panel (ALP), which consists of over 340 diverse surveys and 6,000 representa-
tive samples of U.S. consumers of age 18 and above. ALP surveys capture a
rich information set that is of scientic and policy interest, such as expectations,
opinions, nancial participation and circumstances, cognition and demographics.
Hence it makes it possible to measure stock market literacy, sociability and trust
in the stock market, and also construct proxies for a wide range of household
psychological characteristics.
This study contributes to the existing literature in four major aspects. First,
it reassesses the previously documented inuence of sociability on stock market
participation, once the household stock market literacy is taken into account. Sec-
ond, it utilizes a theoretical framework to understand the distinct e¤ects of stock
market literacy and trust on stock ownership. In particular, this study shows that
stock market literacy and trust have distinct and signicant e¤ects on the proba-
bility of participation as well as the proportion of the household wealth invested in
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stocks. Third, unlike previous studies which use general nancial literacy questions
to measure nancial knowledge, this work constructs a stock-market-specic liter-
acy index that is related to the understanding of the stock market and measures the
household knowledge of investing in stocks directly or indirectly through mutual
funds or investment accounts. In this way, this study is able to reduce the noise
in capturing the household knowledge of the stock market and study its impact
on stock ownership. Fourth, using the rich set of data on household psychological
characteristics, this study is able to additionally test for various psychological fac-
tors inuencing stock market participation. In particular, the impact of economic
shock, time preference, future expectations, self-condence, sense of commitment,
and risk aversion on stock ownership is measured. In this way, this study is also able
to distinguish the e¤ects of stock market literacy and trust from other psycholog-
ical characteristics. For instance, by modelling the impact of both trust and stock
market literacy in the empirical analysis this study is able to separate their distinct
e¤ects, although the two characteristics might often be understood synonymously.
Previous studies allude to the signicant impact of psychological characteristics on
stock market participation, but fail to test adequately for these e¤ects due to data
constraints. Hence this study lls a noticeable gap in the literature by considering
a wide range of psychological characteristics.
The empirical results show that stock market literacy remains a key character-
istic for stock market participation, even after allowing for the e¤ects of sociability,
trust and large set of psychological characteristics. Before considering the house-
hold stock market literacy, signicant relationship for sociability is obtained, but
once stock market literacy is accounted for, it is observed that the impact of so-
ciability vanishes. Hence it is found that what matters is stock market literacy,
rather than sociability. In fact, in the additional subsample analysis, it is observed
that the e¤ect of sociability on participation is insignicant for the households
that have low stock market literacy, while it is observed that stock market liter-
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acy remains to be a signicant determinant of stock ownership even among the
households with low sociability. The other important characteristic that explains
probability of participation is the household level of trust in the stock market. The
result suggests that trusting households are more likely to invest in the stock mar-
ket, and for a given level of trust, lack of stock market literacy additionally acts
as a barrier to stock market participation. Further, it is found that demographic
characteristics including age, education and income, and psychological character-
istics including economic shock and future expectations signicantly inuence a
household likelihood of investing in the stock market.
While examining if the stock market literate households invest larger propor-
tion of wealth in stocks, a signicant positive association between stock market
literacy and the proportion of wealth invested in the stock market is obtained. In
addition, trust in the stock market is found to have a signicant positive impact
on investment in risky assets, conrming the nding of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zin-
gales (2008), whereby the more an investor trusts the stock market, the higher is
his/her optimal portfolio share invested in stocks. Sociability remains insignicant
and does not inuence the household portfolio allocation decision. Further, it is
found that age, education, economic shock, future expectations, self-condence,
and time preference have signicant positive e¤ects, while income has a signicant
negative e¤ect on the proportion of investment in stocks. It is further observed
that some psychological characteristics such as self-condence and time prefer-
ence, that do not explain the probability of stock market participation, are now
signicant. This shows that there are di¤erent psychological factors that a¤ect a
household decision to participate in the stock market and their level of investment
in the stocks.
The investigation of association between household stock market literacy as-
sociation and their cost barrier to stock market participation suggests that stock
market literacy has consistent negative estimates that are signicant in all models.
77
This nding validates the proposition regarding association of stock market liter-
acy with stock market participation cost. In addition, it is observed that age and
employment are also negatively related to stock market participation cost.
The ndings of this work are of interest to policy makers. First, it shows that
trust and stock market literacy have independent e¤ects on participation. This
perhaps can explain the ine¤ectiveness of nancial education programs for stock
market participation reported in previous studies. Second, it is found that trust and
stock market literacy not only a¤ect the probability of stock market participation
but also inuence a household decision as to how much of their wealth to invest
in the stock market. Third, the study shows that psychological characteristics of
the households play a key role in their decision to own stocks. These results can
benet strategic endeavors of policy makers promoting stock market participation.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
theoretical model, Section 3.3 describes the data and variables, Section 3.4 reports
the empirical analysis, Section 3.5 provides results from the robustness analysis,
and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The framework
This section utilizes the framework of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), which
is derived from the standard two-asset portfolio model framework, to understand
the role of sociability and trust in decisions of households to invest in stock market.
In this setup, households have the choice of investing in two nancial assets: a risky
asset, which yields the return rs, considered here to be a stock with E[rs] = rs and
standard deviation s > 0, and a risk-free asset, which yields the return rf (and
rf < rs). This framework assumes that the probability distribution of the returns
of the risky asset is normal. Therefore only the expected return and standard
deviation are relevant for a household i who chooses the proportion wi of their
initial wealth Yi to be invested in the risky asset in order to maximize the expected
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utility:
max
wi
EU [rfYi + wi(rs   rf )Yi] :
The household participates in the stock market if their expected utility from
investing their wealth in the stock market and in the risk-free asset is greater than
(or equal to) the utility from investing only in the risk-free asset U [rfYi]: Thus,
the stock market participation condition is:
EU [rfYi + wi(rs   rf )Yi]  U [rfYi]: (3.1)
The above participation condition holds if the investors have full trust in the
stock market and anticipate that they are going to fully receive the return as deter-
mined from the expected utility in equation 3.1.33 Based on the recent literature
pointing out that less trusting households are less likely to participate in the stock
market, the e¤ects of trust are included in the above model, building a more re-
alistic framework.34 An example in which trust prevents people from participation
is given by Blondel et al. (1998) who show that about 60% of those who do not
vote in the European Parliament elections cites distrust in the European Parlia-
ment, lack of interest, or some other reason for not participating. Even if there
are considerable advantages of selecting the right candidate, households lacking
trust do not bother to cast vote because they do not expect the candidate or the
electoral system to be fair. In case of stock market participation, trust is more crit-
ical because unlike parliament, in the event of cheating, investors may immediately
lose all or partial wealth invested in stocks. In addition, as compared to casting
vote, participation in stock market requires considerable resources and time that
33The most widely accepted denition of trust denes it as rm reliance on the integrity,
ability, or character of a person or thing. Trust can also be dened as a leverage that can be
used to do more by relying on someone else as compared to what an individual would otherwise
be able to achieve.
34See, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), Georgarakos and Pasini (2011),
Pevzner, Xie, and Xin (2013) and Carlin, Dorobantu, and Viswanathan (2009).
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will be wasted without adding any nancial value in case the household is cheated.
Trust is quantied as the subjective probability that individuals attribute to the
possibility of being cheated.
The trust framework is included in the expected utility in Equation 3.1, where
ai [0; 1] is household is assessed probability of being cheated by the managers,
intermediaries or the rm itself, and hence losing a proportion of their wealth
invested in stocks. This probability measures the degree of the households mistrust
and serves as a discount factor applied by the household to their return from
investing in the stock market.35 Hence, household is expected return on the
risky asset is now dependent not only on the risk aversion incorporated in their
utility function but also on their trust in the stock market given as 1  ai:The new
participation condition, o¤ered now becomes:
(1  ai)EU [(rf + wi(rs   rf ))Yi + aiU((1  wi)rfYi)]  U [rfYi]:
Further presents the rst order condition of above participation condition with
respect to wi given as:
(1  ai)U 0[(rf + wi(rs   rf ))Yi](rs   rf )  aiU 0[(1  wi)rfYi]rf : (3.2)
Further, it is argued that investors have to bear additional cost if they decide
to invest in stock market (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2004).
This participation cost reduces the initial wealth invested in stocks and risk free
asset and as a result decreases the motivation to participate in the stock market.36
However, the investors bear the participation cost only if they decide to participate
35This study assumes a partial equilibrium framework in the sense that the choice of one
household does not a¤ect the equilibrium level of ai:
36The literature on stock market participation cost identies di¤erent categories of participa-
tion cost. For example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) categorizes participation costs as xed entry
costs, xed and variable transaction costs and per period trading costs and Andersen and Nielsen
(2011), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), and Campbell (2006) reports xed entry or ongoing par-
ticipation costs to be the leading explanation for non-participation in the stock market.
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in stock market. If they decide to invest only in risk free market, they are able to
invest all of their initial wealth in the risk free asset. The xed cost of participation
is included in Equation 3.2:
(1  ai)EU 0[(rf +wi(rs  rf ))(1  qi)Yi](rs  rf )  aiU 0[(1 wi)rf (1  qi)Yi]rf :
(3.3)
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) use the above participation condition to inves-
tigate the role sociability in stock market participation, where sociability reduces
the cost of participation. This study tests whether the linkage between stock
market participation and sociability that Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) establish
emperically holds. In recent literature, numerous evidences suggest that nancial
knowledge may lead to reduced participation costs, thereby encouraging stock mar-
ket participation (Khorunzhina, 2013). For example, Jappelli and Padula (2013),
while analyzing the channel through which nancial literacy a¤ects asset allocation,
nd that nancial literacy reduces the participation cost that a¤ects the portfolio
choice. Literature also suggests that both tangible and intangible costs of partici-
pation faced by the households are reduced with increasing level of their nancial
literacy. For example Khorunzhina (2013) reports that nancial education and
counselling alleviates the burden on consumerstime and the e¤ort necessary for
making nancial decisions and reduces the objective cost of stock market partic-
ipation. While allowing the participation costs to depend on investors education
as a proxy for the ability to collect and process information, and on age and past
participation as proxies for the accumulation of information and experience, Kho-
runzhina (2013) nds that even when holding labor income xed, the participation
cost is decreasing in education and past stock market experience. Additionally,
Andersen and Nielsen (2011) argue that nancial education might limit the e¤ect
of psychological barriers hence decreasing the non-tangible portion of the partici-
pation cost. The authors conrm the nding that individuals with longer periods of
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education have lower xed objective costs. Finally, Campbell (2006) discusses that
non-participating households may be aware of their limited investment skills and
may withdraw from risky markets, while other households may delegate the decision
making to professionals resulting in higher fees paid by these investors. Moreover,
van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), Arrondel et al. (2012) and Christelis et
al. (2010) establish a positive link between nancial literacy and stock market
participation, although the mechanism through which nancial literacy increases
stock market participation is not clearly set out in their work.
This study does not deny the argument given by Georgarakos and Pasini (2011)
regarding the association between stock market participation cost and sociability.
This study suggests that sociablity while explaining the stock market participation
is capturing the e¤ect of stock market literacy on participation in the stock mar-
ket. This deviation is motivated by numerous evidences in literature showing that
social interaction increases the dissemination of information and knowledge. For
example, Guiso and Jappelli (2005) show that social learning occurs when potential
investors interact sequentially with another investor, and as such, if one is aware
then the other one becomes aware. The authors further report that individuals
often learn about investment opportunities from peers who are ready informed.
Social learning can act as a catalyst in the information dissemination as reported
by Watt (1999), showing that social learning takes place in a ring lattice network.
According to information sharing channel, the knowledge sharing does not mean
that the households will follow what other households decide. The households ob-
tain the information but make a decision based on their own preferences in light of
the new information. The same has been mentioned by Banerjee and Fudenberg
(2004) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), who by analyzing the e¤ect of Word-
of-Mouth information sharing show that agents sample previous decision makers
and, based on this information, decide which choice to follow. Supported by these
ndings, this study proposes that sociability increases awareness and hence reduces
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the stock market participation cost. Therefore, sociability does not directly a¤ect
participation cost and as participation cost is introduced as a function of stock
market literacy, therefore, the e¤ect of sociability is already captured by stock
market literacy.
3.3 Data and variables
To test the model implications empirically, this chapter again uses American Life
Panel (ALP) surveys that are discussed in Section 2.2. As in Chapter 2, primary
unit of analysis is household where stock holding status, proportion of investment
in stocks, family income, net wealth and total nancial assets are that of the
household, while nancial literacy and demographic and psychological characteris-
tics represent that of the household head who is the primary decision maker in the
household. Information on whether households hold stocks or stock mutual funds is
obtained from the E¤ects of the Financial Crisis survey waves elded between No-
vember 2008 and January 2011, with an average response rate of 79%. This study
does not consider stock holdings that are part of an IRA, 401(k), Keogh or similar
retirement accounts. In the sample investigated, 70% of the housholds participate
in the stock market. The Cognition and Aging in the USA survey (elded between
November 2008 and September 2009) is used to acquire information on household
share of wealth invested in the stock market, which is calculated as a proportion of
total nancial assets invested in stocks. The total nancial assets are made up of
the value of checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, bond
funds, balanced or life-cycle funds, foreign investments, index funds, sector funds,
other mutual funds, retirement accounts, short-term assets, other stocks or funds
not listed, educational savings accounts and life insurance settlements. Finally, the
stock market participation cost is measured as the total participation fees paid by
the households as a percentage of their investment in stocks. For this purpose,
this study used the ALP Financial Services Providers survey, was in the eld from
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September 2007 until November 2007 and has a response rate of 86.4%. The total
participation fees is calculated as the sum of fees paid per year by the investors
to all the individuals, professionals and rms for conducting stock market and/or
mutual fund transactions/advising, management, and/or planning. It is observed
that, on average, households in this sample invest 6.7% of their share of wealth in
stocks and face a participation cost equal to 2.4% of their investment in stocks.
3.3.1 Measuring stock market literacy, sociability and trust in the stock
market
Unlike Chapter 2, this chapter utilizes the Investing sub-module of ALP Financial
Literacy survey of Hung, Parker, and Yoong (2009) to develop an index for stock
market literacy.37 The Investing sub-module consists of Lusardi and Mitchells
(2007b) sophisticated nancial literacy items as well as ve additional items on
investment markets and products. This measure of stock market literacy is used
to reduce the noise in capturing the household knowledge of the stock market
and study its impact on stock ownership. This stock-market-specic literacy index
is related to the understanding of the stock market and measures the household
knowledge of investing in stocks directly or indirectly through mutual funds or
investment accounts. Appendix 3.1 presents the items used to develop the stock
market literacy index. As in Chapter 2, the categorical principal component analysis
(CATPCA) is used in this chapter to construct the stock market literacy index for
e¢ ciently handling of categorical variables and nonlinear relationships.
Table 3.1 reports the CATPCA results for the stock market literacy index.
The optimal scaling level of all items is set to ordinal, and Kaisers criterion is
used to determine the number of signicant dimensions. From Table 3.1, it is
found that there are three signicant dimensions with eigenvalues greater than
one, explaining 52% of the variance of our data. The stock market literacy index
37The details of this survey has been given in Section 2.2.
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is created as the weighted sum of the signicant dimensions, where the weight is
given by the eigenvalues. The householdsstock market literacy scores are scaled
to lie between the range of zero and one. The summary statistics in Table 3.2
show that the households in the sample considered has an average stock market
literacy score of 0.61. In Panel B of Table 3.2, the sample characteristics of
households with di¤erent levels of stock market literacy are reported. Comparing
the stock ownership characteristics of household groups with literacy scores in the
upper and lower quartile, it is observed that around 95% of the high stock market
literate households participate in stocks, while around 58% of the low stock market
literate households hold stocks. On average, high stock market literate households
invest 12% of their nancial wealth in stocks, which is about double the sample
average (6.7%) and low stock market literate households invest 4% of their wealth
in the stock market. It can be sees that the high stock market literate group has
an average education of roughly 13 years, is made up of largely male respondents
(around 68%), with an average income double that of the low stock market literate
group, and has large average net wealth. The sample characteristics suggest that,
on average, wealthy households participate more in the stock market and such
households have the ability as well as the incentive to be more stock market literate,
as they participate more in the stocks.
For creating a measure for household level of sociability, unlike Chapter 2, this
chapter utilizes the broader denition of sociability employed by Hong, Kubik, and
Stein (2004), and Georgarakos and Pasini (2011), among others. In addition,
Unger (1998) refers to sociability as the ease and urgency with which individuals
pursue common goals, which will otherwise be impossible or expensive to achieve
if individuals operate in isolation. Hence, household involvement through coopera-
tion in the organization of society is used as a measure of sociability. Based on this
denition, households are considered sociable if they participate in formal train-
ing, make donations of money or possessions totaling $500 or more, participate in
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volunteer work, or spend time helping friends, neighbors, or relatives. The infor-
mation on these sociability characteristics is obtained from various ALP surveys
elded between 2008 and 2013, with a minimum response rate of around 84%.38
The sample characteristics for sociable (with sociability proxy equal to one) and
non-sociable (with sociability proxy equal to zero) households are reported in Panel
C of Table 3.2. It is observed that sociable households participate more in the stock
market and hold a greater proportion of their wealth in stocks than non-sociable
households. In particular, it is seen that around 73% (42%) of (non-)sociable
households hold stocks and on average, (non-)sociable households invest around
6.8% (4.8%) of their wealth in stocks. The average demographic characteristics
(age, education, and gender) between the two groups are similar; however it can
be observed that sociable households have a larger average income and net wealth
than non-sociable households.
In this chapter, additionally, the household trust in stock market measure is
included to test the independent e¤ect of trust on stock market participation. To
measure the household trust in stock markets, the Trust in Financial Institutions
sub-module under the Department of Labor (DOL) Pilot survey is used. This
survey, elded from June 2011 until August 2011, has a response rate of 85.04%.
This study incorporates three questions about household level of trust in the stock
market, trust in stockbrokers and trust in investment advisers. The choices of
responses range from 1 (I do not trust at all) to 5 (I trust completely). The
average of the responses to the aforementioned questions is taken, and that average
is scaled between zero and one, where zero corresponds to households who have
the lowest trust in stock market and one corresponds to those with the highest
level of trust in stock market. While previous studies such as Guiso, Sapienza,
38More specically, participation in formal training data is from the Financial Decision-making
survey, with a response rate of 97.74%; the charity donations data is from the Health and
Retirement Study (Well Being module 62), with a response rate of 83.94%; and we use the
Health and Retirement Study (Well Being module 66), which has a response rate of 97.81%, to
obtain information on participation in volunteer work, and time spent helping friends, neighbors
or relatives.
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and Zingales (2008) use trust in bank o¢ cials and nancial advisers as a proxy for
personalized trust in stock market, the measure in this study is more specic to
household trust relating to stock market investment decisions.39
The summary statistics in Table 3.2 show that the investigated households in
this study have an average trust score of 33%. From the correlations reported in
Table 3, it can be observed that the key variables stock market literacy, sociability
and trust measures are not highly correlated with each other.
3.3.2 Measuring demographic and psychological characteristics
This study considers the key demographic characteristics related to stock ownership
decisions in the literature, including age, education, employed (indicator for being
an employee), male dummy, income and net wealth. For example, Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2008) nd that age is negatively related to stock ownership and
investment in stocks, while employment is positively related to participation in
the risky assets. They further report that males and investors with a college
education have a higher proportion of investment in stocks, while employment
increases the share of investment in risky assets. Likewise, Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2008), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), Georgarakos and Pasini (2011)
and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) report the importance of education for
stock market participation; Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) and van Rooij, Lusardi,
and Alessie (2011) nd a signicant role of gender, observing that stock market
participation is much lower among women than men; Haliassos and Jappelli (2002),
Campbell (2006) and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) show that stock market
participation increases strongly with income and wealth; and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2004) reports that non-nancial income is positively related to both the stock
ownership and share of investment in stocks.
39This study also considers the trust in nancial market, which is a more general measure of
trust as compare to the measure of stock-market-specic trust. The results with trust in nancial
market are reported in additional analysis section.
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This study obtains the demographic characteristic variables  age, education,
employed, and gender  information from the ALP household information. The
selected sample of respondents in this study is aged between 18 and 93. As can
be seen from Table 3.2, the average age of the respondents is around 51 and the
average number of years in education is around 12, with about 42% males and 62%
of respondents in employment. The E¤ects of the Financial Crisis survey is again
used to calculate householdstotal income as the sum of respondentsand their
partnersmonthly income from work and other sources. The summary statistics in
Table 3.2 show that, on average, households in this studys sample have a monthly
income of around $7000. To measure net wealth, this chapter uses the HRS Q
Income and Assets section survey that is elded between June 2009 and August
2013 and has a response rate of 97.74%. This work calculates net wealth as the
total value of all assets (excluding equity wealth) minus total household debt.
In a similar way as in Chapter 2, the analysis in this chapter includes a large
set of psychological characteristic variables, including economic shock, time prefer-
ence, future expectations, self-condence, sense of commitment, and risk aversion.
Except for socialibility variable, all the psychological variables are constructed in
a similar way as in Section 2.2.3.40 The summary statistics from Table 3.2 show
that households in the sample investigated in this chapter on average are largely
optimists but at the same time risk averse, with low expectations of the future.
Further, it is observed that the households on average are moderately self-condent
and committed. From Table 3.3, it is found that overall the psychological char-
acteristics are not strongly correlated with each other, with negative correlations
noted between future expectations and risk aversion.
40The exact details of the psychological variables are provided in Appendix 2.3.
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3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Who participates in stock markets?
This section investigates the importance of stock market literacy, sociability, trust
and other household characteristics for stock market participation. The following
binary choice model is tested for the participation condition in Equation (3.4):
Stock_probi = 1SLi + 2SOi + 3TRi + 4AGi + 5EDi + 6EMi
+7MAi + 8INi + 9NWi+10ESi + 11FEi + 12FEi
+13RAi + 14SCi + 15SMi + 16TPi+"i (3.4)
and "i  N(0; 1);
where the response variable Stock_prob on the left hand side is the probability
of holding stocks. The independent variables on the right hand side are stock
market literacy (SL), sociability (SO), trust (TR), age (AG), education (ED),
employment (EM), male (MA), income (IN), net wealth (NW), economic shock
(ES), future expectations (FE), self-condence (SC), sense of commitment (CM),
risk aversion (RA) and time preference (TP).
The rst set of results is reported in Table 3.4. In contrast to margins reported
in Chapter 2, this section reports the fully standardized coe¢ cients to accurately
measure the relative association of variables among the various probit models.
Winship and Mare (1984), Williams (2009) and Mood (2010) argue that when in-
cluding di¤erent predictor variables in the various probit model specications, the
scaling of the response variable changes and therefore the changes in estimated
coe¢ cients might not entirely be due to the suppressor. Standardizing only the
response variable does not adequately x the scaling issue and hence a full stan-
dardization (that is, standardization of both response and explanatory variables) is
performed. In this way, the changes to reported coe¢ cient estimates in the vari-
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ous nested model specications can be accurately associated with the suppression
e¤ect rather than the scaling e¤ect (see Long and Freese, 2006 for details).
The results show that stock market literacy, sociability and trust are strongly
signicant when considered independently. Moreover, the e¤ect of sociability re-
mains signicant contemporaneously with trust. This is in line with the works of
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) and Geor-
garakos and Pasini (2011), who nd that trust and sociability play distinct roles
for stock market participation. However, when stock market literacy is introduced,
the relationship between sociability and participation vanishes; and what matters
is stock market literacy, along with trust, which is also strongly signicant. This
nding is also consistent with those documented by Hilgerth, Hogarth, and Bev-
erly (2003), Cardak and Wilkins (2009), Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010),
and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), showing that more nancially literate
people are more likely to invest in the stock market. These results indicate that
sociability actually proxies for stock market awareness, which a¤ects stock mar-
ket participation. In terms of demographic characteristics, it is found that age,
education, employment, income, and net wealth are important indicators of stock
ownership, with income having the highest explanatory power (around 53%) for
household probability of participation.
Next, this work examines the importance of household psychological charac-
teristics for explaining the probability of participation. A rich set of psychological
measures is added to the model specication used in Table 3.4, including economic
shock, future expectations, risk aversion, self-condence, sense of commitment and
time preference. In doing so, this work is able to distinguish the distinct roles of
stock market literacy and trust from other household psychological characteristics
that can explain the probability of participation. Table 3.5 reports the test results.
It is found that the introduction of psychological characteristics in the model speci-
cations does not alter the previous results from Table 3.4. In particular, the results
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show that stock market literacy and trust remain the signicant indicators, along
with age, education, employed, and income, even after the introduction of psycho-
logical characteristics. Changing stock market literacy by one standard deviation
shifts the probability of participation by around 11%, while the equivalent e¤ect
of trust in the stock market is around 17%. As before, sociability does not sig-
nicantly explain stock ownership, once stock market literacy is accounted. With
regard to the psychological characteristics, it is observed that past economic shock
is positive and strongly signicant for stock market participation. This e¤ect may
be driven by the fact that during periods of economic downturn and large drops
in the stock market, households holding stocks experience a higher exposure to
these shocks. It is further found that future expectations is positive and strongly
signicant, showing that the households who want to leave more inheritance have
a higher probability of stock market participation. Risk aversion remains negative
and signicant at the 5% level, before considering the e¤ect of household trust
in the stock market. In addition, some marginal signicance is found for time
preference, but its relation with participation vanishes when stock market literacy
is included in the analysis.
3.4.2 Analysis of household share of investment in stocks
This section test if trust, sociability and stock market literacy reduces the cost
barriers and increases the disposable wealth that can be invested between the risky
and risk-free assets. The following ordinary least squares regression is estimated:
Stock_propi = 1SLi + 2SOi + 3TRi + 4AGi + 5EDi + 6EMi
+7MAi + 8INi + 9NWi+10ESi + 11FEi + 12FEi
+13RAi + 14SCi + 15SMi + 16TPi+"i (3.5)
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where the response variable Stock_prop is proportion of investment in stocks,
which is measured as total investment in stocks as a percentage of total nancial
assets (see data section for details).41 All explanatory variables are as in Equation
3.4.
The results reported in Table 3.6 show that stock market literacy is consistently
positive and highly signicant in all model specications considered. This signies
that stock market literate households are not only more likely to participate in
stocks but also investing a larger share of their wealth in stocks. In addition, it
is found that trust in the stock market, which is also highly signicant, positively
a¤ects the share of investment in stocks. These results corroborate those of Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), who nd that trusting households have a higher
portfolio share invested in stocks, conditional on participation. Further, accounting
for household trust in the stock market does not change the relationship or the
signicance of stock market literacy. Changing stock market literacy or trust in the
stock market by one standard deviation increases the share of stocks in a household
portfolio by 0.087 standard deviation. Sociability remains insignicant in all model
specications and does not explain household portfolio allocation decisions.
In terms of household demographics, it is observed that age, education, and
income have a signicant association with the proportion of wealth invested in
stocks. In addition, it is seen that a large set of psychological characteristics ex-
hibit signicance. In particular, psychological characteristics including economic
shock, future expectations, self-condence and time preference signicantly ex-
plain the heterogeneity in the share of wealth invested in stock market, with past
economic shock having the highest explanatory power of around 11% (and highly
41Additionally, the wealth invested in stocks as a percentage of total assets is also considered.
In this case, the total of households assets is calculated as the sum of total nancial assets
and total value of farm equity livestock and equipment, non-farm partnerships, and all other
assets (such as trusts, limited partnerships, hedge funds, commodities, timber or mineral rights,
valuable art, jewelry, metals, coins and collectables). The results for investment in stocks as a
percentage of total assets are not reported, as they are qualitatively identical to those reported
in Table 3.6.
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signicant). Notice that several of the psychological characteristics such as self-
condence and time preference, which did not explain the probability of household
participation in stocks, now signicantly explain the share of wealth invested in the
stock market. This shows that there are distinct psychological characteristics that
explain household decision to participate in stock market and household decision
on how much to invest in stocks.
3.4.3 Analysis of household stock market participation cost
The model framework of Section 3.2, proposes that the household stock market
literacy decreases their participation cost; hence reducing the household cost barrier
to stock ownership. This section empirically tests this prediction of cost reduction
by estimating the following ordinary least square (OLS) model:
Stock_ cos ti = 1SLi + 2SOi + 3TRi + 4AGi + 5EDi + 6EMi
+7MAi + 8INi+9ESi + 10FEi + 11FEi
+12RAi + 13SCi + 14SMi + 15TPi+"i (3.6)
where the response variable Stock_cost is cost of participation in stock market
measured as the total participation fees paid by the households as percentage of
their investment in stocks. All predictor variables are as dened in Equation 3.5.42
The results are reported in Table 3.7. It is found that the household stock
market literacy signicantly explain the stock market participation cost incurred by
the household. The negative estimates for stock market literacy that are signi-
cant in all model specications suggest that households that are knowledgeable in
stock market incur less participation cost. These results corroborate with the gen-
eral ndings of Khorunzhina (2013), Andersen and Nielsen (2011), Jappelli and
42This specication does not include the householdswealth indicator because of the limited
number of observations after including wealth measure.
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Padula (2013) and Campbell (2006) that nancial literacy/education decreases
the household stock market participation cost. The results from the overall model
specications show that one standard deviation increase in stock market literacy
reduces household participation cost by 0.18 standard deviation and this result
is signicant at a 10% tolerance level. Further, it is observed that sociability is
insignicant in all model specications, substantiating the earlier assertion that par-
ticipation cost is a function of stock market literacy rather than sociability. The
conclusions remain the same when incorporating the inuence of psychological
characteristics. For household demographics, it is found that age and employment
are negative and signicant at a 5% tolerance level, depicting a reduction in the
household participation cost.
3.5 Additional analysis
3.5.1 The e¤ect of sociability on stock market participation
The results thus far provide a consistent picture that stock market literate house-
holds and households that trust the stock market are more likely to participate
in the stock market. These two characteristics concurrently explain participation.
Moreover, the results indicate that sociability does not explain participation per se,
but rather mirrors stock market literacy. To further analyze this, separate inves-
tigation is carried out in this section on what explains stock market participation
among high sociability and low sociability households. This section uses proxy for
sociability that denes households to be sociable if they participate in formal train-
ing, make donations of money or possessions totaling $500 or more, participate in
volunteer work, or spend time helping friends, neighbors, or relatives. Using this
proxy, the high sociability households are dened as those that participate in two
or more sociable activities and low sociability households are dened as those that
participate in at most one sociable activity.
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The test results for the two groups are reported in Table 3.8. Interestingly, it is
found that stock market literacy is strongly signicant for both high sociability and
low sociability households. Moreover, although sociability is signicant for both
groups initially, it becomes insignicant once stock market literacy is considered.
Also, it is observed that the trust in stock market is highly signicant only for high
sociable household groups. The results of this table conrm that no matter how
sociable a household is, stock market literacy signicantly explains their probability
of owning stocks. Further, for high sociable household groups, trust has signicant
explanatory power for participation.
In order to further understand the role of sociability, this section segregates
high and low sociability groups further into high and low stock market literacy
groups. Households with the stock market literacy index score above (below) the
median are considered high (low) stock market literate. The motivation here is
to investigate if high sociability increases the probability of participation for those
households who have low stock market literacy and whether high stock market
literacy increases the probability of participation for households with low sociability.
Table 3.9 reports the results for these two household groups. It is found that
sociability is insignicant for high sociable but low stock market literate households.
As expected, stock market literacy is insignicant for this household group and as in
the previous table, trust remains strongly signicant. For the low sociable but high
stock market literate household groups, stock market literacy remains a signicant
determinant of participation. These results conrm that sociability does not play
an important role for participation, while stock market literacy remains a signicant
determinant of stock ownership even among the households with low sociability.
Hence, the results do not provide supportive evidence of participation explained
by social interactions with cheaper information sharing, and peer-group e¤ects;
however participation can be explained by the households level of stock market
literacy.
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3.5.2 Alternative measures of sociability
This section tests the association between sociability and stock ownership using two
di¤erent measures of household sociability. First, the household participation in
national elections as an alternative denition for sociability is used. Previous studies
such as Rogers, Gerber, and Fox (2012) argue that participation in elections is a
volunteering act for society and fundamentally a social behavior. Hence, sociable
households will take active part in setting up the organization of their community
and exercise their voting rights. Their research nds that, for voting behavior,
personal means of contact such as face-to-face canvassing are more motivating
than less personal ones such as telephone calls. In this scenario, less sociable
households will be di¢ cult to reach and therefore less likely to participate in the
electoral process.
The alternative measure of sociability in this section takes the value of one if
the households voted in the recent national elections, and zero otherwise. This
information is obtained from the ALP Post Election survey, elded between Novem-
ber 2008 and September 2009, with a response rate of 91.21%. The results with
this new measure are reported in Table 3.10. In Panel A, the household probability
of participation is examined. It is observed that the alternative sociability proxy is
positive and remains signicant in the presence of trust. However, corroborating
the previous ndings of this study, when stock market literacy in the model spec-
ications is introduced, the signicant association of sociability on stock market
participation vanishes, while stock market literacy remains signicant, along with
trust. Hence, it is stock market literacy rather than sociability that matters for
household probability of participation. In Panel B, the household share of invest-
ment in stocks is investigated. Using the alternative measure of sociability, similar
results to those reported in Section 3.4.2 are obtained, with sociability negative and
insignicant in all specications. Hence this analysis concludes that stock market
literacy and trust are the key indicators of household stock ownership decisions.
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In addition to the above alternative measure of sociability, this section also test
whether the results obtained through previous proxies of sociability are robust in
presence of the sociability measure utilized in Chapter 2. It also allows to test
if the sociability measure adopted in Chaper 2 proxies more broader measure of
sociability used in this work. The details of this measure of sociability is given
in Section 2.2. The results with this measure of sociability are reported in Table
3.11. From Panel A, it can be observed that stock market literacy and trust in
stock market characteristics have independent and signicant association with the
probability of stock market participation. In addition, unlike the ndings with two
previous sociability proxies, sociability measure employed in this test do not have
any association with stock market participation. Furthermore, results suggest that
sociability measure used in this test has no association with proportion of invest-
ment in stocks. These ndings helps to conclude that the independent relationship
of stock market literacy and trust with stock market participation decision remains
robust to di¤erent measures of sociability.
3.5.3 Stock market literacy and sociability interaction
Section 3.5.1 tests the association of stock market literacy and sociability with
stock market participation while grouping households in di¤erent categories and
running separate regression. There are numerous evidences suggesting that the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient for a variable of interest cannot be compared across the
groups. However, this study does not compare the magnitude of the coe¢ cients,
and it is only used to determine whether stock market literacy and sociability
explain the stock market decisions of di¤erent groups. However, in order to obtain
a clean relationship between these indicators, this section utilizes interaction term
between stock market literacy and sociability to determine their conditional e¤ects
on stock market participation. The new emperical specication constitutes stock
market literacy, sociability, interaction between stock market literacy and sociability
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and all the explanatory variables used in earlier specications.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3.12. From Column 1 to 3, it is
found that stock market literacy consistently explains the stock market participa-
tion decision of the households who are not social at all. On the other hand, it is
found that sociability does not explain the likelihood of participating in the stock
market of the households who have no stock market literacy. From the interaction
term, it can be concluded that the e¤ect of stock market literacy are independent
of the e¤ect of sociability on stock market participation decision. Column 4 to
5 of Panel A presents the estimates with proportion of investment in stock as a
dependent variable in ordinary least square regression. The results suggest that
both stock market literacy and sociability are unable to explain the proportion
of investment in the stocks. Further, it is observed that for both completely non-
social and stock market illiterate households, trust explains both the likelihood and
the proportion of investment in stocks. In Panel B of Table 3.12, the alternative
denition of sociability is used as in Section 3.5.2. From the results it is observed
that similar set of estimates are obtained while adopting the alternative measure of
sociability. However, with the new measure of sociability, the stock market literacy
is able to explain the proportion of wealth invested in stocks in addition to the
likelihood of stock market participation. These results again signify that it is stock
market literacy rather than sociability that explain the stock market participation
decision.
3.5.4 An alternative measure of trust
The measure of the household trust used in this study is specic to stock market. In
order to test if the results obtained in Section 3.4 are robust to di¤erent measures
of trust, this section utilizes the household trust in nancial market measure, which
is a more general measure of household trust. In this study, trust in nancial market
is measured by using the Trust in Financial Institutions module of ALP Department
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of Labor (DOL) Pilot survey. Five questions are used to measure trust that ask
individuals to what level they trust the stock market, banks, insurance companies,
stock brokers and investment advisers. The average of the responses on these
questions is taken, and then this average is scaled between zero and one in such a
way that zero corresponds to the households who do not trust nancial market at
all, and one corresponds to the households who completely trust nancial market.
Table 3.13 reports the results with the trust in nancial market measure. In
Panel A, the household probability of participation is examined. The results signify
that in presence of trust in nancial market indicator, stock market literacy retains
signicance of relationship with stock market participation. Simultaneously, socia-
bility still remains insignicant in presence of both stock market literacy and trust.
Hence, the results suggest that both trust and stock market literacy have inde-
pendent signicant e¤ect on stock market participation. The Panel B explores the
household share of investment in stocks while using trust in nancial market mea-
sure. It is observed that, as with the stock-market-specic measure of trust, the
stock market literacy has signicant association with proportion of wealth invested
in stocks. In addition, the household trust in nancial market also signicantly
relates to the household proportion of investment in stocks. Hence it can be con-
cluded that stock market literacy is associated with stock market participation in
presence of di¤erent measures of trust.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter utilizes the standard two-asset portfolio framework to assess the
distinct channels of stock market literacy and trust that simultaneously explain
household stock ownership decisions. Additionally, this study investigates if the
previously documented evidence for sociability is in fact capturing the role of stock
market literacy, and hence whether it is literacy, rather than sociability, that matters
for understanding stock market participation. This chapter constructs a stock-
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market-specic literacy measure and investigates the factors that explain household
decisions to participate in the stock market and their wealth allocation in the
stock market. Moreover, using a rich set of household psychological characteristic,
including past economic shocks, future expectations, risk aversion, self-condence,
sense of commitment, and time preference, this study explains the heterogeneity
observed in stock market participation.
The results indicate that stock market literate and trusting households are
more likely to participate in stocks and invest a higher proportion of their wealth
in the stock market. These two independent household characteristics concurrently
remain signicant even after accounting for several other important psychological
characteristics. It is observed that changing stock market literacy by one standard
deviation shifts the probability of participation by 11%, while the equivalent e¤ect
of trust in the stock market is around 17%. Moreover, it is observe that trust does
not relate to the household stock market participation cost, which is signicantly
associated with the household stock market literacy.
Further, no association between sociability and participation is found, once
the household stock market literacy is considered. In the additional analysis, it
is found that sociability is insignicant even among highly sociable households, if
they have low stock market literacy, while conversely, signicant relation between
stock market literacy and participation even among low sociable households is
seen. These results indicate that the households with low sociability invest in
stocks if they are stock market literate; and hence participation is explained by the
household level of stock market literacy rather than their level of sociability. Similar
results are obtained while testing an interaction model, where stock market literacy
consistently explains the stock market participation decision while sociability has
no e¤ect whatsoever.
Further, it is observed that a large set of household psychological character-
istics play an important role in the household investment decision making. The
100
results signify that past economic shocks and future expectations explain household
probability of participation, and several other psychological characteristics such as
self-condence and time preference, along with past economic shocks and future
expectations, explain household portfolio choice decision of how much to invest in
stocks. The ndings of this study aid the strategic endeavors of policy makers in
promoting stock market participation.
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Appendix 3.1: Stock market literacy questionnaire
3.1.1 Which of the following statements describe the main function of the stock
market?
[ ] The stock market helps to predict stock earnings
[ ] The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks
[ ] The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those
who want to sell stocks
[ ] I dont know
3.1.2. [Stocks/Bonds/Cap] are normally riskier than [Stocks/Bonds/Cap]
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
3.1.3. Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset
normally gives the highest return?
[ ] Savings accounts
[ ] Bonds
[ ] Stocks
[ ] I dont know
3.1.4. Normally, which asset displays the highest uctuations over time?
[ ] Savings accounts
[ ] Bonds
[ ] Stocks
[ ] I dont know
3.1.5. When an investor spreads his money among di¤erent assets, does the risk of
losing money:
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[ ] Increase
[ ] Decrease
[ ] Stay the same
[ ] I dont know
3.1.6. What happens if you buy a companys stock?
[ ] You own a part of the company
[ ] You have lent money to the company
[ ] You are liable for the companys debts
[ ] The company will return your original investment to you with interest
[ ] I dont know
[ ] You have lent money to the company
[ ] You are liable for the companys debts
[ ] You can vote on shareholder resolutions
[ ] I dont know
3.1.7. A stock mutual fund combines the money of many investors to buy a variety
of stocks.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
3.1.8. If you were to invest 1000 in a stock mutual fund, it would be possible to
have less than 1000 when you withdraw your money.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
3.1.9. Which of the following statements is correct?
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[ ] Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the
rst year
[ ] Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks
and bonds
[ ] Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past
performance
[ ] None of the above
[ ] I dont know
3.1.10. Buying a [Single/Mutual] usually provides a safer return than a company
stock?
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
3.1.11. It is hard to nd mutual funds that have annual fees of less than one percent
of assets.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
3.1.12. Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return.
[ ] True
[ ] False
[ ] I dont know
[ ] False
[ ] It depends on the type of 401(k) plan
[ ] I dont know
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Table 3.1: Categorical principal component analy-
sis results for stock market literacy index. This
table reports the eigenvalues and the proportion of the
variance explained by the dimensions. The total num-
ber of dimensions is 12, which is the number of items
in our questionnaire. Optimal scaling level of all the
variables is set as ordinal.
Dimension Eigenvalues Percentage of variance
1 4.138 34.481
2 1.092 9.104
3 1.004 8.365
4 0.883 7.36
5 0.82 6.832
6 0.74 6.165
7 0.67 5.582
8 0.644 5.365
9 0.563 4.696
10 0.522 4.349
11 0.492 4.098
12 0.432 3.602
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Table 3.5: Behavioral characteristics explaining stock market participation. This table
reports the fully standardized probit regression estimates of Long and Freese (2006). The
robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable equaling one for households owning stocks and zero otherwise. The explanatory vari-
ables are stock market literacy, sociability, trust in stock market, demographic and behavioral
variables. ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stock market literacy 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.113*** 0.113***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031)
Sociability 0.046* -0.001 -0.007
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Trust in stock market 0.203*** 0.165*** 0.166***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
Age 0.109*** 0.232*** 0.109*** 0.226*** 0.107*** 0.108***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Education 0.156*** 0.243*** 0.156*** 0.216*** 0.143*** 0.144***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Employed 0.081** 0.113*** 0.081** 0.102*** 0.068** 0.068**
(0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Male 0.008 0.021 0.008 0.02 0.017 0.017
(0.03) (0.026) (0.03) (0.026) (0.03) (0.03)
Income 0.476*** 0.321*** 0.476*** 0.3*** 0.486*** 0.487***
(0.12) (0.115) (0.12) (0.115) (0.112) (0.112)
Net wealth 0.287 0.043 0.287 0.039 0.259 0.26
(0.215) (0.047) (0.215) (0.045) (0.194) (0.194)
Economic shock 0.126*** 0.149*** 0.126*** 0.156*** 0.137*** 0.137***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
Future expectations 0.105** 0.178*** 0.105** 0.163*** 0.091** 0.092**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047)
Risk aversion -0.062** -0.059** -0.062** -0.034 -0.038 -0.038
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Self-condence -0.004 0.039 -0.004 0.028 -0.008 -0.007
(0.035) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035)
Sense of commitment -0.015 0.003 -0.015 0.019 -0.011 -0.011
(0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
Time preference 0.012 0.065** 0.012 0.047* -0.002 -0.002
(0.03) (0.026) (0.03) (0.026) (0.029) (0.03)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.301 0.243 0.301 0.266 0.326 0.326
Observations 1332 1993 1332 1989 1331 1331
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Table 3.6: Analysis of household share of investment in stocks. This table reports the standardized beta
estimates obtained from ordinary least square regressions. The dependent variable is investment in stocks as
a percentage of total nancial assets. The explanatory variables are stock market literacy, sociability, trust in
stock market, demographic and behavioral variables. ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stock market literacy 0.210*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.085*** 0.087***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Sociability -0.026 -0.044 -0.050
(0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
Trust in stock market 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.086***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
Age 0.159*** 0.190*** 0.162*** 0.183*** 0.156*** 0.160***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.058* 0.096*** 0.062** 0.085*** 0.055* 0.059**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Employed -0.013 -0.021 -0.010 -0.027 -0.017 -0.013
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Male 0.021 0.035 0.020 0.034 0.025 0.025
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Income -0.091*** -0.077*** -0.091*** -0.079*** -0.091*** -0.091***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net wealth 0.062 0.053 0.062 0.050 0.058 0.058
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic shock 0.103*** 0.131*** 0.104*** 0.131*** 0.106*** 0.107***
(0.017) (0.014) 0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Future expectations 0.085** 0.098*** 0.087** 0.084*** 0.076** 0.078**
(0.017) (0.014) 0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Risk aversion -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.023) (0.017) 0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
Self-condence 0.075** 0.073** 0.077** 0.067** 0.073** 0.076**
(0.023) (0.018) 0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
Sense of commitment 0.015 0.001 0.017 0.004 0.017 0.019
(0.032) (0.026) 0.032) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)
Time preference 0.080*** 0.110*** 0.079*** 0.106*** 0.076** 0.075**
(0.014) (0.011) 0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 0.114 0.122 0.115 0.127 0.119 0.121
Observations 1542 1239 1577 1239 1575 1239 1239
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Table 3.7: Analysis of stock market participation cost. This table reports
standardized beta coe¢ cients obtained through ordinary least square method.
The dependent variable is the ratio of stock market participation fee to total
investment in stocks. The explanatory variables are stock market literacy, socia-
bility, trust in stock market, demographic and behavioral variables. ***, ** and
* denote signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock market literacy -0.248** -0.184* -0.184* -0.185* -0.183*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.03) (0.029)
Sociability -0.039 -0.037 -0.041
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trust in stock market 0.035
(0.026)
Age -0.268* -0.301** -0.294** -0.309**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.036 -0.045 -0.047 -0.044
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Employed -0.255** -0.260** -0.256** -0.264**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Income 0.016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male -0.077 -0.084 -0.078 -0.088
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Economic shock -0.087 -0.094 -0.080
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Future expectations -0.018 -0.013 -0.025
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Risk aversion -0.075 -0.081 -0.070
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Self-condence 0.051 0.044 0.060
(0.018) (0.019) (0.02)
Sence of commitment -0.107 -0.109 -0.105
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Time preference 0.030 0.032 0.030
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Adjusted R-squared 0.055 0.096 0.087 0.08 0.08
Observations 144 141 128 128 128
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4 Financial distress, poverty and nancial
decision making
This chapter investigates the role of nancial distress, poverty and exposure to eco-
nomics eduction in understanding the unwise nancial decisons of the houseolds.
The ndings of this chapter show that both nancial distress and poverty positively
explains the probability of making unwise nancial decisions. However, nancial
distress outperforms poverty by explaining all unwie nancial decisions and having
signicantly higher marginal e¤ects as compared to the e¤ects of poverty. In con-
trast, no evidence is found suggesting that childhood poverty a¤ects the nancial
decision making in later age. Lastly, exposure to economics eduction is found to
negatively explain the unwise nancial decisions of the households.
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4.1 Introduction
While it is commonly accepted that households make poor nancial decisions, it
is di¢ cult to pin down why and which households make such nancial decisions.
Widely accepted explanations suggests that households make poor or unwise nan-
cial decisions because nancial decisions are complex, require trade-o¤s between
the present and the future, require assessing risk and uncertainty, involve emotions,
and permit little learning from past mistakes (Erta et al., 2013). In determining
which segments of population make poor nancial decisions, numerous evidences
suggest that the shortage of money and adequate living conditions faced by the
nancially troubled households can a¤ect their decision making (Orwell, 1937;
Scott, 1977; Karelis, 2007; Banerjee, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2004; Duo, 2006;
Hall, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011).
Despite above ndings, it is not clear what drives the unwise nancial behav-
iour of the nancially weak households. Massoud et al. (2006) proposes that
some nancial mistakes are intentional where household has no choice such as
not having enough money pay o¤ the credit card debt.43 On the other hand,
the unintentional nancial mistakes of the nancially fragile households have been
associated with psychological biases.44 For example, Banerjee (2000), Bertrand
et al. (2004), Duo (2006), and Hall (2008) advocate that shortage of nancial
resources can modify behavior either by making the nancially weak households
desperate or vulnerable. Ellison (2005) links unwise nancial decisions of the rich
with low marginal utility of income and of the poor with low nancial sophistica-
tion. According to Baumeister et al. (1998) nancially weak households have more
temptations to resist, that rich can fulll easily, resulting in willpower depletion. In
43Massoud et al. (2006) document that individuals who pay penalty fees on their credit cards
do so intentionally, where they do not have enough money or they do it unintentionally, where
they have money to pay o¤.
44In behavioural biases, lack of self-control (Agarwal et al., 2009), over-optimism (Mann,
2013), over-condence (Barber and Odean, 2001), inattention (Agarwal et al., 2012; Mann
2013), scarcity (Mani et al. 2013) and lack of nancial experience and knowledge (Stango and
Zinman 2009) are found to explain household nancial decision making.
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contrast, limited cognitive control argument suggests that cognition control is lim-
ited that is depleted when making decisions under the inuence of limited nancial
resources (Robinson et al., 2010).45 On the other hand, Mullainathan and Shar
(2013) dene shortage of nancial resources as scarcity, where scarcity constraints
negatively inuences ones decision making due to the overload of managing lim-
ited nancial resources.46 The scarcity concept itself is related to the notion of
bounded rationality where rationality is restricted due to information, cognition and
time limitations faced by the households. Further evidence of nancial hardship
impeding nancial decision making is provided by Mani et al. (2013), reporting
that many wealthy people habituate the behavior similar to the poor people in
an environment of scarcity.47 Economic and Social Research Council (2012) also
suggests that preoccupations with pressing budgetary concerns results in increased
chances of households making unwise nancial decisions.
In the existing literature, poverty is widely used as an indicator of the nancial
fragility of household. Poverty is measured by comparing after-tax household in-
come with poverty threshold, minimum income required to meet the basic needs.
Since poverty only concerns income, it is a narrow classication of household -
nancial hardship. The broader denition should consider the total assets and debt
households carry. The motivation in this study is instigated by the recommenda-
tions given by the Stiglitz (2009) that advise use of stock of debt and assets as
additional indicators of nancial hardship. Brandolini et al. (2010) also advocate
the importance of measuring the e¤ect of net worth on household well-being and
use of net worth to dene eligibility for public benets. Net worth is an indica-
45The theory of ego depletion presented by Baumeister et al. (1998) proposes that self-control
is produced with a limited willpower stock that is temporarily used up when people regulate their
emotions or resist temptation.
46Di¤erent population segments face di¤erent forms of scarcity such as nancially troubled
households face the scarcity of money while the richer segment faces the scarcity of time, and
both segments face the scarcity of will-power. Though with di¤erent intensities, each scarcity
taxes the cognitive capacity of that population segment.
47Money scarcity might be more critical as poor are unable to use their time to earn more,
while other scarcities such as time can be compensated by money as richer households can a¤ord
to outsource part of their decision-making.
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tor of how fragile a household is to facing transitory income shocks. Households
with high net worth can rely on transferring their resources from the future to
the present when faced with transitory shocks. In contrast, households that rely
heavily on nancial debt to smooth their current expenditures deplete their net
worth and are nancially fragile to potential transitory shocks. Studies that use
wealth based measures of nancial hardship such as net worth in understanding the
nancial decision making of the households include Barwell et al. (2006), Brown
and Taylor (2008) and Christelis et al. (2009).48
This study refers to wealth based measure of nancial fragility as nancial
distress, dened as a tensed cash situation in which a business, household or
individual cannot pay the owed amounts on the due date. Such situation can lead
the entity to bankruptcy or forced liquidation. The situation is worsened due to
the fact that banks and other nancial institutions deny loans or charge higher
interest rates from the nancially distressed household or rm. Following Brown
and Taylor (2008), nancial distress is measured through household net worth,
where the household with negative net worth is dened as nancially distressed.49
Giarda (2013) provides evidence that nancial distress persists over long periods,
therefore the persistent nancial distress can have signicantly higher e¤ects as
compared to the current nancial hardship. In order to capture the persistence of
nancial distress, the individual nancial distress faced in year 2009, 2007, 2005
and 2003 is aggregated. Further, the additional analysis section tests the same
specication with nancial distress faced only in the current period. Furthermore,
this work includes income based measure of nancial hardship to determine its
association with unwise nancial decisions of households.50 The income based
48Campbell (2006) highlights that research on relationship between nancial mistakes and
wealth is severely impeded because households guard their nancial privacy.
49The net wealth consists of net of debt values of household farm, business, checking and
saving accounts, stocks, vehicles, bond funds, cash value in a life insurance policy, valuable
collection for investment purposes, rights in a trust or estate minus credit card and store card
debts, student loans, outstanding medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives.
50Beside nancial hardship indicators, this study considers a rich set of household character-
istics.
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nancial hardship is referred to as poverty and is determined by comparing pre-tax
household income against the threshold set at three times the cost of a minimum
food diet in 1963 by United States Census Bureau. The di¤erence of income and
corresponding poverty threshold captures the depth of poverty, where the higher
the di¤erence, the higher is the level of poverty.
The nancial decisions studied in this chapter relate to unsecured debt, credit
card debt, mortgage debt and investment diversication management.51 For each
type of household nancial decision, rst the likelihood of making an unwise deci-
sion and then the level of unwise nancial decision is analyzed to get further insight
into household nancial decisions. The ndings of this chapter suggest that nan-
cially distressed households are more likely to make unwise nancial decisions.
Further, it is found that poor households behave di¤erently as compared to their
a­ uent counterparts in managing unsecured debt, credit card debt and mortgage
debt. In line with the ndings of Orwell (1937), Scott (1977) and Karelis (2007),
both measures of nancial hardship positively explain the likelihood of making un-
wise nancial decisions. However, it is found that nancial distress overshadows
poverty by explaining all the unwise nancial decisions with signicantly higher
marginal e¤ects as compared to the e¤ects of poverty. Further, while investigating
the level of unwise nancial decisions, it is found that nancial distress positively
explains the level of di¢ culty faced in paying o¤ credit card debt and investment
under-diversication, and negatively explains the mortgage debt to income ratio.
The endogeneity issues in the above specications give rise to criticism that house-
holds may be making unwise nancial decisions due to habit formation in previous
period irrespective of their current nancial situation. Further, it can be argued
51Financial mistakes that have been studied include lack of checking accounts (Hilgert et al.,
2003), excess interest rate and fee payments (Agarwal et al., 2009), use of high interest payday
loans (Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman, 2009), suboptimal use of credit card balance transfer o¤ers
(Agarwal et al., 2009), intentional credit card non-payment (Massoud et al., 2006), inability to
renance mortgage (Agarwal et al., 2012), non-participation in equity markets (Cole and Shastry,
2009; Li, 2012; Calvet et al. (2007), highly concentrated portfolios (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011;
Calvet et al., 2007), disposition e¤ect (Calvet et al., 2009), inertia in trading (Calvet et al.,
2009), excessive trading (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011).
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that nancially weak households may be culturally poor nancial decision maker
irrespective of their current nancial situation (Collins, 1988; Lewis 1959). To
answer this criticism, controls for habitual decisions are included by incorporating
indicators for unwise nancial decisions in previous period and interaction term
of this indicator with nancial distress. Further, both the aggregate and current
nancial distress indicators are included in order to discretely analyze the e¤ects of
persistent and current nancial distress. The results with both aggregate and cur-
rent nancial distress indicators in this modied specication suggest that nancial
distress has signicant e¤ects on nancial decisions that are independent of the
nancial decisions made in previous period. This chapter also nds evidence of
presence of habit formation in household nancial decision making. Nevertheless,
it is found that the households who made unwise nancial decisions in previous
period are not necessary more likely to make unwise nancial decisions in current
period in presence of nancial distress. In other words, households who make
unwise nancial decisions due to nancial distress do not necessarily repeat the
same mistake when facing nancial distress in future. Agarwal et al. (2012) also
nd that borrowers make mistakes in their rst renancing decisions but then they
learn from their mistakes and change their behavior. In short, no evidence is found
supporting the formation of habit or culture in unwise nancial decision making of
the nancially fragile households.
Another stream of literature suggests that certain segments of the poor pass
their values, attitudes and behaviors to their o¤-spring, and consequently perpet-
uate poverty from one generation to the next (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Ball,
1968; Miller, 1959). In other words, poverty breads poverty, where poor nancial
decision making is rooted in the culture followed by the poor. This chapter inves-
tigates this narrative by testing if a household born in poor family will have poor
nancial behavior in later age, where childhood poverty is determined by asking
the household if the parents were poor during the household childhood. The re-
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sults indicate that childhood poverty, except in mortgage debt, does not explain
the probability of making any unwise nancial decision. Simultaneously, it is found
that the introduction of childhood poverty does not modify the signicance of re-
lationship between nancial distress and unwise nancial decisions. Past nancial
hardship can help the households in anticipating the importance of money. The
e¤orts required to manage expenses and income will make the household mem-
bers better equipped and prepared to survive during future nancial troubles. In
addition, personal experience and motivation at later age can compensate for the
lack of available opportunities to learn and develop during childhood. Therefore,
the results obtained suggest that what matters in nancial decision making is
the household own nancial hardship irrespective of their nancial circumstances
during childhood.
The last investigation carried out in this chapter explores the association be-
tween economics education and nancial decision making in presence of nancial
hardship. Numerous evidences suggest that households with better economics and
nancial knowledge show better nancial behavior (Van Rooji et al, 2011; Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2011; Hastings et al., 2011; Yoong, 2011; Clark et al., 2011; Banks
et al, 2010; Guiso and Jappelli, 2005). Exposure to economics education is deter-
mined by using the questions that ask if households have taken course in economics
during their rst, second or third college education. If the households took a course
in economics in any of the college, they are considered having exposure to eco-
nomics education. It is found that economics education negatively associates with
the likelihood of making unwise credit card debt and investment diversication de-
cisions. Further, the results suggest that nancially literate households have lower
unsecured debt to income ratio, face less di¢ culty in paying o¤ credit card debt,
and have lower investment under-diversication. With the addition of economics
education, nancial distress retains signicance in explaining unwise nancial de-
cisions. On the hand, poverty is unable to explain the probability of making any
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unwise decisions in presence of economics education indicator. This nding further
supports earlier analysis that nancial distress gauge nancial hardship in better
way while explaining unwise nancial decision making.
The ndings of this study show that nancially distress is overarching in explain-
ing the household nancial decision making by accurately indicating the nancial
scarcity or hardship. This inference is in line with the recommendations of Stiglitz
(2009) advising use of stock of debt and assets in measuring household nancial
hardship. Further, in line with the argument of Brandolini et al. (2010), it is rec-
ommended that the policy makers and practitioners should also consider nancially
distress households as economically deprived segment eligible for public benets
that are provided to poor population segment. It is recommended that nancially
fragile households need moral and technical assistance in nancial decision making
that will enable them to make the choices that are in their best interest. Any nan-
cial support to poor or nancially distressed households without guidance may not
be e¤ective as nancially troubled households are unable to make wise nancial
decisions on their own. Further, not only nancially troubled households should
not be monetary taxed but also they should not be cognitively taxed as their deci-
sion making capacity is already compromised while making the ends meet. Filling
out long forms, deciphering complicated rules or undergoing lengthy interviews can
further consume scarce cognitive resources. These actions are necessary to ensure
that the unwise nancial decisions made by the nancially troubled households do
not further deteriorate their nancial wellbeing, resulting in their total nancial
collapse.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
data and variables, Section 3 reports the empirical analysis, and Section 4 con-
cludes:
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4.2 Data and variables
The data used in this study is acquired from Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), the longest running longitudinal household survey in the world. In PSID
family unit is dened as a group of people related by blood, marriage, or adoption
that are living together in the same household unit. Unrelated persons are also
considered as part of a family unit, provided they are permanently living with the
family and share both income and expenses.52 In this chapter, the unit of study
is household, where household wealth and income based measures are that of a
family while other household characteristics are that of the family head, who is
the primary decision maker in the house. The PSID collects data on a wide array
of social, demographic, health, economic, geospatial, and psychological indicators.
The panel began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000
individuals living in 5,000 families in the United States. Information about these
individuals and their descendants has been collected continuously since then. PSID
has gathered almost 30 years of extensive economic and demographic data on a na-
tionally representative sample of approximately 5,000 (original) families and 35,000
individuals in those families. PSID spans all age groups, making it possible to ex-
amine wealth data across the complete life cycle. Wealth modules were included
in the 1984, 1989, and 1994 waves of the survey. Another wealth module was
included in 1999 and is used every 2 years thereafter. These wealth modules incor-
porate transaction questions about purchases and sales so that in principle, active
and passive savings can be distinguished. The PSID has signicantly lower item
non-response rates on most of its wealth items than either the SCF or the SIPP.
The PSID follows and interviews the members of a sample selected in 1968 and
52A PSID family can also be made up of a single person who lives alone or shares a household
with a non-relative. The PSID family is broader than the U.S. Census Bureaus family unit
denition, as it includes cohabiters, single person households, and persons related by blood.
Since the PSID family includes several members of the U.S. Census Bureaus denition of a
household, we refer to the PSID family unit as a household which is our basis unit of analysis
(McKernan and Ratcli¤e, 2002). If a PSID sample member is not living with any partner and
blood related or unrelated individual, then the household is simply that individual.
126
their adult o¤spring plus the members of the supplemental sample added in 1997
and their adult o¤spring. With the addition of a supplemental immigrant sample
in 1997, the PSID was restored to full representativeness of the U.S. household
population.
Several prior studies have employed micro-survey data on the behavior of in-
dividual families to explore various aspects of the decline in household saving and
most of that work, such as Skinner (1996), Hurst and Sta¤ord (2004), and Lehnert
(2004) and Juster and others (2006), used data from the PSID (Bosworth and An-
ders, 2008). However, there are other surveys that provide wealth measures such
as Health and Retirement Study (HRS) survey, Asset and Health Dynamics Among
the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The denition of personal net worth
in PSID closely parallels that used in HRS and AHEAD, but fewer and somewhat
broader categories are used (US National Research Council, 2001). On the other
hand, other surveys lack full population representation, for example Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) but do not interview the younger population hence only
representing older population segment.53 Further, Bosworth and Anders (2008)
while comparing wealth measures in di¤erent surveys nd that estimates from the
PSID and HRS are quite similar. Bosworth and Anders (2008) also suggest that
other surveys such as SCF allows to better capture small asset holdings. However,
they further state that the wealth data of the PSID yield very similar results as
compared to SCF. Subsequently, PSID provides measures of wealth accumulation
and saving across a wide range of families di¤ering in age, marital status, edu-
cation, income, and the composition of their wealth holdings making it possible
to test wide range of hypotheses about saving behavior. The development of key
variables using PSID is described in the following sections:
53For a detailed comparison of PSID with other surveys please read Bosworth and Anders
(2008).
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4.2.1 Measuring household unwise nancial decisions
This chapter primarily focuses on the household decisions related to unsecured debt
, credit card debt, mortgage debt and investment diversication. The following
section denes the mechanism of determining household unwise nancial decisions
in each area:
Unsecured debt management Unsecured debt is a vital source for the house-
holds to smooth consumption during nancial troubles. Since, unsecured debt does
not require pledging property, cash or other valuables, therefore, it is easier for the
poor and nancially distressed households to obtain unsecured debt. However, for
the welfare of the households, it is critical that the household debt burden remains
under a threshold level. These debts can be benecial in some instance, but secur-
ing such debt to nance luxuries and other non-essential goods is not considered
a wise strategy. Because unsecured debt carries more risk for the creditors, they
charge a higher interest rate than for secured debt. Excess level of unsecured debt
will signicantly decrease the consumable income after monthly interest payments
and net worth after principal payment at the maturity of the loan.
In this chapter, household unsecured debt calculate is calculated by summing
the household credit card and store card debts, student loans, medical bills, legal
bills and loans from relatives. Following Brown and Taylor (2008) and Cox et al.
(2002), household unsecured debt to income ratio is calculated to assess the relative
indebtedness of the households. High unsecured debt to income ratio signies the
inability of the households to service the debt, resulting in increased chances of
nancial default. Following Hurst and Willen (2004) and Lawless (2015), the 75th
percentile of unsecured debt to income ratio is used as an upper bound to dene the
unwise level of unsecured debt. Households having unsecured debt to income ratio
more than the 75th percentile level are considered making an unwise unsecured
debt decision. Further, it is investigated what characteristics explain the household
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unsecured debt relative to income by taking the percentage of unsecured debt to
income ratio and scaling the reported percentages from zero to one, where zero
represents minimum and one represents maximum percentage of unsecured debt
relative to income.
Credit card debt management Often, households use their credit cards to
purchase items or services they cannot a¤ord, thinking it will be easy to pay o¤
the bill later. What often occurs, however, is the gradual accumulation of large
credit card bills that the cardholder cannot pay o¤ in a reasonable amount of time.
In some cases, cardholders can only a¤ord to make the minimum payments required
by their credit card companies, which often dramatically extends the amount of
time it will take to get out of unsecured credit card debt. Many nancial experts
advise consumers against carrying large amounts of credit card debt. In fact, some
recommend that cardholders only charge the amount they can a¤ord to pay back
within a credit card billing cycle. Thinking of credit card use as taking on a loan,
rather than as an easy way to purchase, may help individuals keep unsecured credit
card debt in prospective and decide how best to protect their nancial health.
In addition, many a­ uent investors also unknowingly hurt themselves with late
credit card payments (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Since, the costs of failing to
pay the minimum card balance would be less consequential for rich individuals than
for nancially troubled individuals; therefore, the nancially troubled households
should be more diligent in monthly credit card payments. However, evidences
suggest that poorer individuals may be more likely to fail to pay o¤ their credit
card debt, even though they have su¢ cient funds on deposit to pay. It is necessary
for the households to manage their credit card monthly payment as the interest
rate of credit cards, even with low introductory rate, shoots up if the households
miss a single payment. At the time of credit card introduction the standards of
acquiring credit card debt was very high. However, since 1970s the standards got
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lowered to the extent that households with almost no income and assets could
obtain a credit card. Currently, an average American family has around $9,000
in debt, and pays around $1,3000 a year on interest payments. According to
Massoud et al. (2007) consumers are turning to credit cards to make ends meet
because banks are limiting home equity lines, gas and food bills are on the rise, and
homeowners are struggling to make their mortgage payments. However, according
to National Foundation for Credit Counseling (2009), in the last 12 months,15
percent of American adults have been late making a credit card payment while
penalty on the late payment has reached up to $39 per incident (Consumer Action
credit card survey, 2008).
Due to the severity of the credit card debt problem, this chapter separately
assesses the credit card debt management by determining the e¢ ciency of the
households in paying o¤ credit card debt each month. The question which is used
asks the individuals how good are they at paying o¤ credit card balances each
month on a scale of one to seven, where one represents "not at all well" and seven
represents "extremely well". The household unwise credit card decision is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the households report di¢ culty in paying o¤
credit card, reected by score of one to three in the above mentioned questions.
On the other hand, the dummy variable takes the value of zero if the households
report no di¢ culty in paying o¤ credit card debt, reected by the scores of ve to
seven in the same question. Additionally, chapter investigates the level of di¢ culty
faced in paying o¤ credit card debt by utilizing the same question used to determine
the unwise credit card debt decision. To obtain comparable estimates with other
nancial decisions studied here, the scores are reversed in this specication so that
the minimum value of the score represents the maximum di¢ culty faced.
Mortgage debt management The mortgage debt payment is another impor-
tant nancial commitment of the households. Mortgage remains an important way
130
of securing assets such as house or car. Without such facility, many households
cannot a¤ord these assets on their own. Mortgage monthly payment, if paid on
time, can boost the household credit score. In contrast, if the households fall
behind on the agreed payments on their loans, the creditors have the right to seize
the security for the debt and sell it to recover their investment. Most mortgage
companies, in addition to looking at the overall credit score, look at all the money
the households owe and the monthly payments on all of that debt. They want
to ensure that the household income is enough to cover all their debts, including
the mortgage which households are applying for. Any miss-commitment in pay-
ing monthly mortgage payment will not only result in reduced credit score and
nancial penalty but also results in higher payments in the next billing period that
will be more di¢ cult to meet. Di¤erent institutions use di¤erent levels of loan to
income ratio to determine the ability of the households to service the mortgage
debt. Since the idea behind dening these ratios is to determine household nan-
cial capacity to pay mortgage debt payments, in our work, we use the actual status
of the household monthly payments. The capacity to make monthly mortgage pay-
ment is determine by using the PSID question asking the household heads if they
are or their spouse/partner currently more than two months behind on mortgage
payments (Read, Stewart and Cava; 2014; Bianco, 2008; Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross, 2006). We regard households as making unwise mortgage debt
management decision if they are behind their monthly mortgage payment.
In addition to analyzing the ability to pay o¤ mortgage monthly payments,
this study investigates the level of mortgage to income ratio of the households.
Oversized debt obtained through mortgage contracts can severely harm household
ability to service the mortgage debt and decrease the consumable income after
monthly mortgage payments. For this purpose, debt on all mortgages is summed
and then divided by the income. Higher mortgage to income ratio reects the
vulnerability of the households to fall short in making monthly mortgage payments
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and face nancial collapse. The chapter investigates what characteristics explain
the household mortgaged debt relative to income by taking the percentage of
mortgage debt to income ratio and scaling the reported percentages from zero to
one, where zero represents minimum and one represents maximum percentage of
mortgage debt relative to income.
Investment diversication The nal unwise nancial decision investigated in
this study is related to household investment diversication. Investment diversi-
cation is an important tool for households to reduce their risk exposure, thereby im-
proving the performance of their investment. Earlier evidence of under-diversication
by the investors is reported by Blume and Friend (1975). Since PSID does not
provide data on household investment in each stock, this study is unable to test
for stock market diversication. However, PSID provides information regarding
household possession of Individual Retirement Account (IRA), stocks, real estate,
current and saving accounts, and other savings or assets, such as bond funds, cash
value in a life insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes or
rights in a trust or estate. In this study, the unwise investment diversication deci-
sion indicator takes the value of one if the household have investment in only one
asset, and one if the household have investment in more than one asset. Further
insight into investment diversication is obtained by investigating the number of
assets held by the household. The number of assets is scaled to lie between zero
and one, where zero corresponds to the lowest and one corresponds to the highest
investment under-diversication.
4.2.2 Financial distress
Following Brown and Taylor (2008), in this study nancially distressed households
are dened as those who posses negative net worth. The net worth is calculated by
PSID and consists of net of debt values of household farm, business, checking and
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saving accounts, stocks, vehicles, bond funds, cash value in a life insurance policy,
valuable collection for investment purposes, rights in a trust or estate minus credit
card and store card debts, student loans, outstanding medical and legal bills, and
loans from relatives. Households facing persistent nancial distress over long period
of time will be more a¤ected as compared to the households who face nancial
distress for short period. In order to incorporate the length of nancial distress
faced by a household, this chapter individually determines nancial distress for the
years 2009, 2007, 2005 and 2003. The aggregate nancial distress is the number
of times the household faces nancial distress faced during these four periods. In
this way, nancial distress indicator ranges from zero to four, where zero means
no nancial distress and four means maximum nancial distress. In the additional
analysis section, the e¤ects of nancial distress faced only in year 2009 are also
tested.
4.2.3 Poverty
The U.S. Census Bureau determines poverty status in order to track poverty over
time, compare poverty across di¤erent demographic groups, and as the starting
point for determining eligibility for a range of federal assistance programs. The
poverty status is determined by comparing pre-tax cash income against a threshold
that is set at three times the cost of a minimum food diet in 1963, updated
annually for ination using the Consumer Price Index, and adjusted for family
size, composition, and age of householder. "Family" is dened as persons living
together who are related either by blood or marriage. These thresholds do not
consider geographical or living standard variations. In order to determine the
household poverty, this work follow Gabe (2015) and Mykyta and Renwick (2013)
by taking the di¤erence of corresponding income threshold dened by the United
States Census Bureau and household total annual income. The di¤erence of these
two measures gives the poverty level of the households (Orwell, 1937; Scott, 1977;
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Karelis, 2007; Banerjee, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2004; Duo, 2006; Hall, 2008;
Campbell et al., 2011).
4.2.4 Measuring exposure to economics education
Numerous evidences suggest that households with better economics or nancial
knowledge show better nancial behavior (Van Rooji et al, 2011; Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2011; Hastings et al., 2011; Yoong, 2011; Clark et al., 2011; Banks et
al, 2010; Guiso and Jappelli, 2005). PSID does not provide any direct measure
of economics or nancial literacy of the households. Earlier studies have widely
used exposure to economics or nancial education during school and college as
a proxy for nancial literacy to capture the individuals nancial capability before
entering in nancial market (van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie, 2012; Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2009). Such proxy of nancial literacy, even though not precise, resolves
the endogeneity issue which is the major problem in understanding the linkage
between nancial literacy and nancial decision making. Further, studies suggest
that exposure to economics education highly correlates with objective measures
of nancial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009). Based on these arguments and
ndings, household economics education is determined by using the questions that
ask if the households have taken course in economics during their rst, second or
third college education. If the households took a course in economics in any of the
college, they are considered as having exposure to economics education.
4.2.5 Measuring demographic and psychological characteristics
This study incorporates a rich set of household demographic characteristics that
can inuence household nancial behavior such as family income, employment,
marriage, education, age, gender and number of children. For example, Calvet et
al. (2009), while analyzing under-diversication, inertia in risk taking, and the dis-
position e¤ect in direct stockholdings, nd that the index of nancial sophistication
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is strongly a¤ected by nancial wealth and household size, and relatively weakly by
education and nancial experience. Agarwal et al. (2009), while analyzing ten dif-
ferent types of household credit behavior, report that the nancial mistakes follow
a U shaped pattern, with the cost-minimizing performance occurring around age
53. Davies and Lea (1995), Hayhoe, Leach, and Turner (1999), and Norvilitis et al.
(2006) associate age to the number of credit cards held, and the attitudes toward
debt. Horn and Cattell (1967) report that the younger households make nancial
mistakes because of inexperience, while the older households make such mistakes
because of limited uid cognitive abilities. Cole and Shastry (2009), Fonseca et
al., (2012), Gathergood (2012), and Murphy (2005) relate lack of education to
household poor nancial behavior. Similarly, Boddington and Kemp (1999) and
Norvilitis et al. (2006) nd years in college to be associated with the level of debt,
with debt increasing with each year in college.
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the sample studied in this study. From
the table, it is found that the average family income of our respondents is $68,900,
average age is 43 years, the average number of years in education is 13, and the
average number of children is around 1, with 55% married, 72% males, and 71%
employed respondents. Further, it can be seen that households in our sample on
average are not nancially distressed, are not poor, did not face poverty during
childhood. From the median, it can be observed that median income of $53,000 of
the sample is comparable to the US median real income of $51,000. From Table
4.2, it is observed that poverty is moderately correlated with family income, mar-
riage, education, age and gender. On the other hand, family income is moderately
correlated with employment, marriage and education.
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4.3 Empirical analysis
4.3.1 Who makes unwise nancial decisions?
This section tests whether nancial distress and poverty has distinct and signicant
association with the likelihood of making unwise nancial decision through the
following probit specication:
UFD_probi = 1FDi + 2POi + 3INi + 4EMi + 5MAi + 6EDi
+7AGi + 8AGSi + 9MLi + 10NCi + "i (4.1)
where the dependent variable UFD_ prob on the left hand side is the prob-
ability of making unwise nancial decisions as dened in Section 4.2.1. The key
independent variables on the right hand side are nancial distress (FD) and poverty
(PO). Further, a large set of household characteristics including income (IN), edu-
cation (ED), age (AG), age square (AGS), number of children (NC) and dummies
for employed (EM), married (MA) and male (ML) that we outlined in Section 4.2.5
is included.54
The test results are reported in Table 4.3, presenting the mean marginal e¤ects
for the sample after running the probit specication of Equation 4.1. The reported
estimates indicate that nancial distress increases the likelihood of making unwise
decisions in all four areas. These results are consistent with and without indicator
for poverty. The marginal e¤ects show that a unit increase in nancial distress
increases the probability of making unwise decisions related to unsecured debt,
credit card debt, mortgage debt and investment diversication by 28, 12, 8 and 9
54To avoid the causality issues, nancial mistakes are calculated based on gures in 2011, year
preceding the period for which nancial distress is included in the tests. However, causality tests
are performed in the additional analysis section.
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percentage points (estimates signicant at 1 percent tolerance level) respectively.
Simultaneously, a one thousand dollars increase in the poverty level increases the
probability of making unwise unsecured debt management decision by 0.7 percent-
age points (estimates signicant at 1 percent tolerance level). The results concur
with the literature suggesting that poor households are poor decision makers when
it comes to managing nances (Orwell, 1937; Scott, 1977; Karelis, 2007), such
as poor households have lower stock market diversication (Calvet et al., 2009;
Calvet et al., 2007; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003).
Further, results indicate that magnitude of the estimates for poverty is consider-
ably low. On the other hand, nancial distress not only explains all four unwise
nancial decisions but also has signicantly higher impact on nancial decision
making. Therefore, it can be concluded that net worth nancial hardship, such as
nancial distress, is superior in explaining household nancial decision making.
In demographics, family income is negatively associated with the likelihood
of making unwise unsecured debt, mortgage debt and investment diversication
decisions. Employed households are found to be less likely to make unwise credit
card debt decision and more likely to make mortgage debt decisions. Married
households are more likely to make unwise unsecured debt and mortgage debt
decisions. Married people may have more nancial and time constraint, making
them vulnerable to make unwise nancial decisions. Similarly, education is found to
be positively related to the likelihood of making unwise unsecured debt decision.
Irwin and Scott (2010) also report that educated households end up acquiring
excess level of unsecured debt households as they face less di¢ culty in raising
nance. In contrast, educated households are found to be less likely to make unwise
mortgage debt and investment diversication decisions. Further, positive estimate
for age and negative estimate for age square show that the household life cycle
e¤ect on unwise mortgage debt decisions is quadratic. At young age, the probability
of making unwise mortgage debt decision increases with age, while at old age this
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probability decreases with age. In contrast to the estimates found for mortgage
debt, the age e¤ect on investment diversication decision is inverse, where young
households are less likely to make unwise investment diversication decision and
at old age this probability increases. Households with male heads are found to be
more likely to make unwise unsecured debt and investment diversication decisions,
while such households have less chance to make unwise mortgage debt decision. In
household size, the number of children negatively relates to unwise unsecured debt
and investment diversication decisions. In contrast, the number of children in the
household increases the chances of making unwise mortgage debt decisions. The
hefty expenses, time commitment and need for an adequate house for large families
is an important factor in explaining the probability of making unwise mortgage debt
decisions.
4.3.2 What explains the level of unwise nancial decision?
This section investigates the characteristics of the households that explain their un-
secured debt to income ratio, level of di¢ culty faced in paying o¤ credit card debt,
mortgage debt to income ratio and investment under-diversication.55 Following
ordinary least squares regression is estimated:
UFD_leveli = 1FDi + 2POi + 3INi + 4EMi + 5MAi + 6EDi
+7AGi + 8AGSi + 9MLi + 10NCi + "i (4.2)
where the response variable UFD_level is the unsecured debt to income ratio,
level of di¢ culty faced in paying o¤ credit card debt, mortgage debt to income
ratio and level of investment under-diversication. All explanatory variables are as
55In investment under-diversication, the number of assets households hold are scaled between
zero and one, where zero represents the highest diversication and one represents the lowest
diversication.
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in Equation 4.1.
The estimates reported in Table 4.4 show that nancial distress positively asso-
ciates with the level of di¢ culty faced in paying o¤ credit card debt and investment
under-diversication. On the other hand, nancial distress decreases the mortgage
debt to income ratio. Further, poor households face lower di¢ culty in paying o¤
credit card debt and hold higher mortgage debt to income ratio. In line with the
ndings of Section 4.3.1, poverty has economically lower marginal e¤ects as com-
pared to the e¤ects of nancial distress. Hence, nancial distress is more important
in explaining not only the likelihood of making unwise decisions but also the level
of unwise nancial decisions.
In demographics, family income negatively relates to unsecured debt to income
and mortgage debt to income ratios. Higher family income reduces the house-
hold dependence on unsecured debt and mortgage debt. However, higher income
households can a¤ord to obtain higher debts, as they have the nancial capacity
to service such debts, reected in their debt to income ratio. Similarly, employed
households have lower unsecured debt to income ratio and face less di¢ culty in
paying o¤ credit card debt. This nding is consistent with the nding of Kim,
Chatterjee, and Eun Kim (2012), reporting a similar negative relationship between
amount of student loans and work status for respondents currently in college.
Further, married households have more mortgage debt to income ratio and invest-
ment under-diversication, and they face less di¢ culty in paying of credit card
debt. Education is found to be positively related to unsecured debt to income
ratio, mortgage debt to income ratio and investment under-diversication.
As in Section 4.3.1, similar quadratic life cycle e¤ect of age is observed on
mortgage debt to income ratio and investment under-diversication. For young
households, age increases the level of mortgage to income ratio and, for older
households, age decreases this ratio. Kim, Chatterjee, and Eun Kim (2012) also
nd that the age prole signicantly inuences the household monthly mortgage
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payments relative to their monthly income. In contrast, reverse quadratic life cycle
e¤ect is obtained, with age having a negative and age square having a positive
association with investment under-diversication. Young households may have
more energy, incentives and skills to manage multiple nancial assets. In contrast,
older households do not have capacity or incentive to manage multiple assets in old
age. Furthermore, households with male heads are found to hold higher investment
under-diversication, showing the higher investment risk they carry. Similar nding
is reported by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), suggesting that females are more
risk averse. The number of children is negatively related to the investment under-
diversication, suggesting that the households with greater number of children may
be investing in more assets to nance their childrens future needs.
4.3.3 Childhood poverty and unwise nancial decisions
This section investigates if poor nancial behavior is transferred from one gen-
eration facing nancial hardship to its next generation. Signicant amount of
literature suggests that certain segments of the poor pass their values, attitudes
and behaviors to their o¤-spring, and consequently perpetuate poverty from one
generation to the next (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Ball, 1968; Miller, 1958).
In this study, the poverty faced during childhood is determined by asking the
household if the parents were poor during the household childhood. The results
reported in Panel A of Table 4.5 indicate that childhood poverty, except for mort-
gage debt decision (estimate signicant at 1 percent tolerance level), does not
explain the probability of making unwise nancial decisions. This nding supports
the earlier argument that it is not necessary that a household born in poor family
will have poor nancial behaviour. Simultaneously, it is found that the introduc-
tion of childhood poverty indicator does not modify the signicance of relationship
between nancial distress and unwise nancial decisions. The Panel B of Table
4.5, show that poverty faced by the household during childhood only explains the
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unsecured debt to income ratio (estimate signicant at 1 percent tolerance level).
Therefore, it can be concluded that what matters is the household personal -
nancial hardship rather than any nancial hardship faced by parents during the
household childhood.
4.3.4 Economics education and nancial decision making
Households with exposure to economics or nance education face lower barriers to
gathering and processing information, and thus, may be better equipped to manage
their nancial resources. Better economics and nancial knowledge and skills will
enable the households make better nancial decision, and hence such households
may be less likely to make unwise nancial decisions. Numerous evidences suggest
that households with better nancial knowledge show better nancial behavior.
For example, nancially knowledgeable households have better stock market (van
Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie, 2011) and retirement planning behavior (Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2011; Ameriks ,Caplin and Leahy, 2003; Clark et al., 2011; Guiso and
Jappelli, 2005; Hastings et al., 2011; Yoong, 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007;
McHugh et al, 2011).
This section proposes that good nancial decisions can help accumulate wealth,
and therefore, nancially literate households may face low instances of nancial
distress. French and McKillop (2014) also report that nancial knowledge and
skills is correlated with higher debt burdens. In particular, the authors nd that
better money management ability reduces the debt to income levels. Gather-
good (2012) nd that poor nancial knowledge is positively associated with over-
indebtedness. A possible reason for the positive correlation between knowledge and
wealth accumulation is that knowledgeable individuals take advantage of the nan-
cial markets such as stock market (Van RooijLusardi and Alessie, 2011). Further,
economics and nancial skills help planning for the future, hence higher savings
and investments that result in higher wealth accumulation (Lusardi, 1999; Lusardi
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and Mitchell, 2007, 2009, 2011; Ameriks et al. 2003). Thus, nancial knowledge
and skills will indirectly a¤ect the unwise nancial decisions of the households by
reducing the frequency/intensity of the nancial distress.
Panel A of Table 4.6 report the estimates that show that economics educa-
tion negatively associates with the likelihood of making unwise credit card debt
management decision (estimates signicant at 5 percent tolerance level), where
economics education reduces the probability of making such decision. Similar re-
sult is found by Scholnick et al. (2013), who suggest that failure to pay monthly
credit card balance is related to low levels of nancial knowledge. Further, Disney
and Gathergood (2012) nd that nancially illiterate individuals are more likely to
report credit arrears or di¢ culty paying their debts. Moreover, economics educa-
tion reduces the probability of making unwise investment diversication decision
(estimates signicant at 10 percent tolerance level). In contrast, economics ed-
ucation and likelihood of making unwise mortgage debt decision are positively
associated (estimates signicant at 10 percent tolerance level); however, the sig-
nicance of estimates is inconsistent in di¤erent specications. Subsequently, it is
found that signicance of nancial distress in explaining the likelihood of unwise
unsecured debt, credit card and mortgage debt management decisions is retained
in the company of economics education. In contrast, with the addition of eco-
nomics education, poverty loses signicance of relationship with the probability of
making unwise unsecured debt, credit card debt and mortgage debt management
decisions. These estimates suggest that poverty can be compensated by nancial
knowledge and skills but the same is not true for nancial distress. Next, this
section considers the level of unwise nancial decisions as dependent variables and
analyze through OLS specication. The results, reported in Panel B, suggest that
nancially literate households have lower level of unsecured debt to income ra-
tio, face lower di¢ culty in paying o¤ credit card debt, and have lower investment
under-diversication.
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4.3.5 Alternative measure of nancial distress
The nancial distress measure that is used earlier in this chapter relates to the
di¤erence of assets and debts. In this section, a di¤erent measure of nancial
distress is employed that does not take into account household net worth. One
possible alternative is the household bankruptcy that can arise due to inability of
the household to pay o¤ creditors. As argued by Mann et al. (2012), bankruptcy
is the remedy for nancial distress, not its cause, a counter mobility institution
rather than an adverse event in its own right. Thus, bankruptcy ling is a weak
proxy for nancial distress, where not all nancially distressed households opt to
declare bankruptcy. On the other hand, Cava and John Simon (2003) mention
seven dimensions of nancial stress that are related to cash constraint. These
dimensions include inability to pay utility bills or registration or insurance fee on
time due to shortage of money, ask family or friends for nancial assistance and
inability to raise emergency money. All the dimensions mentioned by Cava and
John Simon (2003) relate to di¢ culty in managing money by the households.
Therefore, the di¢ culty in managing money, capturing all the dimensions explaining
the households nancial distress, is used in this section as an alternative proxy of
nancial distress. The information about the level of di¢ culty faced by households
is provided by PSID. The question that is used asks the households how good they
are at managing money on scale of one to seven, where one represents "not at all
well" and seven represents "extremely well".
The results with the alternative measure of nancial distress are reported in
Table 4.7. As in previous sections, all other characteristics of the households are
controlled for; however, for the ease of readability only estimates for nancial dis-
tress and poverty are reported. Panel A examines the household probability of
making unwise nancial decisions. It is observed that the alternative nancial dis-
tress proxy is positive and remains signicant in case of unsecured debt, credit
card debt and investment diversication management decisions (estimates signi-
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cant at 1 , 1 and 10 percent tolerance levels respectively). Panel B investigates the
household level of unsecured debt to income ratio, di¢ culty in paying o¤ credit
card debt, mortgage debt to income ratio and investment under-diversication.
Using the alternative measure of nancial distress, similar results to those reported
in Section 4.3.2 are obtained, positive estimates for the level of di¢ culty faced in
paying o¤ credit card debt and investment under-diversication (estimates signi-
cant at 1 and 10 percent tolerance levels respectively). Hence it may be concluded
that nancial distress, irrespective of its measurement strategy, is the key indicator
of household unwise nancial decisions.
4.3.6 Additional analysis
Section 4.3.1 report the independent e¤ect of nancial distress on nancial decision
making. However, the major issue with this specication is that nancial decisions
made in 2011 may be derived from the nancial decisions made in previous period.
In other words, households may be making unwise nancial decisions due to habit
formation in previous period irrespective of their current nancial situation. This
section includes the controls for habitual decisions, thereby acquiring estimates
specic to nancial distress. Another possible issue in earlier analysis is that the
nancial distress is a slow moving process, therefore, it might be correlated to
the nancial decisions in previous period and current period. In order to test for
the existence of such e¤ects, the specication in Section 4.3.1 is re-tested with
allowance for interaction between nancial distress and unwise nancial decisions
in 2009. This section follows Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005) approach by
taking into account all constitutive terms in calculating marginal e¤ects for the
two indicators of interest; that is nancial distress and unwise nancial decision in
2009.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 4.8. The rst key nding from
this specication suggest that nancial distress has signicant positive e¤ects on
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nancial decisions in 2011 that are independent of the nancial decisions made in
2009. Further, the signicant estimates obtained for unwise nancial decision in
2009 indicate presence of habit formation in household nancial decision making.
This result points towards existence of poverty culture where households make
unwise nancial decisions because of their values. However, from the estimates
obtained for the interaction term, it is found that the households who made unwise
nancial decisions in 2009 do not necessarily repeat unwise nancial decisions
in 2011 in presence of nancial distress. This nding concurs with the earlier
argument that households do not make unwise nancial decisions because of the
poverty culture. Furthermore, as in childhood poverty, household who face nancial
hardship may be better equipped to make nancial decisions during future nancial
troubles.
In the analysis, nancial distress captures the aggregate e¤ects of nancial
hardship faced during 2009, 2007, 2005 and 2003 on unwise nancial decisions.
This aggregate measure of nancial hardship will also have e¤ect on nancial
decisions made in 2009. In order to control for this e¤ect, the above specication
is re-tested with only the current nancial hardship, which is indicated by the
nancial distress in 2009. In this case, interaction term is the product of nancial
distress in 2009 and unwise nancial decisions in 2009. The results are reported in
Panel B of Table 4.8. The estimates signify that nancial distress faced in 2009
has signicant relationships with unwise nancial decisions made in 2011 that are
independent of the nancial decisions made in 2009. Additionally, similar results
are obtained for previous nancial decisions and its interaction with the current
nancial distress.56
56In this section, the unwise nancial decisions are calculated based on 2011 gures and
all independent variables are measured from the gures in 2009. This section re-deploy the
specication by placing nancial decisions based on 2009 gures and independent variables based
on 2007 gures. Due to the unavailability of the nancial distress module prior to 2009, only
unsecured debt and credit card debt decisions can be investigated. From the results obtained, it
is found that changing the sampling period does not modify the signicance of nancial distress
and poverty. Therefore, it is conclude that the ndings of this chapter are robust to di¤erent
sampling period and not merely circumstantial.
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4.4 Conclusion
This study investigates how di¤erent forms of money scarcity a¤ect nancial de-
cision making of the households. This scarcity concept links to the notion of
bounded rationality theory, which argues that rationality is restricted due to infor-
mation, cognition and time limitations faced by the households. The chapter refers
to the scarcity of money as nancial hardship and consider both income and net
worth measures of nancial hardship. The income based measure of nancial hard-
ship is referred to as poverty and measured by comparing poverty threshold with
household income. The net worth measure of nancial hardship is called nancial
distress and is measured by subtracting household total debt from total assets. In
addition, a large set of demographic characteristics is considered to control for the
household heterogeneity.
The results of this chapter suggest that both nancial distress and poverty
have positive and independent association with the probability of making unwise
nancial decisions. However, nancial distress is superior in explaining decision
making because nancial distress not only explain all the nancial decisions but
also have signicantly higher marginal e¤ects on nancial decisions as compared
to poverty. Further, while allowing the nancial distress to interact with previous
nancial decisions, it is found that the e¤ects of nancial distress and previous
nancial decisions on unwise nancial decisions are independent of each other. The
positive association between nancial distress and recent unwise nancial decisions
shows nancial distress has independent e¤ect on nancial decision irrespective of
the previous nancial decisions. Further, the estimates of the interaction term
between nancial dress and previous nancial decisions with varying directions
signify that households do not necessarily repeat same unwise behavior while facing
nancial distress in future.57
57For the interaction term, negative estimates are obtained for unsecured debt and investment
diversication management while positive estimates are obtained for mortgage debt management
(all estimates signicant at 1% tolerance level).
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These households may learn from their experience and restrain themselves from
replicating unwise nancial decisions whenever they can. Further, while investigat-
ing whether the nancial hardship faced during childhood a¤ects nancial decision
making in later age, it is found that childhood poverty does not explain the prob-
ability of making any unwise nancial decision. Simultaneously, it is found that
introduction of this measure does not modify the signicance of relationship be-
tween nancial distress and unwise nancial decisions. These ndings suggest that
nancially troubled households make unwise nancial decisions because of their
circumstances, therefore, nancially troubled and nancially sound households be-
have similarly in absence of nancial hardship.
Moreover, this chapter investigates the e¤ects of economics education on nan-
cial decision making in presence of nancial hardship, where economics education
is determined by the exposure to economics education during college. The results
show that economics education reduces the likelihood of making unwise nancial
decisions. Further, with the introduction of economics education, nancial distress
retains signicant relationship with nancial decision making. On the contrary, the
addition of economics education results in poverty losing signicance of relationship
with the nancial decision making. This contradiction implies that the knowledge
and skills gained through nancial education may compensate for poverty, while
the same is not true for nancial distress.
Based on the ndings of this study, nancial distress is recommended as a better
measure to capture the e¤ect of household nancial hardship on nancial decision
making. Further, it is advocated that household nancial circumstances result in
unwise nancial decisions, while their values or culture is unrelated to nancial de-
cision making. Therefore, nancially troubled households should not be left alone
by holding them responsible for their situations and absolving the nancial sys-
tem from its responsibility. In particular, the nancially troubled households need
moral and technical assistance that will enable them to overcome cognitive stress,
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resulting in better nancial decision making. Any income support to nancially
troubled households without guidance may not be e¤ective as nancially troubled
households are unable to make wise nancial decisions on their own. Further, -
nancially distress households should also be considered as economically deprived
segment of the population requiring special consideration from the policy makers.
Further, not only nancially troubled households should not be monetary taxed
but also they should not be cognitively taxed as their decision making capacity is
already compromised while making the ends meet. Filling out long forms, deci-
phering complicated rules or undergoing lengthy interviews can further consume
scarce cognitive resources. These actions are necessary to ensure that the unwise
nancial decisions made by the nancially troubled households do not further de-
teriorate their nancial wellbeing, resulting in their total nancial collapse. The
policy makers should also make sure that nancially troubled households, lacking
nancial decision making ability, are not exposed to predatory lenders, who seek
rent from the household compromised economic and cognitive state. Suitable poli-
cies and good governance is required to protect the nancially troubled households
from such rent seekers.
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5 Limitations and further research
The major limitation of this thesis is that some of the ndings in Chapter 2 are
a¤ected by the lack of required information. The ALP surveys, used in Chapter
2 and Chapter 3, provide information on household psychological characteristics,
nancial literacy, and nancial decision making, but its panel is small in terms of
both time and number of respondents. Specically, because not every respondent
has participated in all ALP surveys, the sample size is signicantly reduced when
the psychological characteristics are included in the specications. Therefore, the
samples considered in this thesis may not be fully representative of United State
population, in particular family income and age are found to be higher than the
United States averages. Having said that, this thesis makes every e¤ort to ef-
ciently utilize the ALP surveys by creating suitable proxies for Chapter 2. As
a result, the sample investigated in this chapter is similar in size to the samples
accepted and used by other researchers studying this area of nance. In addition,
this study is able to carry out a thorough investigation of households even at a re-
duced sample, as it gives consistent results across the di¤erent model specications
considered.
Furthermore, Chapter 3 argues that the household stock market literacy in-
uences their stock market participation decisions by reducing the stock market
participation cost faced by them. The ALP surveys allow investigating the relation-
ship between the household stock market literacy and stock market participation.
However, this chapter is unable to carry out a detailed investigation of the relation-
ship between stock market literacy and stock market participation cost because of
limited data. Similar sample representation issue is faced here where family in-
come and age seem to be on the higher side of the United States averages. For
further research, the investigation can be carried out in detail to understand the
relationship between the stock market literacy and stock market participation cost.
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Such study will warrant the ndings of Chapter 3 and add important value to the
existing literature.
Another drawback of this thesis is that the study in Chapter 4 requires the use
of time series data. Since ALP surveys are not periodically conducted, therefore
PSID surveys, which are frequently elded, are utilized to carry out the investi-
gation in Chapter 4. However, unlike ALP surveys, PSID surveys do not have
information regarding the household nancial literacy. Therefore, even though the
household nancial literacy is expected to inuence nancial decision making ca-
pability, Chapter 4 is unable to analyze the e¤ect of household nancial literacy
on the nancial decision making ability. In order to compensate for the e¤ects
of nancial literacy, exposure to economics education is included in the analysis.
Further, this thesis is unable to measure household nancial mistakes due to un-
availability of the required data. Instead, unwise nancial decisions are studied to
analyze the e¤ect of nancial distress and poverty on nancial decision making.
For further research, with the availability of household time series data on nancial
distress and indicators of nancial literacy and nancial behavior, the distinct link
of nancial distress and nancial literacy with nancial decision making can be
investigated.
The last limitation of this thesis is that it is unable to investigate the e¤ects of
regional and occupational characteristics on household nancial decision making.
Regional characteristics such as culture, religion, economy and political structure
can have signicance inuence on household nancial behavior. However, the the-
sis was unable to acquire the cross-country household data on nancial behavior,
nancial awareness, demographics, and psychological characteristics. Occupational
characteristics can also inuence nancial decision making, however, due to lim-
ited sample size such characteristics cannot be included in the analysis. In future,
the availability of suitable data will enable this study to investigate the house-
hold nancial decisions across di¤erent regions, revealing valuable insights into
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the household nancial decision making in presence of cultural, occupational and
structural di¤erences in their countries.
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6 Conclusion
This thesis explores the household nancial decision making by looking at di¤er-
ent aspects of household nancial management and nancial market participation.
Specically, the role of nancial awareness is investigated in this study, while con-
trolling for the diversity of the households using a rich set of psychological char-
acteristic variables, including economic shocks, future expectations, risk aversion,
self-condence, sense of commitment, and time preference. Additionally, this study
explores the relationship of household nancial distress with their nancial deci-
sion making ability by analyzing di¤erent nancial mistakes and levels of nancial
vulnerability.
Overall, the ndings of this study points towards a strong association of house-
hold nancial literacy with nancial decision making. The household nancial lit-
eracy is found to explain their overall nancial behavior, retirement saving, credit
management, investment, and stock market participation. The household nancial
literacy remains a signicant explanatory characteristic of their nancial behavior
even when household psychological characteristics are considered in the analysis.
Simultaneously, the household psychological characteristics are also found to be
associated with their nancial behaviors. However, it is found that some of the
characteristics of households have di¤erent nature and strength of relationship
with di¤erent nancial behaviors, for example, employment is positively related
to investment but negatively related to cash ow management. In addition some
psychological characteristics, such as exposure to economic shock, consistently
explain many of the aspects of household nancial behavior. Further, it is found
that older and male households are more likely to have lower nancial management
score as compared to nancial literacy score. These estimates suggest that older
household have less nancial management not because of their level of nancial
capability. The di¤erence attributes to the lack of incentive for the older house-
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holds to manage nance as compared to the younger households. While, results
regarding male households fall in line with the ndings of Jianakoplos and Bernasek
(1998) suggesting that males are less risk averse and of Brake(2005) reporting that
males are have more responsibilities to manage. Further, it is observed that future
expectations positively and risk aversion negatively relates to the probability of
having positive nancial spread.
The detail analysis of joint impact of both trust and stock market literacy sug-
gests that stock market literate and trusting households are more likely to invest in
stocks. Both these characteristics of the households retain signicant even in the
presence of several other important psychological characteristics. Furthermore,
signicant relationship between the household sociability and stock market par-
ticipation decision is obtained in the absence of household stock market literacy.
However, the signicance of the impact of sociability disappears, when stock mar-
ket literacy is considered in the analysis. The result suggests that the household
participation in stock market is explained by the household level of stock market
literacy rather than their level of sociability. It is also reported that stock market
literate households face lower cost of participation in stock market as compared to
their counterparts.
Furthermore, while analyzing the association between nancial hardship and
unwise nancial decisions of the households, it is found that both poverty and
nancial distress have positive and independent association with the probability of
making unwise nancial decisions. However, nancial distress outperforms poverty
in explaining decision making because nancial distress not only explain all the
nancial decisions but also have signicantly higher marginal e¤ects on nancial
decisions as compared to poverty. It is also found that the e¤ects of nancial dis-
tress and previous nancial decisions on unwise nancial decisions are independent
of each other. The positive association between nancial distress and recent un-
wise nancial decisions shows nancial distress has independent e¤ect on nancial
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decision irrespective of the previous nancial decisions. On the other hand, the pos-
itive association between previous nancial decisions and current unwise nancial
decision may suggest presence of poverty culture where the nancially weak house-
holds make unwise nancial decisions because of their values. However, estimates
of the interaction term between nancial dress and previous nancial decisions with
varying directions signify that households do not necessarily repeat same unwise
behavior while facing nancial distress in future.These households may learn from
their experience and restrain themselves from replicating unwise nancial decisions
whenever they can.
Further, while investigating whether the nancial hardship faced during child-
hood a¤ects nancial decision making in later age, it is found that childhood
poverty does not explain the probability of making any unwise nancial decision.
Simultaneously, it is found that introduction of this measure does not modify the
signicance of relationship between nancial distress and unwise nancial deci-
sions. These ndings suggest that nancially troubled households make unwise
nancial decisions because of their circumstances, therefore, nancially troubled
and nancially sound households behave similarly in absence of nancial hard-
ship.While investigating the e¤ects of economics education on nancial decision
making in presence of nancial hardship, the results show that economics educa-
tion reduces the likelihood of making unwise nancial decisions. Further, with the
introduction of economics education, nancial distress retains signicant relation-
ship with nancial decision making. On the contrary, the addition of economics
education results in poverty losing signicance of relationship with the nancial
decision making. This contradiction implies that the knowledge and skills gained
through nancial education may compensate for poverty, while the same is not
true for nancial distress. Based on the ndings of this study, nancial distress
is recommended as a better measure to capture the e¤ect of household nancial
hardship on nancial decision making. Further, it is advocated that household
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nancial circumstances result in unwise nancial decisions, while their values or
culture is unrelated to nancial decision making.
The ndings of this thesis are of interest to policy makers and academic re-
searchers. For example, the results suggest that nancial literacy plays an im-
portant role in household nancial decision making. Furthermore, the household
attitudes, beliefs, and personalities are also found to explain their nancial manage-
ment. These additional factors are found to inuence di¤erent nancial manage-
ment aspects with di¤erent natures and signicances. The ndings suggest that
there is no general formula or strategy to improve the household nancial manage-
ment in all areas, or to improve household nancial management for all population
segments. Similarly, the ndings signify that trust and stock market literacy have
independent e¤ects on participation. This perhaps can explain the ine¤ectiveness
of nancial education programs for stock market participation reported in previous
studies. It is also found that trust and stock market literacy not only a¤ect the
probability of stock market participation but also inuence a household decision
as to how much of their wealth to invest in the stock market. The study also
shows that psychological characteristics of the households play a key role in their
decision to own stocks. These results can benet strategic endeavors of policy
makers promoting stock market participation.
Moreover, the ndings of this thesis show that nancially distress is overarch-
ing in explaining the household nancial decision making by accurately indicating
the nancial scarcity or hardship. This inference is in line with the recommen-
dations of Stiglitz (2009) advising use of stock of debt and assets in measuring
household nancial hardship. Further, in line with the argument of Brandolini et
al. (2010), it is recommended that the policy makers and practitioners should also
consider nancially distress households as economically deprived segment eligible
for public benets that are provided to poor population segment. It is recom-
mended that nancially fragile households need moral and technical assistance in
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nancial decision making that will enable them to make the choices that are in
their best interest. Any nancial support to poor or nancially distressed house-
holds without guidance may not be e¤ective as nancially troubled households are
unable to make wise nancial decisions on their own. This purhaps can explain
why authors such as Cole, Sampson and Zia (2009) nd that nancial education
provision failed while nancial incentive provision succeeded in acquiring required
nancial behaviour from the households. Further, not only nancially troubled
households should not be monetary taxed but also they should not be cognitively
taxed as their decision making capacity is already compromised while making the
ends meet. Filling out long forms, deciphering complicated rules or undergoing
lengthy interviews can further consume scarce cognitive resources. These actions
are necessary to ensure that the unwise nancial decisions made by the nancially
troubled households do not further deteriorate their nancial wellbeing, resulting
in their total nancial collapse.
Moreover, there are some evidences suggesting that rms make extensive use of
household nancial mistakes in gaining extra prot (McGovern and Moon, 2007).
They report that, even if it makes the households vulnerable, many rms use com-
plex investment strategies to seek rent from the nancially fragile households. The
policy makers should make sure that nancially troubled households, lacking nan-
cial decision making ability, are not exposed to predatory lenders, who seek rent
from the household compromised economic and cognitive state. In contrast, there
are evidences reporting that rms might not know that the customers are mak-
ing unwise nancial decisions, as the rms respond to observed consumer demand
that may be driven by household psychological biases. In such situation, nancial
market left on its own will not make the households wise nancial decision makers
and may further deteriorate nancial wellbeing of the households who participate
in nancial market. Weaken nancial situation of the households will hinder the
growth and stability of the overall economy. Therefore, suitable policies, good gov-
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ernance and timely interventions are required to ensure that nancially troubled
households make nancial decisions in best of their and overall economy interests.
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